UN LIGHT PACKAGE IN DARFUR NEEDS AN ENERGIZER

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000017

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, AF/SE NATSIOS AND IO A/S
SILVERBERG
NSC FOR PITTMAN AND SHORTLEY

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/04/2027
TAGS: PGOV PREF PHUM KPKO SU AU
SUBJECT: UN LIGHT PACKAGE IN DARFUR NEEDS AN ENERGIZER


Classified By: CDA C. Hume, Reason: Section 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary: A January 3 visit to El Fasher revealed
numerous problems with the initial deployment of the UN light
package. As reported septel, the small initial UN military
contingent has yet to be integrated with the AMIS
peace-keeping force. The UN police contingent is trying to
define a role for itself in improving management of AU police
monitors. However, the UN has dropped the ball on leadership
and management: it has not recruited more than half the staff
for the light package, and it cannot deploy more than 35 to
El Fasher because it lacks accommodations; it has yet to
resolve important issues regarding the standards for physical
security that it will insist on in all installations; it most
recent time-line for deployments is already three months out
of date, and it has no concrete plan in place for deployment
of the heavy package. This message recommends several steps
that should be taken immediately. End Summary.


2. (C) Cease-fire: On January 3 CDA Hume met with AMIS force
commander Aprezi to discuss his efforts to restart work of
the cease-fire commission, next scheduled to meet on January
8 in El Fasher. Aprezi said he had traveled to a remote
location in North Darfur to meet with over a hundred rebel
leaders a week earlier. They confirmed their earlier public
statement that AMIS forces should not be attacked and agreed
to respect a cease-fire. Aprezi, taking advantage of their
newly declared support for a cease-fire, came back to El
Fasher ready to push ahead to implement the two chamber
solution for the cease-fire commission (one chamber for the
two DPA signatories; the second for all forces on the ground
willing to cooperate in maintaining a cease-fire).


3. (C) The day after Aprezi's meeting, the Sudanese Armed
Forces (SAF) bombed the meeting site. Although the African
Union had previously approved this arrangement, the SAF has
now told Aprezi that it will not attend meetings with
non-signatories. Aprezi intends to go ahead with the
cease-fire commission meeting planned for January 8
regardless, intending to put pressure on the SAF to
cooperate. S/CRS poloff will attend the January 8 meeting as
U.S. rep.


4. (C) AMIS/UN Cooperation: Aprezi avoided answering CDA's
questions regarding plans for cooperation between AMIS and
the UN. In a previous meeting, UN staff had told the CDA
that Aprezi insisted that the UN military be in separate
offices and not collocated with AMIS.


5. (C) Light Package: On January 3 CDA Hume also met with a
UN team for a briefing on deployment of light package. As
described by UN staff in El Fasher, the full light package
will include 105 military staff and 80 civilian staff (rather
than the 105 total mentioned earlier by UN staff in
Khartoum). The UN sent to El Fasher a first group of 49 (15
military, 19 civpol, 4 coordination officers, and 11 support
staff),but of this first group 15 returned to Khartoum the
same afternoon because of inadequate accommodations in El
Fasher. The UN briefers presented a time-line for deployment
that had not been updated since October, and they had no/no
answer to when the full light package could be deployed.
They "hoped" by the end of February. They said that the
Sudanese government had not impeded the deployment in any way.


6. (C) Follow-up questions revealed disarray and lack of
leadership on the UN side. Among the problems that surfaced:
1) Only half of the personnel for the light support package
have been recruited so far, and some staff were pulled back
by their governments at the last moment (Norway, Germany).
2) The UN has recently changed its physical security
requirements for offices and accommodations, and co-location
of military staff inside the security perimeter of AMIS HQ is
not an option. Outside the AMIS force HQ in El Fasher
construction on UN offices has stopped on the prepared site,
although it is surrounded by concertina wire and the
containers are in place, while the UN determines if HESCO
barriers are required. Nor has the UN requested Sudanese
government authorization for installing top level security
arrangements at the agricultural college site it has selected
for long-term use. No additional deployments will take place
without required security being put in place. 3) In addition
to having no SRSG in place in Khartoum, the operation in El
Fasher (previously headed by a senior officer in charge),
lacks leadership. The current officer in charge is a refugee
protection officer without adequate experience to stand up
the light package, let alone the heavy package.


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7. (C) Heavy Package: UN staff (which included the officer in
charge, the senior admin officer, and the commanders of the
police and military contingents) said they had no information
on plans for the heavy package, which they said was under
further discussion in Addis with AU officials. Given the
inevitable lead time required for any deployment in Darfur
(approximately four months to construct a company-sized based
camp),under the most favorable circumstances the UN cannot
begin to deploy the heavy package until May. However, if/if
the UN insists on the top level of physical security at all
locations, even that schedule would be in doubt.


8. (C) Recommendations to expedite deployment of light and
heavy packages: 1) the UN needs senior, proven leadership on
the ground in El Fasher, as well as in Khartoum. 2) If the UN
packages are to improve AMIS operations rather than merely
observe AMIS problems, the UN needs to send the complete
light package with competent staff ASAP. In this regard, the
USG should urge NATO allies to make personnel available. 3)
To resolve contracting issues that are causing delays in
providing accommodations and office facilities, the UN, the
USG, and the PAE contractors should cut through the red-tape
and security questions. One way to do this would be to send
to El Fasher as soon as possible a mission of officials from
State (AF and IO),the UN (DPKO and Security),and PAE who
can make decisions and commitments on the spot.
HUME