Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07KHARTOUM1436
2007-09-11 16:12:00
SECRET
Embassy Khartoum
Cable title:  

TRACK TO LIBYA TALKS FRAUGHT WITH HURDLES

Tags:  PREL PGOV KPKO UN AU SU US LY 
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VZCZCXRO4220
OO RUEHDU RUEHMR RUEHPA RUEHRN RUEHROV RUEHTRO
DE RUEHKH #1436/01 2541612
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 111612Z SEP 07
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8488
INFO RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI IMMEDIATE 0221
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA IMMEDIATE
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 KHARTOUM 001436 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR D, AF A/S FRAZER, AF S/E NATSIOS AND AF/SPG
NSC FOR PITTMAN AND HUDSON
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/10/2012
TAGS: PREL PGOV KPKO UN AU SU US LY
SUBJECT: TRACK TO LIBYA TALKS FRAUGHT WITH HURDLES

KHARTOUM 00001436 001.2 OF 003


Classified By: CDA Alberto Fernandez, Reason: Sections 1.4 (b) and (d)

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Summary
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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 KHARTOUM 001436

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR D, AF A/S FRAZER, AF S/E NATSIOS AND AF/SPG
NSC FOR PITTMAN AND HUDSON
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/10/2012
TAGS: PREL PGOV KPKO UN AU SU US LY
SUBJECT: TRACK TO LIBYA TALKS FRAUGHT WITH HURDLES

KHARTOUM 00001436 001.2 OF 003


Classified By: CDA Alberto Fernandez, Reason: Sections 1.4 (b) and (d)

--------------
Summary
--------------


1. (S) While the announcement of UN/AU-brokered negotiations
between Sudan and Darfur's rebels is a very positive step
toward ending the conflict, five hurdles obstruct the track
to talks in Libya at the end of October: disunity within the
rebel factions; ongoing hostilities on the ground; the Fur's
continued support for intransigent rebel leader Abdulwahid Al
Nur; the selection of Libya as a venue for the talks, which
resulted from a lack of a joint UN/AU negotiator monitoring
the situation on the ground; and unreasonable expectations
for the outcome of the negotiations. These hurdles, however,
present an opportunity for the U.S. to exert leadership in
the next seven weeks, and throughout the negotiations, by
articulating explicit positions on key issues. Though our
ability to shape the UN/AU strategy may be limited to
pressing for the immediate appointment of a joint UN/AU chief
negotiator, Darfur's rebels--and even the Sudanese
Government--view the U.S. as the guarantor of any agreement,
and we should utilize this leverage to address the other
hurdles. End summary.

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Disunity
--------------


2. (C) Disunity continues to plague the Darfur rebel
factions. The Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) remains fractured
between at least eight different groups based on competing
ethnic and political rivalries. The few groups with
significant military strength are not allied with any
political leader. A definitive rift has also opened within
the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM),traditionally the
most cohesive of Darfur's insurgent groups. One faction, led
by Khalil Ibrahim, has political clout but little military
capacity. Another group, controlled by Bahar Abu Gharda (who
represented JEM at the July Arusha conference sponsored by

the UN and AU) and Abdallah Banda, lacks charismatic
leadership but controls most of the movement's armed elements.


3. (C) While it may be difficult to reconcile JEM at this
stage, the SLA factions continue to express an interest in
coming together for an internal dialogue facilitated by
outside mediators. Though this request has fallen on deaf
ears in the UN and AU, the SLA cannot participate
productively in negotiations without a decision-making
mechanism to form positions on key issues. Beginning
September 16, the UN/AU plan to hold a meeting of the seven
"leading personalities" from Arusha (plus one aide) in
N'djamena to bring the rebel groups to a common platform and
determine an agenda for the October talks, an impossible task
given the level of disunity and the limited number of
participants. The absence of a more comprehensive UN/AU
strategy to bring cohesion within the Darfur movements,
particularly the SLA, before the start of negotiations will
leave them vulnerable to the Sudanese Government, which will
adeptly exploit the rebels' divisions.


4. (C) Recommendation: At the highest levels, the U.S. should
continue to press the UN and AU to make a serious effort to
consolidate the gains made in Arusha and facilitate better
coordination among the rebel groups in advance of
negotiations. At the same time, we should publicly state our
view that the rebels must have the opportunity for internal
dialogue prior to the start of negotiations.
--------------
Ongoing Hostilities
--------------


5. (C) Combined with an expected rush among the movements to
position themselves for negotiations, the rebels' political
fissures are also fueling an expansion of hostilities. The
recent JEM/SLA-Unity attack in Kordofan represented a bloody
and cynical attempt by the militarily-weak Ibrahim to bolster
his credibility in the face of Abu Gharda and Banda's
defection. A UN official who met with Ibrahim on September 9
told Poloff that Ibrahim proclaimed JEM is fighting for all
of the marginalized people of Sudan, including those in
Kordofan. A September 10 clash between JEM/SLA-Unity and the
Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) near Haskanita, South Darfur,
which included Government aerial bombing, was related to the

KHARTOUM 00001436 002.2 OF 003


earlier attack in Kordofan, according to UN and AU officials,
which had led to the death of over 40 policemen.
Negotiations cannot succeed in an environment of ongoing
hostilities, particularly if the violence spreads from Darfur
to neighboring regions of the country. Rebel support for a
cessation of hostilities, however, will be difficult to
achieve without a serious UN/AU-sponsored effort to bring
cohesion to the rebel factions, including the field
commanders.


6. (C) Recommendation: The U.S. should call on Sudan and the
Darfur rebel groups to sign an immediate cessation of
hostilities in the runup to the talks and state our intention
to view violations of such an agreement as a lack of
commitment to the UN/AU peace process. Rebel provocations
which lead to violent responses by the SAF are
counterproductive.

--------------
Abdulwahid and the Fur
--------------


7. (C) Abdulwahid Al Nur still commands the loyalty of a
broad swath of the Fur and has declared he will not attend
the talks in Libya. Though some Fur leaders, such as Ahmed
Diraige, have real pockets of support in Darfur, Abdulwahid
has no serious rival for leadership of the Fur, either among
civilians or the armed SLA fighters. The UN/AU has taken
tentative steps to undermine his support by appealing to the
Fur's desire for their voice to be included in the peace
process. The absence of a UN/AU strategy to bring the
political and military elements of the rebel groups into
dialogue, however, has heightened Abdulwahid's intransigence.
Even commanders allied with Abdulwahid continue to request
outside assistance for internal dialogue, both to bring
pressure on Abdulwahid to join the peace process and to
strengthen their negotiating position vis-a-vis the
Government prior to the talks.


8. (C) Recommendation: Western threats against Abdulwahid
increase his popularity among the Fur. Instead, the U.S.
should deliver a consistent message to the Fur that
Abdulwahid's gamesmanship will not earn them greater
concessions but instead alienate them from the process.
Privately, Abdulwahid needs to be warned that there will be
consequences to his sabotage of the peace talks.

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Venue
--------------


9. (S) The selection of Libya as a venue for talks has opened
a Pandora's box. Libya has an interventionist history in
Darfur, including military support for rebel groups--both
directly and via Chad. SLA-Unity commander Abdullah Yehia
received a massive infusion of Libyan support just prior to
the Arusha conference and has been traveling Darfur
dispersing newly-acquired weaponry and supplies to his forces
in recent weeks, according to the UN. Tripoli is as
unpredictable as it is impartial, and the UN/AU has ceded a
significant amount of control over the negotiations by
holding them in Libya. As one UN official told Poloff, half
of the negotiations will be between Sudan and the rebels, the
other half between the UN/AU and Libya. In his announcement
of the venue for talks, Ban had said negotiations would
"begin" in Libya, which UN officials are interpreting as an
opening to shift their location if the negotiations stall.


10. (S) UN and AU officials admit that Eritrea is furious at
the selection of Libya as host for the talks and anticipate
that Asmara will take action either to undermine the process
or open a separate negotiating track. One Eritrean liaison
to the Darfur rebels, Abdullah Jabar, has been in N'djamena
in recent days. A UN source predicted that Jabar may be
attempting to lure the break-away JEM faction of Abu Gharda
and Banda toward Asmara to complicate the process and create
more violence and chaos.


11. (S) The selection of the Libyan venue also highlights the
inefficiency of a joint UN/AU decision making process in the
absence of a strong chief negotiator on the ground to exert
leadership. Several UN and AU sources report that AU
Chairman Alpha Omer Konare pushed for Libya against UN
objections. President Bashir then told visiting UNSYG Ban Ki
Moon that he supported Libya as well, which tipped the scales

KHARTOUM 00001436 003.2 OF 003


in Tripoli's favor. National Congress Party (NCP) insider
Saeed Al Khatib told CDA Fernandez on September 11, however,
that Sudan was concerned about the Libyan venue and Bashir
had only conceded because he could not oppose Qaddhafi
without UN cover (to be reported septel).


12. (S) Recommendation: The UN/AU and the international
community view the U.S. as the Western power with the most
influence over Libya. We should consider putting Tripoli on
notice that we are closely following its actions toward
Darfur and expect them to be a constructive host for the
negotiations. We should also engage with the UN and AU at
the highest level to appoint a joint negotiator immediately
to avoid similar missteps, such as occurred with the
selection of the venue, as the peace process proceeds.

--------------
Unreasonable Expectations
--------------


13. (C) Despite numerous hurdles to successful talks,
expectations as to their outcome are still unreasonably
high--as are expectations of the concessions that the rebels
can achieve through negotiation. The rebellion in Darfur
erupted to some degree as a response to a perceived exclusion
from the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). This sentiment
persists, and the rebels do not share the international
community's belief that the CPA is the vehicle for democratic
transformation in Sudan, which will complicate productive
negotiations on power-sharing. Opposition to the DPA is even
more acute, though this opposition is based more on symbolism
than on disagreement with the fundamentals of the document.
The UN/AU process has failed to set realistic parameters and
outcomes for the negotiations and to underscore that
compromise will be necessary on both sides, within the
framework of both the CPA and the DPA. Progress was made in
Arusha when the rebels acknowledged that both the 2004
Declaration of Principles and the DPA were important
documents, but much more work remains on this issue before
the start of negotiations.


14. (C) Recommendation: Sustainable security agreements
underpin all other elements of a solution to the Darfur
crisis--including reconciliation, reconstruction, and
development. The U.S. can make an explicit statement that a
realistic outcome for the negotiations would be an effective
and sustainable set of security arrangements, coupled with
adjustments to the DPA to address the reasonable grievances
of the rebel groups on power and wealth-sharing. We should
also underscore our view that the CPA is the vehicle for
building a prosperous future for all of Sudan.


15. (U) Tripoli minimize considered.
FERNANDEZ