S/E NATSIOS MEETING WITH NISS CHIEF SALAH GHOSH

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KHARTOUM 001708

SIPDIS

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (CLASSIFICATION PARA 2)

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR A/S FRAZER, S/E NATSIOS, AND AF/SPG
NSC FOR PITTMAN AND HUDSON
ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/05/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL KPKO UNSC SU
SUBJECT: S/E NATSIOS MEETING WITH NISS CHIEF SALAH GHOSH


KHARTOUM 00001708 001.2 OF 003


Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Alberto Fernandez, reasons: 1.4 (b) an
d (d)


1. (C) Summary: S/E Natsios met with GNU Intelligence Chief
Salah Ghosh November 2 during the Special Envoy's visit to
Sudan. On UNAMID troops contributions, Ghosh said President
Bashir's preference is for African or Muslim troops. He said
the Norwegian engineering unit is a problem, but the Thai
unit might be acceptable at some later date. On the IDP
camps in Darfur, Ghosh said the SAF must stop JEM and other
rebel groups from sparking conflict in the camps, but
promised to cooperate with the international community. On
Abyei, Ghosh said "powerful forces" in the SPLM (meaning
Abyei locals such as Deng Alor) are blocking a possible
agreement, but that President Bashir and Salva Kiir had
agreed to an interim administration for Abyei. Ghosh said
the deployment of the Joint Integrated Units throughout the
South, including oil fields, must occur as soon as possible.
On elections, Ghosh said the NCP wants a strong partnership
with the SPLM so that both parties can lead the country
following the elections. On the current political crisis,
Ghosh invited the assistance of the US which he said might be
useful at the right moment. End summary.


2. (C) Special Envoy Andrew Natsios met November 2 with GOS
Intelligence Services Chief Salah Ghosh. S/E Natsios thanked
Ghosh for his cooperation on counter-terrorism intelligence,
including in disrupting an Al-Qa'ida related plot in August

2007. Regarding the current NCP/SPLM political crisis and
the Darfur peace talks in Sirte, Natsios made clear that the
US had nothing to do with the SPLM's supposed encouragement
of some Darfur rebels to stay in Juba and not to attend the
talks in Sirte. S/E Natsios explained that he is putting
maximum pressure on the rebels to attend and that SPLM
President Kiir had promised him that the SPLM was not
encouraging the rebels to boycott Sirte. The U.S. had also
not prompted the SPLM walk out from the Government of
National Unity on October 11.

UNAMID DEPLOYMENT
--------------


2. (C) S/E Natsios said it would be very helpful if Sudan
would accept some more non-African troops for UNAMID
deployment, to ensure the technical capacity of the UN/AU
forces. Although some suspect that the UN is using Sudan as
a scapegoat to cover for its own slowness in deploying
UNAMID, the perception that Sudan was once again obstructing
was growing in New York, even though Sudan had just been
helpful in rapidly moving in 800 additional Rwandan
peacekeepers and their 18 APCs as part of the Heavy Support
Package. In particular, he encouraged the Sudanese to accept,
at least, the battalion of Thai troops. Natsios suggested
that perhaps it would be useful to establish an acceptable
percentage of foreign troops, such as twenty percent.
Natsios explained this in the context of the impending Darfur
Divestment Act, pointing out that the Administration had
testified that now is not the time to impose additional
punitive measures against Sudan given recent positive steps
taken by the Sudanese. However, he explained that if UNAMID
does not deploy rapidly as an effective force, this position
would be difficult to sustain in the face of domestic
pressure in the US. Natsios also pointed out that an
effective UNAMID force is very much in the interests of the
Sudanese government, to assist effectively with the chaotic
situation in Darfur, which could very easily spiral out of
control.


3. (C) Ghosh believed that the UN was being less than honest
to the US on the challenges facing UNAMID deployment. He
replied that President Al-Bashir had made a political
commitment to having mostly African and Muslim UN troops
deployed to Darfur. He explained that there would be trouble
with domestic constituencies (such as extremist Islamic
groups) if there are too many non-Africans and/or
non-Muslims. He suggested that there is no need to fight
about the presence of foreign troops and pointed out that
there should be non-African troops only if there are not
enough Africans. Nonetheless, Ghosh accepted the point about
the need for qualified technical troops and said they could
be non-African. He said Sudan had no objection to some Thai
troops, but not a whole battalion. Ghosh said troops from
Scandinavia would be unacceptable because of the furor over
the cartoons about the Prophet Muhammad in Scandinavia a few
years ago. Ghosh added that the NCP had spoken to

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"mujahideen" forces (most likely Arab Popular Defense and
militia units allied with the NCP) in Darfur to calm them
down but they were very suspicious that the regime had sold
them out and had agreed to western troops in Darfur. He noted
that Sudan had accepted non-African units from China and
Pakistan, and that they were willing to accept helicopter
units from non-African countries, "including America", he
joked, but the composition of infantry units is a sensitive
issue because it affects President Al-Bashir's credibility in
front of his own public.

DARFUR IDP CAMPS
--------------


4. (C) S/E Natsios expressed thanks for allowing the US Air
Force planes assist with the deployment of the Rwandan AMIS
battalions. However, S/E Natsios pointed out that SAF
actions in Haskanita and Mujaheria had cast the GOS in a very
bad light (even though they were responding to a plea fo help
from AMIS and retaliating to rebel attacks outside Darfur. He
expressed further concern about reports of forced relocations
of IDPs in Kalma camp. Ghosh explained that if there is
fighting in the camps, the GOS has a responsibility to go
into the camps and stop it. He claimed that Justice and
Equality (JEM) fighters are starting conflicts in the camps
and said the SAF must stop this, there was arms smuggling
going on as different rebel factions tried to take over these
dependent populations. However, Ghosh said the GOS is
willing to cooperate with the international community
regarding the camps.


5. (C) Ghosh agreed with SE Natsios that Libya was a
problematic venue. He noted that the Libyans were actually
arming some of the rebel factions. Sudan wanted a real
solution to the problem because otherwise it could get
totally out of control, "Darfur is no longer an internal
issue but has become a problem for hire." Charge Fernandez
noted that Sudan needs to understand that without resolving
the problems of IDPs currently in the camps and getting them
to return to their homes "voluntarily and in safety," the
problem would not be solved. This also means removing Arab
tribes who are squatting on the land of others, "without
this, the problem will not be solved no matter what, if
anything is agreed to in Libya." Ghosh said that the Sudanese
Government fully agreed with this, without IDP return and
tribal reconciliation there will be no peace no matter what a
treaty may say.

ABYEI NEGOTIATIONS
--------------


6. (C) S/E Natsios said reports from the recent UNMIS
Cease-fire Joint Monitoring Commission (CJMC) were very
positive, and noted that allowing the UN to fully monitor
Abyei is an important step. He suggested that any agreement
on Abyei should include the Misseriya Arabs in addition to
the Ngok Dinka because without them there will likely be
additional conflict. Natsios pointed to the recent abduction
of oil workers by JEM and the Misseriya in Khordofan as an
example. S/E Natsios reminded Ghosh that Abyei is an
emotional issue for the Ngok Dinka and needs to be resolved
quickly. Natsios reminded Ghosh US offers in the form of a
possible tripartite arbitration committee that could consist
of the Chinese, the Saudis, and the US, although we are not
wedded to this, it is just an idea but the US wants to be
helpful if we can.


7. (C) Ghosh said he wanted to make clear that the NCP was
"comfortable" in its negotiating with the SPLM, you should
think we are under pressure. He said both sides are now
committed to finding a solution to the Abyei issue. He said
the troops will withdraw and that the JIUs must deploy in the
area. "This must happen soon," he said. Ghosh observed that
powerful forces in the SPLM are "making a veto" on a possible
solution to the Abyei border dispute, mentioning Deng Alor in
particular. Ghosh said the problem all boiled down to the
definition of one small locality in Abyei. He said Salva
Kiir asked President Bashir for an interim administration for
Abyei and the President had agreed. Ghosh suggested that
both sides need to be flexible on Abyei and stop trying to
"score goals." Ghosh noted that President Bashir would be
going to South Africa the evening November 2 and that he
would meet with First Vice President Salva Kiir before his
departure to try to achieve a comprehensive breakthrough. The
Sudanese would try to solve this crisis among themselves but

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would call for international assistance if needed.

CENSUS AND ELECTIONS
--------------


8. (C) Natsios pointed out that there is a perception that
the North is slowing down the census to make the GOSS look
bad. He pointed out that the money for the census had not
been released, the election law had not been passed, and the
border commission had not begun its work. Natsios reminded
Ghosh that for the southerners, the CPA is like the Bible or
the Koran, that they view it as "liberation from a past of
oppression." Natsios warned that the GNU ignores the CPA at
its peril.


9. (C) Ghosh replied that the border commission has asked for
security to begin its work and that the money for the census
will soon be released. Ghosh stated confidently that
elections will be held and that the NCP believes it can win.
He said the NCP wants a good partnership with the SPLM "so
that both parties can take over." Ghosh pointed out that he
is not part of the NCP. "I'm just a technical man," he
chuckled, but promised to take Natsios' suggestions to the
NCP. Ghosh observed that at this point "both sides are
trying" and suggested that at a certain point US intervention
and assistance may be useful.

COMMENT
--------------


10. (C) Ghosh's demeanor was helpful and positive throughout
the meeting. His explanation of possible Sudanese
"backtracking" on UNAMID composition is plausible if
unhelpful although is suspicion of UNAMID may be well placed.
Ghosh is the latest Sudanese official to have nothing good to
say privately about Libya's role in the Darfur peace talks.
He seemed genuinely interested in the proposals tabled by S/E
Natsios, particularly the suggestion of an arbitration panel
on Abyei. This offer may become useful if the direct
NCP/SPLM negotiations on Abyei stall.


11. (U) S/E Natsios did not clear this cable before he left
Khartoum.
FERNANDEZ