DARFUR: STATUS OF THE NON-SIGNATORIES

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000170

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, AF S/E NATSIOS, AND AF/SPG
NSC FOR PITTMAN AND SHORTLEY
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/04/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL AU SU CD
SUBJECT: DARFUR: STATUS OF THE NON-SIGNATORIES

REF: KHARTOUM 00155

Classified By: P/E Chief E. Whitaker, Reason: Sections 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary: The conference of Darfur Peace Agreement
(DPA) non-signatory commanders has again been delayed to
allow time for more commanders to assemble in North Darfur.
A variety of Embassy contacts report that efforts to unify
the commanders, facilitate negotiation within the framework
of the DPA, and advance the political process in Darfur have
been obstructed by the competing interests of some
non-signatory leaders, neighboring governments, and the
regime in Khartoum. Rebel leaders and commanders continue to
jostle for position, Chad continues to influence the internal
power struggles of the rebel movements, and the Sudanese
government continues to manipulate individual
non-signatories. Meanwhile, Sudan People's Liberation
Movement (SPLM) leaders have offered to take a more active
role in reconciling the Sudanese and Chadian governments and
bringing the non-signatories to political dialogue, but have
asked for high-level USG assistance in facilitating both.
End summary.

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Non-Signatories Conference
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2. (C) The opening of the conference of DPA non-signatory
commanders in North Darfur has been postponed until at least
February 9 to allow more time for some faction commanders to
reach the event site. At present, commanders representing
many of the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) factions have arrived
in North Darfur. We continue to encourage the factions to
announce their intention to unite in order to engage in
peaceful dialogue with the Sudanese government within the
framework of the DPA. Many commanders have expressed
frustration at their current political leadership, and a
variety of reports suggest that the commanders are engaged in
discussions to restructure the movement and nominate
individuals to leadership positions. However, internal
bickering and power struggles make it difficult to predict
the outcome of the event should it begin.

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Chadian Role
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3. (C) As reported reftel, Embassy contacts indicate that the
leaders of the factions that comprised the National
Redemption Front (NRF) continue to meet along the Chad-Sudan
border and have the greatest access to resources of any
rebels, courtesy of the Chadian government. This group,
including the leaders of the Justice and Equality Movement
(JEM),the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) faction aligned with
Adam Ali Shoggar, and the Sudan Federal Democratic Alliance
(SFDA) led by Sharif Harir and Ahmed Diraig, are attempting
to revitalize the NRF. Signals are mixed as to whether any
elements of this group or SLA/G-19 commander Adam Bakhit --
who commands the largest number of fighters and has clear
ties to the Chadian government -- intend to participate in
the conference in North Darfur or instead pursue a policy of
regime change in Khartoum with Chadian backing.

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Sudan Making Separate Peaces
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4. (C) The Sudanese government continues to make individual
bargains with DPA non-signatory leaders outside the DPA
framework. On January 4, the Presidency announced the
appointments of Declaration of Commitment (DOC) signatories
Abdelrahman Musa and Ibrahim Madibbo as state minister of the
Council of Ministers and chairman of the Darfur Resettlement
and Rehabilitation Commission, respectively. In addition,
the Sudanese government appointed 12 Darfurian members to the
Sudanese parliament. These decisions were made without the
concurrence of Senior Assistant to the President and Sudan
Liberation Movement (SLM) leader Minni Minawi and may
alienate some non-signatory groups by limiting the positions
now available to them should they join the DPA. Reports also
indicate that DOC signatory Abdulgassim Imam was appointed
governor of West Darfur, and in recent days, he has
cooperated with Government forces to "box-in" areas
controlled by commanders allied with Abdel Wahid al-Nur in an
attempt to assume the leadership of the Fur.

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SPLM Assists in Diffusing Conflict?
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KHARTOUM 00000170 002 OF 002




5. (C) In a February 4 meeting with USAID Mission Director
and Poloff, SPLM Secretary General Pagan Amun and SPLM Deputy
Secretary General for the Northern Sector Yassir Arman

SIPDIS
expressed an interest in working with the Chadian and
Sudanese governments to diffuse bilateral tensions and in
organizing a conference in Yei for non-signatory political
leaders to facilitate a common negotiating position. This
follows First Vice President Salva Kiir's announcement on
February 4 that he planned to travel to Darfur in the near
future. Arman proposed that Kiir could also serve as an
emissary to Chadian President Idriss Deby based on SPLM
connections from the past, while the Yei conference would lay
the groundwork for the broader UN/AU political process
stipulated in the November Addis Ababa agreement. Arman said
that he had spoken with Abdel Wahid, SLA leader Ahmed Abdul
Shafi, JEM leader Khalil Ibrahim, and Minawi in recent weeks,
all of whom were open to an SPLM-sponsored dialogue. (Note:
SFDA leaders Harir and Diraig would also be included in the
Yei conference. End note.) He requested USG assistance in
re-establishing a direct link with President Deby in Ndjamena
and recommended that either A/S Frazer or S/E Natsios speak
to Kiir on the SPLM's role vis-a-vis the non-signatories.

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Comment
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6. (C) The absence of clear signals from the non-signatories
in Chad and in North Darfur on whether they intend to unify
in support of constructive political dialogue suggests that
the SPLM initiative is worth considering. If the SPLM could
succeed in lessening the tensions between the Chadian and
Sudanese governments, this may decrease Chad's intervention
in the Darfur conflict. Similarly, the SPLM's successful
engagement with non-signatory political leaders might lessen
their manipulation of commanders on the ground. Despite the
SPLM's renewed interest in diffusing the Darfur crisis, it
remains to be seen how much political capital Kiir will
expend to that end. End comment.
POWERS