Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07KHARTOUM16
2007-01-04 12:40:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Khartoum
Cable title:  

UNMIS POLICE AND MILITARY CONTINGENTS STRUGGLE TO

Tags:  PGOV PREF PHUM KPKO SU AU 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO8819
PP RUEHMR RUEHPA RUEHRN RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #0016/01 0041240
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 041240Z JAN 07
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5717
INFO RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000016 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR AF A/S FRAZER AND AF/SPG
NSC FOR PITTMAN AND SHORTLEY

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/04/2027
TAGS: PGOV PREF PHUM KPKO SU AU
SUBJECT: UNMIS POLICE AND MILITARY CONTINGENTS STRUGGLE TO
INTEGRATE WITH AU


Classified By: CDA C. Hume, Reason: Section 1.4 (b) and (d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000016

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR AF A/S FRAZER AND AF/SPG
NSC FOR PITTMAN AND SHORTLEY

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/04/2027
TAGS: PGOV PREF PHUM KPKO SU AU
SUBJECT: UNMIS POLICE AND MILITARY CONTINGENTS STRUGGLE TO
INTEGRATE WITH AU


Classified By: CDA C. Hume, Reason: Section 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary: Poloff and CDA Hume met with UNMIS Darfur
Military Staff Chief and UNMIS Civ/Pol Director on January 1
and 3 to gain a very early assessment of the UN-AU lash-up.
The picture for Civ/Pol is encouraging, for the military far
less so. Civ/Pol Director reported a smooth integration with
his AU counterpart; they will be co-located and have already
discussed where he believes the small UN contingent can add
value to the overall mission, several officers commented that
the mission is not well defined and will take months to
develop any clarity. On the military side, the UNMIS
Military Chief said he met with the AU Force Commander
briefly before the latter went on leave and did not get a
sense that he would part of the team. He was told there was
not room for him or his officers in the AU command group so
they will be located in another building (UN security
regulations may preclude this until either waivers are
granted or better physical security measures are in place).
End Summary


2. (U) See Septel for CDA's comments and recommendations.


3. (C) Darfur based S/CRS Poloff met with South African
Colonel Thinus Van Staden, UNMIS Military Staff Chief
(strictly protect),and Gambian Inspector General Landing
Badjie, UNMIS Darfur Civ/Pol Chief on January 1. Ambassador
met with Van Staden and Badjie again on January 3 as well as
Planning Officer Immanuel Egunyork in a trip to Darfur.

--------------
Good Initial Integration of Civ/Pol into AU
--------------


4. (C) Badjie has been in Sudan since October and brought the
first contingent of 10 UNMIS Civ/Pol to Darfur last week; an
additional 12 will arrive in the next week to 10 days. He
has begun the process of integration with the AU Civ/Pol,
which number over 1,400. Badjie said that he will be
physically co-located with his AU counterpart, Police
Commissioner Moenyana from South Africa, who has been very

accepting of his help and has provided space for him by
shifting officers around. Badjie suggested that he would
effectively serve as the co-director of the joint Civ/Pol
mission. Poloff met with Badjie at his UNMIS office, which
he said was set up for the officers only until they have work
stations at the AU, which they hope will be ready in the next
week. He described a full partnership with the officer,s
various counterparts.


5. (C) Badjie said he sees his role as offering observations
and new ideas to how the AU Civ/Pol operate. His first
observation and suggestion was on how the Civ/Pol officers
are assigned, which he believes is not being done to maximize
the skills and background of the respective officers. He
also sees recommendations forthcoming on how to improve
training and implement a better community policing program
throughout the camps. Of the 33 officers in the light
package, eight will remain in El Fasher and the rest will
provide a leavening for the force in the field. Badjie said
that he believes the Force Commander does not understand the
mission or the value of Civ/Pol and has not been supportive
or attentive to their work. He believes the Force Commander
may try to argue against the need for the Civ/Pol from the
heavy support package. Badjie's initial assessment is that
the numbers of the AU Civ/Pol are far too low for the mission
and that they lack the material support to be effective in
terms of patrolling and night operations. They need more
communications, transportation, and overall resources.
Badjie also mentioned that he understands some of the foreign
police units that were designated may not be coming, and he
fears a loss of effectiveness as a result.


6. (C) In discussions with five members of the Civ/Pol force
itself -- from Sweden, Uganda, Jordan, and Gambia, Poloff was
told that the officers do not have a clear picture of how
they will fit in to the Civ/Pol force structure and
anticipate many months before the UN officers are fully
integrated and have clarity of mission. But they also said
they can see ways in which the force can be more dynamic and
will push for greater effectiveness when they are deployed to
their respective sectors. They understand that the AU Force
Commander is the main impediment to increased effectiveness
and will block most initiatives. They expressed dismay that
one individual could cast such a negative pall over a
mission, which they said is palpable.


KHARTOUM 00000016 002 OF 002


-------------- --------------
Force Commander the Problem with Military Integration
-------------- --------------


7. (C) The initial experience of the military contingent was
the polar opposite of their Civ/Pol counterparts in terms of
integration. Colonel Thinus Van Staden of South Africa is
the Military Staff Chief for UNMIS in Darfur. He arrived
last week after several months in a holding pattern in
Khartoum with 11 officers from the light package. He conveys
a very determined and professional demeanor, the kind of
officer who will not be easily dismissed. Van Staden said
that immediately upon his arrival he sought a meeting with
the Force Commander, but was told the General did not have
time to see him until after his upcoming vacation. Van
Staden insisted and was given a brief office call with no
indication of where he would fit into the command group
structure or how the two would work together. He believes
the Force Commander's plan is to string the UN officers along
for as long as possible -- country and mission briefings,
meetings, etc. -- before giving them something to do. Even
then he does not see an easy integration into the existing
force structure. The natural position for Van Staden would
have been Chief of Staff, a post which was open, but the
Force Commander filled it with another officer from the
existing AU force. Van Staden said that the Force Commander
has also made clear that there is no space for the officers
in the AU command group building and they will need to find
office space elsewhere.


8. (C) Van Staden seemed to take all of this in stride as
something he had been expecting. He sees his job as one of
reporting back on the situation and knows that absent a
change in Command Group attitude the AU-UN integration cannot
proceed effectively. But he also knows this is a decision
that will be made between New York, Addis and Washington, not
in El Fasher. Van Staden expressed the importance of having
a leavening of European and North American officers in the UN
force. He believes if all the officers are from African and
South Asian nations they will be co-opted by the existing AU
force and will not affect any positive change. This is
especially the case with African officers where there are
senior officers already in the AU force. What Rwandan
officer would be in a position to make waves, he said,
knowing that the Deputy Force Commander, whom he will
presumably have to deal with the rest of his career, is from
Rwanda? Van Staden has heard rumor that some of the
Europeans have decided not to fill their commitments --
Norway recently pulled its two off the list -- and he
believes it will be difficult to be effective if this trend
continues. He noted that there are two U.S. officers on the
light package list and said he looks forward to their arrival.
HUME