S/E NATSIOS, MEETING WITH PRESIDENTIAL ADVISOR

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 001569

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR AF A/S FRAZIER AND AF/SPG
NSC FOR PITMANN AND HUDSON
ADIS ABBABA ALSO FOR USAU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/03/2012
TAGS: PREL PGOV KPKO UN AU SU
SUBJECT: S/E NATSIOS, MEETING WITH PRESIDENTIAL ADVISOR
NAFIE ALI NAFIE

REF: KHARTOUM 1557

Classified By: CDA Alberto Fernandez, for reasons 1.4 (b) & (d)


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Summary
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1. (C) S/E Natsios and Presidential Advisor Dr. Nafie Ali
Nafie agreed that they have low expectations for the initial
Darfur peace talks in Tripoli, but hope that it may start a
process that will eventually bear fruit. Nafie responded
defensively to S/E Natsios, proposal for a package of
confidence-building measures designed to get the
Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) back on track (reftel),
saying that the SPLM and SPLA, not the NCP or SAF, are
responsible for any slow-down in CPA implementation. He then
promised that Khartoum will study S/E Natsios, proposals
carefully and respond in due time. He agreed that there has
been a deterioration in the political environment between the
two Government of National Unity (GNU) partners.

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Low Expectations for Tripoli Talks
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2. (C) In an October 6 meeting, S/E Natsios told Sudanese
Presidential Advisor Nafie Ali Nafie that he is concerned
that the Darfur peace talks in Tripoli will not result in any
meaningful progress. He is alarmed that Libyan leader
Khadafi is inviting a large cast of foreign notables,
including former-U.S. Presidents Carter and Clinton, and is
turning the talks into a &circus.8 Nafie agreed that there
already are too many negotiating participants in the process
and that the additional guests in Tripoli will only
complicate things further. S/E Natsios noted that Khartoum
has said that these will be the last peace talks on Darfur.
He urged that Sudan regard Tripoli as only the initial
meeting in a series of talks. Later negotiating sessions
still hold the prospect of reaching an agreement.

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Focus on North-South
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4. (C) S/E Natsios said that the main purpose of his visit
was to focus on North-South peace issues. He told Nafie that
the United States senses that since January the atmosphere
surrounding the CPA has been deteriorating. While President
Bashir and FVP Salva Kiir will not sanction a return to
conflict, the rhetoric among more junior officers on both
sides has been growing more extreme, even violent. S/E
Natsios said he is concerned that in the present atmosphere a
clash between an SAF and an SPLA unit could escalate into a
general conflict that would result in a conventional ) not a
guerrilla * war between North and South with disastrous
consequences for both.


5. (SBU) S/E Natsios argued that the CPA has not failed, but
that the situation has begun to slide and action must be
taken now to arrest this. Therefore, he proposed a series of
steps to reduce tensions (see reftel for full text):

-- First, following the Muglad incident in September, the SAF
and SPLM have allowed a temporary UNMIS presence in Abyei.
S/E Natsios suggested that this presence be maintained, as a
means to dispel tensions, until the Abyei question is
resolved.

-- Second, he proposed a phased pullback of 25 kilometers by
the SAF and the SPLA on either side of line 1156, until the
border issue is resolved, with UNMIS patrolling the zone in
between.

-- Third, the United States, Saudi Arabia and China should
work jointly to draft a compromise proposal to resolve the
question of oilfield security, for consideration by the two
sides. Their draft would have to be a consensus of all
three, and would be a proposal only, for North and South to
accept or reject.

-- Finally, both sides should lower their rhetoric.


6. (C) All of these steps would be subject to verification.
The United States is not looking to be some sort of mediator,

KHARTOUM 00001569 002 OF 002


but we want to be helpful. If after three months, both sides
have accepted and implemented these measures, S/E Natsios
said that he would be prepared to propose that the United
States take steps to begin improving relations. He cautioned
that full normalization will not be possible at this time,
but that Washington could be able take some initial steps in
that direction that would be of interest to Khartoum although
he cautioned that he had not fully consulted with Washington
about this.

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CPA Non-Implementation Not Our Fault
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7. (C) Nafie responded defensively that the South, not the
North, is responsible for any slow-down in CPA
implementation. He charged that while the vast majority of
SAF forces have been withdrawn north of line 1156, SPLA units
continue to operate throughout the South, outside of their
garrisons, contrary to the CPA. Nafie argued that some
elements in the SPLM are seeking to undermine the CPA process
in order to destabilize the North. These forces realize that
the SPLM can count on the South in the 2009 national
elections. By destabilizing the North, they believe they
will win the elections and take control of the national
government in Khartoum or sow chaos and turmoil throughout
the North. Nafie said that this will never happen, but the
CPA might be destroyed in the process. Inspired by the "wild
dreams" of "former communist" Yasir Arman and reckless and
ambitious SPLM SG Pagan Amum "who wants to be a second John
Garang," the South is seeking to foment conflict in the North
and in Darfur. He added that the SPLA thought they could
create militias and Other Armed Groups (OAGs) in the North to
weaken the NCP, but "I can assure you, we don't want war but
in case of war, we can do much worse to them than they do to
us. I will personally make sure that no Missirriya (some
have joined the SPLA) fights on their side." He aded that
the SPLM/SPLA had become "ambitious ad agressive" because of
U.S. support.


8. (C) S/E Natsios and CDA Fernandez responded that they
heard many of the same charges made in Juba against the NCP.
S/E Natsios said that he had presented this proposal to VP
Salva Kiir, who had said the North would never except it.
S/E Natsios had told Kiir not to make that assumption, but to
see what happens. The proposal is intended to dispel this
kind of mutual distrust. The U.S. hopes the two sides will
surprise each other.


9. (C) On Darfur, Nafie noted that the Darfur talks will
need a few people empowered to negotiate. "Too many people
will spoil it" and rebel disunity may be too large a problem
to overcome.

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We,ll Take a Look At It
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10. (C) Nafie promised that the NCP will examine the U.S.
proposal and give it full consideration. This will take some
time, he added. He promised to respond to S/E Natsios when
this process is complete. He said that he personally did not
believe the United States could or would improve relations
with Sudan. "I am quite skeptical," noting "you have your
own Pagan Amuns in the U.S."


11. (C) Comment: Nafie was relatively unprepared for the CPA
enhancement ideas as his caution made clear. His frank and
balanced admittance of the problems with the CPA and the GNU
was outweighed by his chilling readiness to sow mayhem the
South -- should war come again. His complanits about SPLM
interference in the North make one wonder about how much in
control the NCP feels itself to be on its home turf. End
comment.


12. (U) S/E Natsios did not have an opportunity to review
this message before his departure.
FERNANDEZ