OCHA: NO EASY SOLUTION TO COMPLEX KALMA CAMP ISSUE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 001888

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, AF/SPG, SE NATSIOS, NSC FOR
PITTMAN AND HUDSON

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/30/2017
TAGS: KPKO PGOV PHUM PREL UN AU SU
SUBJECT: OCHA: NO EASY SOLUTION TO COMPLEX KALMA CAMP ISSUE
IN DARFUR

REF: A. KHARTOUM 1854

B. KHARTOUM 1809

C. KHARTOUM 1795

Classified By: CDA Alberto M. Fernandez, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary: OCHA field officers see no real solution to
the massive problems confronting the very large Darfur IDP
camp of Kalma, a particular target of Sudanese Government
ire. They recommend engagement with the GOS on the issue
while cautioning that the Khartoum regime will certainly
manipulate a situation which it may not longer fully control.
A realization that the status quo, with some adjustments, may
be the best way forward was their ground truth suggestion.
End summary.

THE KALMA OBSESSION
--------------


2. (C) In preparation for his upcoming visit to Kalma and
Otash Internally Displaced Person (IDP) Camps in South Darfur
(December 1-2) Charge Fernandez met with UN Office for the
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) North Sudan
Manager, Mike McDonagh and recently expelled (reftel c) OCHA
South Darfur Director Wael al-Hajj Ibrahim on November 28.
Both noted that the issue of the 90,000 person Kalma IDP camp
has become a particular obsession of the Sudanese Government,
particularly the local state governor and federal
Humanitarian Affairs Commission (HAC) Hassibo Abdelrahman, a
notorious local figure with a very murky human rights past.
The HAC and Governor had recently floated plans to divide
Kalma into several smaller, more easily controlled camps and
local security authorities (and the governor) had threatened
to somehow seize illegal weapons from the camp. Both
suggestions had caused alarm among the NGO community and
among camp dwellers. In the OCHA staffers' view, there was
no real solution to the Kalma camp issue (other than people
voluntarily returning home) and the only real option was to
better manage the situation on the ground.


3. (C) Both McDonagh and Ibrahim noted that the Sudanese
regime had a point. The camp was somewhat unmanageable and
logically should be divided and weapons are indeed a problem
in the sprawling, dusty camp just outside the state capital
of Nyala. But as usual in Sudan, things were not so simple.
Even though the camp is too big by international standards,
IDPs don't see it that way, preferring "safety in numbers,
like a giant school of anchovies, they know the sharks can't
eat them all if they stick together." The only way to safely
break up the camp was with the consensus of the IDP camp
sheikhs who will only move back to the Fur heartland of Jebel
Marra (most Kalma residents are Fur).


4. (C) As for the weapons, they had first appeared when,
after the 2006 Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA),armed members of
the Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM) - Mini Minawi had
appeared in the camp. This was followed by followers of the
SLM-Peace Wing faction. Their presence had sparked an
"internal arms race" in the camp and while some weapons may
have been smuggled in by SLM exiled leader Abdul Wahid Nur,
"most of them had been bought or bartered from SLM Mini and
Peace Wing." In October 2007, the more numerous Fur had
risen up and driven out thousands of Zaghawa (from which SLM
Mini and Peace Wing draw their support) who had then fled to
Nyala town and Otash camp. Supposedly the IDPs in Otash had
refused the turbulent newcomers and the strangely obliging
Sudanese security forces had forcibly removed the Kalma IDPs
from Otash in the middle of the night, using whips and clubs
to do so. The OCHA officers noted that Fur were also not
innocent - not only did they displace many Zaghawa - they are
running illegal detention centers inside the camp, "something
we all know but don't want to admit."

"FROM MY COLD, DEAD HANDS"
--------------


5. (C) As they saw it, arms in the camp is not the big issue.
It is how and why these weapons are used. Many acquired them
because they fear their enemies the janjaweed, who are still
armed. It is unfair to talk about disarming Kalma when
disarming everyone - rebels, IDPs and Arab militias - is part
of a political process tied to a future, viable peace accord
in Darfur. In any case, they noted that the UN Country Team,
led by OCHA, had six months ago tried to prepare a security
plan to at least begin addressing the question of disarmament
in the camps, and perhaps this could be revived.


6. (C) Even though the Sudanese regime had not caused the

KHARTOUM 00001888 002 OF 002


recent unrest in the IDP camps around Nyala, their motives
were indeed sinister. During the war in the south, the
regime had pursued a similar strategy with Dinka IDPs,
promoting a policy of divide and conquer, weakening a people
and they wanted to do the same with Kalma, demonizing it and
making it easier to control. "Of course there are weapons
there, of course, there are some drugs (marijuana mostly,
locally known as "bango") and petty crime!" an exasperated
Ibrahim laughed. The same is true in Nyala town and in other
cities throughout Sudan. A better way to address the problem
was the full, effective deployment of the newly arrived
Bangladeshi Formed Police Unit (FPU) which could provide a 24
security patrol over the sector and also establishing
Sudanese police inside the camp. "But it can't be the current
brutal and hated local police," but one that has been
reformed, trained to meet human rights standards and which is
accepted by the people. So far the local authorities have
resisted such a pro-active approach. They would prefer to
slowly squeeze out foreign NGOs, thereby further isolating
Kalma.


7. (C) While the minimalist approach may be best in Kalma,
there are some useful measures the international community
can push. First of all, the UN and its NGO partners need to
have full, not partial, access to Kalma. The Sudanese
Government is differentiating between essential and
non-essential assistance. It allows in food, water and
medical care but restricts programs and activities in
categories such as rule of law, women's empowerment, and
youth activities. There is also the need to push for
permission for UNHCR to take over camp coordination functions
in North and South Darfur as it already does in West Darfur.
This is currently the subject of sensitive discussions
between Deputy SRSG for Humanitarian Affairs Amira Haqq and
the HAC. But in addition to supporting UNHCR's added
responsibilities, they will need additional international
financial support and to be matched up with acceptable local
Sudanese NGOs (INGOs will not step forward to do this)
tolerated by both the suspicious HAC and equally doubtful IDP
leaders.


8. (C) Comment: The situation in Kalma is almost a microcosm
of the problems in Darfur: a duplicitous and incompetent
government, suffering people who are lashing out themselves,
a besieged and bewildered international community, and no
clear end in sight. At the very least the OCHA staff point
to some basic truths that should underlie many of our efforts
in Darfur: first, don't make things worse than they already
are, second, work with the government but don't trust them or
believe anything they say, third, don't romantize the
victims, and finally, focus on small, concrete steps which
can improve the situation on the ground. End comment.


FERNANDEZ