JEM/CL CLAIMS ZAGHAWA UNIFYING, WARNS UN/AU LOSING

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 001889

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E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV PREL KPKO UN AU SU
SUBJECT: JEM/CL CLAIMS ZAGHAWA UNIFYING, WARNS UN/AU LOSING
CREDIBILITY

KHARTOUM 00001889 001.2 OF 002


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ZAGHAWA GROUPS APPROACH UNITY
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1. (SBU) Meeting with Poloff on November 29, cadres of the Justice
and Equality Movement/Collective Leadership (JEM/CL) were optimistic
that it will finalize its consolidation with the other major Zaghawa
military elements in Darfur after upcoming field consultations and
will be ready to resume negotiations within two weeks. Following
the conclusion of the rebel unification talks in Juba, JEM/CL
representatives will travel to Darfur in the coming days to brief
the commanders on the results of the meetings sponsored by the Sudan
People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) and on the Sirte process. The
consultations will focus on solidifying the momentum generated by
the establishment of the United Revolutionary Front (URF),which
formed in Juba and consists of JEM/CL, the National Movement for
Reform and Development (NMRD),and the Sudan Liberation Movement
(SLM) affiliated with Adam Bakheit. They urged the UN/AU to
capitalize on the momentum in the process, saying that the problems
of Darfur "were bigger than the upcoming holidays" and should take
precedence.


2. (SBU) JEM/CL is coordinating politically and militarily with
SLA/Unity, which, the representatives claim, is posed to join the
URF and is committed to participating in resumed peace negotiations
in Sirte. They emphasized, however, that SLA/Unity is "not one
movement" and confirmed independent reports that Suleiman Jamous,
Sharif Harir, and Abdullah Yehia each control different power
centers within the faction. Pressed by Poloff on which SLA/Unity
leader will soon join the URF, they hesitantly admitted that Jamous
had just allied with them. (Note: JEM/CL's reticence to disclose
this information is likely indicative of the tentative nature--and
sensitivity--of this alliance. End note.)

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UN/AU Consultations Essential
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3. (SBU) JEM/CL cautioned that all-inclusive invitations to the next
round of talks will legitimize movements with no military or
political influence and will result in further splintering. "The
UN/AU should revise the strategy for invitations," one of the JEM/CL
representatives explained. "It could lead to one-man movements."
They suggested that priority be given to factions that maintain
formidable military forces. Acknowledging the risk that excluding
some groups could also be detrimental to the process, JEM/CL said
that the UN/AU can only "do the invitations right" if they launch
consistent, direct discussions with the field commanders and
political leaders in Darfur.

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CFC Demands
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4. (SBU) The Sudanese Government violates its unilateral declaration
of a cessation of hostilities on a daily basis, according to the
JEM/CL representatives, and they called on the UN/AU to establish a
more effective cease-fire monitoring mechanism, characterizing the
current arrangement as "useless." Nonetheless, JEM/CL demanded
that, as a signatory to the N'djamena Humanitarian Cease-fire, it be
allowed to participate in the Cease-fire Commission (CFC) and
claimed that AU Chief Mediator Sam Ibok had promised them seats.
(Note: Having denied JEM/CL representation on the CFC, Agwai told
international observers on November 28 that participation by JEM/CL
would open the door for other splinter movements to request the same
status. End note.)

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Deferring to Sudan, UN/AU Risks Credibility
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5. (SBU) JEM/CL criticized the UN and AU for their deference to the
Sudanese Government, on both the political and peacekeeping tracks.
"We understand that we can't get all we want," said one cadre, "but
the UN/AU cannot just accommodate the Government--they must also
compromise." Mentioning China and Pakistan, they said the
Government is only accepting troop contributions for the UN-AU
Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) from allies that were complicit in the
"genocide." While they acknowledged that the Chinese and Pakistani
troops will come under international authority, they questioned both
countries' motives and said that their troop contributions needed to
be balanced by Western forces--or UNAMID risked a backlash from the
volatile IDP population. The "people" had respected the AU Mission
in Sudan (AMIS) from 2004 to 2005, but it had later lost all of its
credibility due to its own inefficacy. They warned that a similar
fate could befall UNAMID and asked for the U.S. to intervene

KHARTOUM 00001889 002.2 OF 002


politically to ensure a balanced force.


6. (U) Tripoli minimize considered.

FERNANDEZ