MINAWI PRESSES QATAR FOR ASSISTANCE

S E C R E T KHARTOUM 001846

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR AF/SPG, NEA/ARP
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/24/2012
TAGS: PREL PGOV SU QA
SUBJECT: MINAWI PRESSES QATAR FOR ASSISTANCE

REF: A. KHARTOUM 01133

B. SECSTATE 98121

Classified By: CDA Alberto Fernandez, Reason: Sections 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (SBU) Please see action request para. 4.


2. (S) Senior Assistant to the President and Sudan Liberation
Movement (SLM) leader Minni Minawi traveled to Doha November
21 to 25 as part of a broader effort to solicit political and
financial support from Arab capitals for his beleaguered
movement. On November 22, Minawi called Poloff from Doha to
request that the USG intervene with the Qatari government to
underscore his request.


3. (S) In late July, Minawi visited Jeddah, where he had
requested Saudi assistance to maintain the loyalty of his
forces, integrate SLM fighters into the civilian population,
and treat the injured (Ref. A). At Minawi's request, the USG
had previewed his visit with the Saudi authorities (Ref. B).
Despite Minawi's reports of initially positive signals from
King Abdullah, however, no assistance was forthcoming.
Sudanese Minister of Defense Abdulrahim Mohammed Hussein
traveled to Jeddah two days after Minawi's departure, and,
according to conventional SLM wisdom, convinced the Saudis to
reverse their decision to provide assistance. CDA Fernandez
followed up with the Saudi Ambassador in Khartoum repeatedly
to no avail.

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Action Request
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4. (S) While remaining the sole rebel signatory to the Darfur
Peace Agreement (DPA),the SLM's inability to secure
resources has left it unable to provide tangible benefits to
its supporters and vulnerable to manipulation by Sudan's
ruling National Congress Party (NCP). Minawi's support in
Darfur--even within his own movement--has plummeted since he
signed the agreement, leading to a breakdown in the SLM's
command and control structure. In addition, the fate of the
SLM serves as a cautionary tale to other rebel movements
considering their participation in a renewed peace process
for Darfur. Post recommends that the Department and Embassy
Doha engage with the Qatari government to encourage their
support for providing basic services to the SLM in the
interests of securing a durable peace for Darfur. End
comment.
FERNANDEZ