Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07KHARTOUM1720
2007-11-05 06:49:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Khartoum
Cable title:  

S/E NATSIOS MEETING WITH MFA U/S MUTRIF SIDDIQ

Tags:  PGOV PREL KPKO UNSCAPU AU SU 
pdf how-to read a cable
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PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDU RUEHKUK RUEHMR RUEHPA RUEHRN RUEHROV RUEHTRO
DE RUEHKH #1720/01 3090649
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 050649Z NOV 07
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9072
INFO RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE
RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 001720 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR A/S FRAZER, S/E NATSIOS, AND AF/SPG
NSC FOR PITTMAN AND HUDSON
ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/04/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL KPKO UNSCAPU AU SU
SUBJECT: S/E NATSIOS MEETING WITH MFA U/S MUTRIF SIDDIQ

REF: KHARTOUM 1709

Classified By: CDA Alberto Fernandez, for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 001720

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR A/S FRAZER, S/E NATSIOS, AND AF/SPG
NSC FOR PITTMAN AND HUDSON
ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/04/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL KPKO UNSCAPU AU SU
SUBJECT: S/E NATSIOS MEETING WITH MFA U/S MUTRIF SIDDIQ

REF: KHARTOUM 1709

Classified By: CDA Alberto Fernandez, for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary: S/E Natsios met November 3 with MFA
Undersecretary and NCP insider Mutrif Siddiq. Siddiq said
that Qaddafi's statement at the beginning of the Sirte talks
on Darfur had "spoiled the show" and recommended that the
talks be moved to South Africa. Siddiq outlined ways he had
facilitated rebel attendance at Sirte including paying for
SLM/U rebel Suleiman Jamous' passport fee. On UNAMID
deployment, Siddiq claimed the UN complicates processing of
paperwork for visas and customs clearances by submitting
incorrect or incomplete forms, which often arrive at the last
minute, but then blames any delays on the Sudanese. On troop
contributions, Siddiq requested that the troops from African
countries be allowed to deploy first to see if troops from
non-African countries are really required. As a compromise,
he suggested strengthening UNAMID with non-infantry
contributions from Jordan, South Africa, Russia, or Pakistan
and felt that Sudan would be more forthcoming with the
deployment of non-African unit once the force is bing set up
in earnest.. Siddiq said the impasse on the CPA had been
resolved and that a joint implementation committee would
follow up on specific points in the coming weeks (reftel).
End summary.

SIRTE
--------------


2. (C) A/E Natsios provided U/S Muttrif Siddiq with a
read-out on his meetings with Darfur rebel groups in Sirte
and Juba, explaining that he urged them to unify their
proposals and designate a lead negotiator as soon as
possible. Natsios expressed concern that the talks had
failed because of interference from neighboring states.
Siddiq agreed, observing that everyone "wants to hold the
keys to the process" and that Libyan leader Qaddafi's
statement "spoiled the show." Siddiq claimed he had advised
Jan Eliasson not to hold the talks in a neighboring state,
and suggested that the talks should now be moved to South

Africa, while realizing that this may not be possible at this
late date. Siddiq also blamed African Union SecGen Konare
for the failure of the talks, observing that Konare had
probably been overly influenced by "brother leader" Qaddafi.


3. (C) Natsios said the rebels told him they don't feel
comfortable in Libya, that they fear their commanders are
being paid off by Libyan agents. Siddiq said he had
information to confirm this, and claimed that Libyan spy
chief Musa Kusa told him that he is paying off (and possibly
arming) JEM leader Khalil Ibrahim. Siddiq observed that
although Abdel Wahid Nur is an obstacle to peace in the
region, he is increasingly weakened in the camps, as shown by
the fact that there were no large demonstrations in the IDP
even though Abdul Wahid had called for them. Siddiq said the
GOS and he personally had done everything possible to
facilitate rebel participation at Sirte, and claimed the MFA
had paid for SLA/U rebel leader Suleiman Jamous' paperwork
and passport fee. When challenged that the Sudanese had
physically removed some Darfuri civil society reps from a
flight to Libya, he explained that this was a mistake
exacerbated by suspicious UN procedures. "They had no
transparency in the selection of these people, and they had
them traveling on UN travel documents as if they were
stateless, these are Sudanese citizens and have a right to
travel on Sudanese passports which we would gladly
facilitate," he fumed. To increase the chances of a peace
agreement on Darfur actually sticking, Siddiq recommended
broader participation of tribal groups, political parties
("not just the DUP and the Communists which the UN preferred
but also the NCP "),and civil society.

UNAMID
--------------


4. (C) S/E Natsios warned Siddiq that there is a perception
in the West that Sudan is trying to slow things down on the
implementation of UNSC 1769 and the deployment of UNAMID,
pointing out that the resolution says troops should be
"predominantly African," and countries therefore question why
the Sudanese have raised objections to the Norwegian
engineering company when the company would increase the
capacity of UNAMID and the vast majority of the troops will
still be African. Natsios pointed out that the Sudanese are

KHARTOUM 00001720 002 OF 002


making things more difficult for themselves than they have to
be, by not facilitating the deployment of UNAMID, and by
damaging their reputation further on the international stage
by burning Haskanita to the ground when it was entirely
unnecessary.


5. (C) Siddiq, who is in charge of 1769 implementation,
replied that a compromise was possible on foreign troops, and
noted their acceptance of engineering units from Egypt,
Pakistan, and China. Siddiq also took issue with the claim
that Sudan is slowing down the deployment of UNAMID. He
claimed the UN had openly told the GOS that they would blame
Sudan for delayed deployment, meanwhile the UN submits
documents late that are incomplete and don't follow the
correct format, which complicates the work of the MFA. He
contrasted this with the rapid deployment of new Rwandan
peacekeepers with American help. He noted that medical units
for UNAMID are to be non-African, engineering units are
non-African, the police offered are only one-third African,
but that it is in the field of infantry units, where African
countries pledged 200 percent of the needed force where the
perceived (but not actual) duplicity seems to be. He added
that Sudan expected the air assets for UNAMID to be
overwhelmingly non-African with possibilities from Russia,
India, Jordan and South Africa. He said that Sudan would
probably be willing to accept non-African infantry units
(like the Thais) later on once the bulk of the force has
deployed and Sudanese have seen that it is not an invasion
force seeking to overthrow the government, "we have a
domestic political problem with this deployment that we are
trying to manage."

CPA
---


6. (C) Turning to the CPA, Siddiq said the NCP had almost
reached agreement on Abyei (reftel) and that a temporary
administrative area would be established there pending final
status negotiations. Siddiq said the resolution of the
political crisis would be announced before Bashir departed
for South Africa and Kiir departed for the US. (Note:
President Bashir and Vice President Kiir did announce late in
the day November 3 that they had resolved all outstanding
issues on the implementation of the CPA except on Abyei and
the demarcation of the North-South border.)

COMMENT
--------------


7. (C) As in the other meetings with the GOS, Siddiq laid on
a charm offensive designed to demonstrate that the government
is doing everything possible to solve the Darfur crisis and
implement the CPA. This could be due to the threat of
further sanctions in the US (with the Darfur Divestment Act
looming),concern about the crisis with the SPLM, or it could
be because of increased Chinese engagement. Although there
are many reasons to assume the GOS has no good intentions in
Darfur, the GOS may actually want to resolve the Darfur
crisis, recognizing that the situation there has gotten out
of control and could threaten its real concern - power in
Khartoum. Siddiq is right that the bulk of the UNAMID force
that Sudan has agreed to, amounting to thousands of soldiers
representing the majority of the force, is moving slowly
because of internal issues related to the UN and AU. When
confronted with clear, simple requests for cooperation - such
as with the Rwandan peacekeepers and their 18 APCs - they
have moved with relative alacrity.


8. (U) S/E Natsios did not clear this cable before he left
Khartoum.
FERNANDEZ