HASKANITA ATTACK PART OF INCREASED VIOLENCE IN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 001535

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, AF/SPG, AND AF/SE
NSC FOR PITTMAN AND HUDSON
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/30/2012
TAGS: PREL PGOV KPKO MOPS UN AU SU
SUBJECT: HASKANITA ATTACK PART OF INCREASED VIOLENCE IN
ADVANCE OF TALKS

REF: A. KHARTOUM 01526

B. KHARTOUM 01439

KHARTOUM 00001535 001.2 OF 002


Classified By: DCM Roberto Powers, Reason: Sections 1.4 (b) and (d)

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Summary
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1. (SBU) One day after the September 29 attack on the its
camp near Haskanita, South Darfur, AMIS evacuated 10 dead and
14 wounded peacekeepers with the help of the Sudanese Armed
Forces (SAF). Reports abound on the number and identity of
the assailants, ranging from two Darfur rebel factions to
Arab militias. Violence in the area among rebel movements,
Arab tribes, and the Sudanese Government has increased as
popular support for the single DPA rebel signatory has
collapsed and its command structure deteriorated and as
UN/AU-sponsored peace talks loom on the horizon. While
international focus shifts from the Sudanese Government to
the Darfur rebel movements--either as a result of attacks
attributed to the various rebel factions or in response to
their outright opposition to, or lukewarm support for,
UN/AU-led peace efforts--Sudan may use the opportunity to
strengthen its hand both politically and militarily in
advance of negotiations scheduled to begin in late October.
End summary.

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AMIS Dead, Wounded Evacuated
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2. (SBU) One day after the September 29 attack on the African
Union Mission in Sudan's (AMIS) camp near Haskanita, South
Darfur, which left 10 AMIS peacekeepers dead and 14 injured
(Ref. A),an AMIS team reached the Military Group Site (MGS)
by Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) helicopter on the afternoon of
September 30. Force Commander Martin Luther Agwai and six
AMIS helicopters later followed and evacuated the dead and
wounded to Khartoum and El Fasher. The ten deceased consist
of seven AMIS soldiers, two Milobs, and one civilian
policeman. Twenty-two personnel remain missing. During a
briefing in El Fasher on October 1, Agwai said that the
damage to the MGS was more limited than initially reported
and that he planned to re-open the site within five days.
AMIS placed the neighboring MGSs in Muhajeria and Labado on
alert.


3. (SBU) Agwai referred to the attack as "a wake-up call"
that highlighted AMIS' weaknesses. Noting the delay in
information dissemination within the force, he said that the
operations and intelligence sections needed to coordinate
more effectively. Agwai ordered the major staff sections to
study the attack and response to formulate lessons learned.


4. (SBU) S/CRS field officers in Darfur report that
AMIS-contracted helicopters had refused to fly into Haskanita
until the area was secure. As a result, the SAF had provided
a helicopter for the advance team. Agwai acknowledged that
the use of SAF aircraft could re-inforce negative impressions
of AMIS' association with the Sudanese Government but had
weighed that political considerations against the necessity
of rescuing the wounded.

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Attackers: JEM, SLA/Unity, or Arab?
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5. (SBU) Reports on the number of attackers varies between
several hundred and 2,000, and speculation abounds as to the
identity of the assailants. The Sudanese Government, the
Justice and Equality Movement (JEM),and the Sudan Liberation
Army (SLA)/Unity commanded by Abdullah Yehia have engaged in
hostilities in the area since a joint JEM-SLA/Unity attack in
Kordofan in late August led to Sudanese reprisals near rebel
outposts near Haskanita in early September (Ref. B). Before
the September 29 attack, JEM had blamed AMIS for facilitating
Government action in the area.


6. (C) Several credible reports, including from AMIS,
indicate that JEM forces had left the area within the last
week. While SLA/Unity--one of the strongest military forces
among the disparate rebel factions--may have attempted to
capitalize on the local population's resentment of AMIS to

KHARTOUM 00001535 002.2 OF 002


increase its political support in advance of upcoming peace
talks in Libya, the brazen nature (and target) of the attack
is uncharacteristic. Both JEM and SLA/Unity have denied
involvement. Independent Sudanese press have attributed the
attack to local Arab militias. Militias from the Maalia
tribe have attacked Zaghawa and Rizeigat areas for the last
several months. While resulting in few deaths, the attacks
have driven the African populations from their villages into
the town, according to Western sources in the areas of
Haskanita, Muhajerria and Al Daien.

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SLM/Minawi's Collapse Increases Vulnerability
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7. (C) The SLM/Minawi had traditionally controlled the area
of South Darfur that encompasses Haskanita. This control has
deteriorated in recent months, however, as support for the
movement and its command structure has collapsed. Western
sources in the area have told the Embassy in the last two
weeks that "the SLM (Minawi) doesn't even know what's going
on" as SLA/Unity and JEM have become the dominant African
rebel force on the ground to counter the Arab militias. In
late July, Minawi sent a letter to the African Union alluding
to this loss of control and warning that the Darfur Peace
Agreement (DPA) non-signatories posed an imminent threat to
AMIS.

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Comment
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8. (C) As reported in Ref. B, violence in South Darfur
between competing rebel factions and the Sudanese Government
is on the rise prior to the UN/AU-sponsored Darfur peace
talks scheduled to begin in Libya in late October. As
international focus shifts to the Darfur rebel
movements--either as a result of attacks attributed to the
various factions or in response to their outright opposition
to, or lukewarm support for, the UN/AU process--the
Government of Sudan may use the opportunity to strengthen its
hand both politically and militarily in advance of the talks.
The international community could counter this trend by
defining its expectations for the negotiations. The talks
should concentrate on the development of an "implementation
protocol" for the DPA that sets out new timelines and strong
monitoring mechanisms for the security, power-sharing, and
wealth-sharing provisions of the agreement to provide a
constructive political outlet for the rebels' grievances and
shift some of the political burden for addressing Darfur's
instability back onto the Sudanese Government. End comment.


9. (U) Tripoli minimize considered.
FERNANDEZ