CONSPIRACY THEORIES ABOUND ON INTENTIONS IN DARFUR

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 001702

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR A/S FRAZER, S/E NATSIOS, AND AF/SPG
NSC FOR PITTMAN AND HUDSON
ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/01/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL KPKO UNSC SU
SUBJECT: CONSPIRACY THEORIES ABOUND ON INTENTIONS IN DARFUR

REF: A. KHARTOUM 1680

B. KHARTOUM 1681

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Alberto Fernandez, reasons: 1.4 (b) an
d (d)


1. (C) Summary: Despite differences in ideologies and
political platforms, leaders of Darfur groups are expressing
a common level of suspicion about the Government of Sudan's
(GOS) current actions with regard to Darfur. They believe
the GOS is pursuing a strategy to further undermine the
efficacy of international non-governmental organizations
(NGOs) and peacekeepers and the probability of political
settlement throughout the Darfur region. Representatives
pointed to the October 30-31 Arab League Donors Conference
for Humanitarian Aid for Darfur, the allegations of human
trafficking by foreign aid workers in eastern Chad, the
stalled Sirte talks, and the increased pace of "Arabization"
of Darfur lands. End summary.


2. (U) On October 29 Poloff met with Adam Abdul Ahmed,
Chairman of the Darfur Land Commission of the Darfur
Transitional Regional Authority (TDRA),established by the
Darfur Peace Agreement and headed by Minni Minawi. On the
same day Poloff met with representatives of the Fur tribes'
Shura (consultation) Council, including Secretary-General
(SYG) Dr. Idriss Yusuf and Deputy SYG Amin Mohammed Osman.
On October 30 Poloff followed up with Sudan Liberation
Movement (SLM) representative to the Darfur Ceasefire Joint
Commission Ali Trayo.

DONORS CONFERENCE ILLUSTRATES GOS HIDDEN AGENDA
-------------- --

3. (C) TDRA leaders saw no good will in Khartoum,s hosting
of the Arab League Conference on humanitarian aid for Darfur
(even though TDRA power Mini Minawi was prominently featured
at the conference). Abdul Ahmed acknowledged TDRA resentment
at having been upstaged by the GOS to spearhead this
conference. During his visit to Cairo in early October,
Minni Minawi accepted an AL offer to assume responsibility
for this conference, only to have the AL later hand over the
reins to the GOS without explanation. Ahmed complained that
the conference had not been coordinated through the TDRA,s
Darfur Reconstruction Fund, which he said would have ensured
a transparent disbursement mechanism for the $500 million
goal (Note: Actual pledges at the conference amounted to $250
million, real figures will be much less.)


4. (C) The absence of any oversight mechanism would enable
the GOS to channel funds directly to local Sudanese NGOs,
which Ahmed claimed are "99 percent pro-government," and
which he claimed were established solely to delegitimize the
INGO community. Ali Trayo was blistering in his contempt for
GOS efforts in this regard, stating that the AL conference
was convened only as a way to empower GOS-affiliated local
NGOs at the expense of INGOs, which he claimed the GOS saw as
"international spies" for the incoming United Nations-African
Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID). In this way, Trayo
explained, the conference was intended to downplay UNAMID
deployment.

CHADIAN COLLUSION AGAINST INTERNATIONAL PRESENCE
-------------- ---

5. (C) According to Trayo, another calculated blow to the
credibility of INGOs and international peacekeepers was the
relentless publicizing in the Arabic press in Sudan of the
alleged trafficking of 103 children from eastern Chad by
foreign aid workers of the organization Zoe,s Ark. Trayo
asserted "there was no coincidence on timing" of the breaking
of that story. The conspiracy-minded Trayo did not dismiss
the possibility of collaboration between Chadian President
Deby and Sudanese President Bashir (and possibly Libyan
leader COL Muamar Qadhafi) in inflating the incident as part
of an overall campaign to discredit INGOs operating in Chad
and Darfur and to stall deployment of international
peacekeepers on both sides of the Chad-Sudan border. Trayo
had no doubt that further foot-dragging would result, as
already evidenced in Bashir,s October 30 assertion that
UNAMID,s composition would remain mostly African (and
therefore perpetually lacking in capacities),with Chinese
and Pakistani elements permitted.


GOS "EXPERT" AT DELAYING POLITICAL PROCESS
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6. (C) In addition to undermining the INGOs and
international peacekeepers, the GOS was succeeding in its
plot to keep the rebel and non-signatory movements
politically divided, according to members of the Fur Shura
Council (the Council is strongly in favor of Sirte
rejectionist rebel leader Abdul Wahid Nur). Idriss and Amin
said Sirte had made the GOS look like the good guy in the
eyes of the international community through GOS participation
in preliminary talks, its declaration of a unilateral
ceasefire (which the Council dismissed as lip service) and
its stated "commitment" to giving non-signatories political
space to reach a common negotiating position for subsequent
rounds of talks. Amin interpreted this behavior as a front
for active GOS conspiring against rebel and non-signatory
movements, efforts toward unity in a bid to divide the
groups along tribal lines. Idriss elaborated that a
systematic upending of the pyramidal structure of Darfur
tribes was underway by the GOS, creating an imbalance within
the tribal system that was resulting in the current security
situation in Darfur. Idriss went on to say that the GOS,
separation of the movements, political leadership from the
IDPs on the ground was marginalizing the leaders and bringing
in their place at the negotiating table field commanders, who
lacked the knowledge to address political questions, and
tribal leaders/civil society representatives, who lacked a
force on the ground to command, none of whom was a bona fide
representative of the parties in Darfur.

STAGE SET FOR RE-SETTLEMENT OF DARFUR
--------------

7. (C) Ali Trayo argued that as a result of GOS maneuvering
on the political, humanitarian and peacekeeping fronts, the
time was ripe for the "Arabization" of Darfur through GOS
resettling of nomadic Arab tribes there. Both the TDRA and
the Shura Council acknowledged that this phenomenon was not
new, but Trayo noted its frequency had recently spiked (Note:
Trayo added that he was compiling a "database" of this trend
to track numbers of tribes and areas of "occupation" and
offered to share this information with Poloff upon arrival in
El Fasher.) The Fur Shura Council reps added that the GOS
was becoming increasingly sophisticated in its methods of
incorporating Arab tribes into the Darfur population, saying
that COL Qadhafi had a big hand in the execution of these
processes. Here again, Trayo did not rule out the
possibility of collusion by the Chadian Government as well
(seeking to eliminate a potentially disloyal Arab tribal
minority inside Chad). Trayo warned that the longer the
political reconciliation process in Darfur dragged on, the
deeper the "war fatigue" among IDPs would become and the
greater the ability of the GOS and the janjaweed to assert
themselves in Darfur territory would grow. The only way to
stave off this eventuality, according to Trayo, was to
accelerate the political process, which he said necessitated
pressure on Sudan Liberation Army faction leader Abdulwahid
al-Nur.


8. (C) Comment: Conspiracy theories and illogical reasoning
are nothing new among the political opposition, and certainly
not for the TDRA, whose roadmap for Sirte talks had just been
outright rejected by the UN/AU mediation. Similarly, the Fur
Shura Council, with its close ties to Abdulwahid, harbors an
equal if not greater amount of vitriol for the GOS. The TDRA
and the Shura Council are likely to see evil in almost any
action taken in Darfur by the GOS, Libya, Chad, UN, and AU.
However, their common perception of a concerted push by Arab
interests on all sides of the border to insulate the region
from the international community,s efforts to get
peacekeepers on the ground is noteworthy as an example of the
deep distrust on the ground. As the international community
seeks to stabilize the Darfur region, it is not unexpected
that there should be a reaction from governments in the
region, and we should only expect this opposition to
intensify as deployment deadlines draw nearer. The level of
paranoia on all sides is bound to increase.
FERNANDEZ