Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07KHARTOUM1810
2007-11-19 15:08:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Khartoum
Cable title:  

DARFUR PEACE PROCESS: SIX RECOMMENDATIONS FOR

Tags:  PREL PGOV UN AU SU 
pdf how-to read a cable
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DE RUEHKH #1810/01 3231508
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 191508Z NOV 07 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9230
INFO RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA IMMEDIATE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KHARTOUM 001810 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR D, AF A/S FRAZER, AF S/E NATSIOS, AND AF/SPG
NSC FOR PITTMAN AND HUDSON
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/18/2012
TAGS: PREL PGOV UN AU SU
SUBJECT: DARFUR PEACE PROCESS: SIX RECOMMENDATIONS FOR
SUSTAINABLE TALKS

REF: A. KHARTOUM 01436


B. KHARTOUM 01785

C. KHARTOUM 01776

D. KHARTOUM 01798

Classified By: CDA Alberto Fernandez, Reason: Sections 1.4 (b) and (d)

-------
Summary
-------

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KHARTOUM 001810

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR D, AF A/S FRAZER, AF S/E NATSIOS, AND AF/SPG
NSC FOR PITTMAN AND HUDSON
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/18/2012
TAGS: PREL PGOV UN AU SU
SUBJECT: DARFUR PEACE PROCESS: SIX RECOMMENDATIONS FOR
SUSTAINABLE TALKS

REF: A. KHARTOUM 01436


B. KHARTOUM 01785

C. KHARTOUM 01776

D. KHARTOUM 01798

Classified By: CDA Alberto Fernandez, Reason: Sections 1.4 (b) and (d)

--------------
Summary
--------------


1. (C) The next critical milestone in the Darfur peace
process is UN Special Envoy Jan Eliasson's briefing for the
UN Security Council scheduled for November 27. While
admitting that the rebel factions were unprepared to engage
in negotiations in Sirte in late October, the UN and AU have
set a tentative timeline to reconvene the Darfur peace talks
by mid-January without articulating a clear strategy for
bringing the movements to talks. The much-heralded UN/AU
delegation to Darfur following the "de facto" recess of the
Sirte talks did not result in any substantive tactical
decisions, and in recent briefings for the international
community, Eliasson and AU Special Envoy Salim Ahmed Salim
continue to ask the international community to support its
efforts to prepare the movements for negotiations without
specifying a program--even to a key stakeholder like the
USG--around which international efforts can coalesce.


2. (C) Prior to the Sirte talks, Embassy Khartoum highlighted
several hurdles to a successful UN/AU effort (Ref. A):
disunity within the rebel factions, ongoing hostilities and
tribal conflicts on the ground, the intransigence of rebel
leader Abdulwahid al Nur, regional rivalries, and dysfunction
within the UN/AU team. Each of these factors endures. In
the next three weeks, the USG has a narrow opportunity to
keep the Darfur peace process on track and increase the
chance that UN/AU mediation will result in a sustainable
political settlement by following the six recommendations in
paras 3 through 8. End summary.

--------------
Preparing the Movements
--------------


3. (C) With the exception of intransigent Sudan Liberation
Movement (SLM) leader Abdulwahid al Nur, the rebel movements'
unpreparedness to participate in negotiations is based on

internal fissures not substantive policy differences. While
they recognize that factionalism has weakened their position
vis-a-vis the Sudanese Government, history has shown that the
movements are unable to overcome their internal disagreements
on their own, necessitating outside mediation. The UN/AU
continues to resist involvement in internal rebel dynamics,
but reaching the mediators' stated end game of forging at
most three to four rebel negotiating teams, each armed with
specific platforms, cannot be reached without greater
consolidation within the factions. In addition, fostering
greater internal unity within a critical mass of the rebel
movements and then bringing them into the peace process is
more likely to put pressure on hold-outs like Abdulwahid than
external, punitive measures.

--Recommended USG Action: Call for the UN/AU to set a date
for an inclusive meeting of the rebel groups in a neutral
venue to address their internal problems with hands-on UN/AU
facilitation and mediation. While briefing the Khartoum
diplomatic corps on November 15, Salim provided the first
opening for such an effort when he said that the UN/AU needed
to achieve "some degree of unity." (Ref. B) We should
capitalize on his statement. (Note: This announcement will
also provide momentum to the process, which currently has no
announced agenda beyond the November 27 briefing at the UN
Security Council. End note.)

--------------
Restructuring the UN/AU
--------------


4. (C) The Joint Mediation Support Team (JMST) that oversees
the peace process suffers from the absence of high-level,
day-to-day management to bring cohesion and focus. Eliasson
and Salim's commitment fluctuates. UN Chief Mediator Taye
Brook Zerihoun is also the deputy head of the UN Mission in
Sudan (UNMIS) and will step down from his Darfur role on
January 1. AU Chief Mediator Sam Ibok is the AU's nominee

KHARTOUM 00001810 002 OF 003


for the director of political affairs for the UN-AU Mission
in Darfur (UNAMID). JMST Director Jacques Christofedes
finishes his tenure in late December. The JMST is
overwhelmed with high-quality strategy documents which are
not executed because of its internal dysfunction. The result
is that sophisticated approaches for preparing the movements
for negotiations, for involving tribal representatives and
IDPs in the talks, for addressing the worsening intra-Arab
and intra-African conflicts, for leveraging regional
governments, and for communicating the UN/AU's messages are
never implemented. This dysfunction also limits the
international community's ability to support the process.

--Recommended USG Action: Call for the UN/AU to appoint a
single, permanent UN/AU chief mediator and a permanent
director of the JMST (reporting to the chief mediator) within
the next four weeks. The terms of reference for both senior
positions should state that they are resident in Khartoum,
hold six-month contracts, and oversee both UN and AU efforts
and personnel (under the leadership of the Special Envoys).
They may require additional funding, and the JMST should be
established as an independent political mission under the UN
Department of Political Affairs rather than as part of UNAMID
to maintain its impartiality. (Note: Our contacts within the
UN in Khartoum inform us that there is support for this
approach, but it needs a push in this direction.)

--------------
Winding Down the SPLM Initiative
--------------


5. (C) The SPLM initiative to work with several of the Darfur
movements in Juba has been a useful step in uniting some of
the smaller factions (Ref. C.). The SPLM's next steps,
however, are unclear--as is how the SPLM effort intersects
with UN/AU outreach to movements with more political and
military weight that remain in Darfur. Representatives of
the Justice and Equality Movement/Collective Leadership
(JEM/CL) and SLA/Unity now in Juba want to return to Darfur
to pursue preparatory efforts with the leadership of their
forces but are torn by the vaguely defined--yet ongoing--SPLM
meetings in Juba.

--Recommended USG Action: We should thank the SPLM for their
efforts, which have supported the UN/AU process, and suggest
that the SPLM encourage the rebels still present in Juba to
return to their bases and/or reach out to other groups in
preparation for attendance at an inclusive, UN/AU-managed
meeting of the movements as noted in para. 3. (Comment: This
has the added corollary benefit of removing a distration from
the SPLM while they attempt to resolve their political crisis
with the NCP and get the CPA back on track, rather than using
the Darfur groups as leverage against Khartoum, either
implicitly or directly.)

--------------
Bringing in SLM/Minawi
--------------


6. (C) The SLM/Minawi remains committed to playing a
constructive role in the peace process but insists that it
participate only as a signatory to the Darfur Peace Agreement
(DPA) rather than as a member of the Government of National
Unity (GNU) delegation (Ref. D). Minawi could not maintain
any credibility among his supporters if he subordinated his
movements' interests to the National Congress Party (NCP) and
Presidential Assistant Nafie Ali Nafie, the GNU's chief
negotiator. For the last six weeks, senior NCP officials,
including Nafie and Director General of the National
Intelligence and Security Service (NISS) Salah Ghosh, have
rebuffed Minawi's requests to discuss a formula for the SLM's
participation. The UN/AU's legal analysis has determined
that SLM/Minawi can participate as a signatory because the
DPA is not integrated into the national legal framework. In
addition, the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) and
the SLM both stand to benefit through closer coordination as
partners in the GNU. The SPLM has failed to engage
effectively with the SLM, and the SLM is now resistant to
SPLM overtures because of a lack of trust.

--Recommended USG Action 1: Assist the SLM/Minawi in drafting
a legally sound and public document outlining its position on
participation in the Darfur peace process and underscoring
that it: 1) supports the UN/AU lead and wants to play a
positive and constructive role and 2) is permitted--on legal

KHARTOUM 00001810 003 OF 003


grounds--to participate as a signatory to the DPA.

--Recommended USG Action 2: Facilitate coordination between
the SLM and the SPLM and develop a transparent
confidence-building program to bring the parties toward
better cooperation--while avoiding the perception that the
U.S. is attempting to overthrow the NCP.

--------------
Leveraging the Regional Governments
--------------


7. (C) Complex regional rivalries leave the rebel movements
overwhelmed by a cacophony of competing messages and are one
of the primary underlying causes for the splintering of the
movements. The absence of a comprehensive UN/AU framework
for engaging with regional governments has made it difficult
to channel Libya, Eritrea, Chad, and Egypt's interests into a
constructive process.

--Recommended USG Action: Develop a diplomatic strategy of
incentives to employ with Libya and Chad once UN/AU plans for
the next stages in the process solidify (per paras. 3 and 4).
Working closely with France, such a strategy could give
tangible weight to UN/AU actions and reinforce their attempts
to foster a degree of unity within the movements.

--------------
Balancing Sanctions
--------------


8. (C) Past sanctions against rebel leaders, including those
with strong ties to the West, have done little to change
their behavior. In addition, UN, AU, or U.S. action against
rebel leaders could backfire and jeopardize life-saving
humanitarian operations in Darfur. Forging greater unity
among the rebel factions and advancing a sophisticated
strategy for including tribal leaders and IDPs in the
negotiations are more likely to put pressure on hold-outs
like JEM's Khalil Ibrahim and Abdulwahid. However, it is
worth recognizing that the threat of sanctions could send a
useful political message.

--Recommended USG action: Draft a carefully-worded U.S.
position on sanctions against rebel leaders that balances the
potentially positive impact of the threat with the possible
consequences to humanitarian operations and does not tie the
USG to commitments that it is unlikely to fulfill.

FERNANDEZ