Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07KHARTOUM1384
2007-09-04 06:39:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Khartoum
Cable title:  

ON EVE OF UNSYG VISIT, UN CHIEF DISCUSSES NCP,

Tags:  PREL PGOV KPKO UN AU SU ER 
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VZCZCXRO7112
OO RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #1384/01 2470639
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 040639Z SEP 07
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8387
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA IMMEDIATE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 001384 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, AF S/E NATSIOS, AND AF/SPG
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/02/2012
TAGS: PREL PGOV KPKO UN AU SU ER
SUBJECT: ON EVE OF UNSYG VISIT, UN CHIEF DISCUSSES NCP,
SPLM DYNAMICS


Classified By: CDA Alberto Fernandez, Reason: Sections 1.4 (b) and (d)

-------
Summary
-------

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 001384

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, AF S/E NATSIOS, AND AF/SPG
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/02/2012
TAGS: PREL PGOV KPKO UN AU SU ER
SUBJECT: ON EVE OF UNSYG VISIT, UN CHIEF DISCUSSES NCP,
SPLM DYNAMICS


Classified By: CDA Alberto Fernandez, Reason: Sections 1.4 (b) and (d)

--------------
Summary
--------------


1. (C) Noting that the relationship between Sudan and the UN
had improved in the last year, the UN Acting Special
Representative of the Secretary General told CDA Fernandez
that UNSYG Ban Ki Moon's September 4-8 visit comes at an
ideal time to sustain momentum on the Darfur peace process,
pave the way for UNAMID, and raise the profile of the CPA.
Hardliners and pragmatists in Khartoum view Ban's visit
differently, with the former seeing a tacit acknowledgment of
a successful strategy to overcome UNSCR 1706, the latter an
affirmation for continued engagement with the international
community. He warned of the risks of another failed SPLM
attempt to organize the Darfur rebel groups and called on the
international community to encourage the SPLM to coordinate
with the UN/AU political process--and thus head-off Asmara's
baleful influence on SPLM efforts. End summary.

--------------
UN-Sudan Relations Much Improved
--------------


2. (C) On the eve of UNSYG Ban Ki Moon's first visit to
Sudan, UN Acting Special Representative of the Secretary
General Taye Brooke-Zerihoun told CDA Fernandez on September
1 that the UN's relationship with the Khartoum regime "was
much better than it was one year ago, despite all the
difficulties." The Government is now "accommodating" the UN
on flight and customs clearances, is more open to meetings
with UN officials, and is implementing the High Level
Communique on Humanitarian Access, all steps that make it
possible to build a rapport with the regime leadership. He
noted that a year ago, "Sudanese government officials were
leading demonstrations against the UN. Now, it is
different." While the UN would not ignore some of the
lingering issues--such as the January 2007 assault on
humanitarian workers in Nyala and visa restrictions on UN
employees--the UNSYG's visit came at an ideal time to sustain

momentum on the peace process, pave the way for the
UN-African Mission in Darfur (UNAMID),and raise the profile
of Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) implementation,
according to Taye.

--------------
Different Prisms: Hard-liners and Pragmatists
--------------


3. (C) Pragmatists and hardliners view Ban's visit through a
distinct prism, said Taye. The former see it as tacit
acknowledgment of their success in overcoming UN Security
Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1706 in favor of the more recent
UNSCR 1769 to authorize the UN/AU hybrid peace-keeping force.
The latter hope the visit will highlight the Comprehensive
Peace Agreement (CPA) and underscore the importance of
improving Sudan's relations with the international community.
Ban's first event would be an address to the UN Association
in Khartoum in order to empower the pragmatists and "bring
Sudan into the fold," said Taye.


4. (C) The ASRSG said that the regime's policies reflect the
ongoing conflict within the National Islamic Front (NIF),
which pits the National Congress Party (NCP) against Hassan
al Turabi's Popular Congress Party (PCP) and pragmatists,
such as Vice President Ali Osman Taha and National
Intelligence and Security Service (NISS) Director General
Salah Ghosh, against hardliners, such as Presidential
Assistant Nafie Ali Nafie and the Ministers of Defense and
Interior. The recent expulsions of the Canadian Charge
d'Affaires and the country director for CARE "were
symptomatic of these internal struggles," said Taye.
Implying that the pragmatists were ascendant, Taye explained
that "they understand they have to give in here and there,
and on these expulsions, they conceded." He believed that
Vice President Taha "has made a little bit of a comeback" in
recent months.

--------------
Instability in the SPLM
--------------


5. (C) The Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) is
similarly unstable, with three major internal reshuffles in
the last year, according to Taye. A reshuffle of cabinet

KHARTOUM 00001384 002 OF 002


posts in the Government of National Unity was also on the
horizon, with Foreign Minister Lam Akol and Presidential
Advisor Mansour Khalid still poised to swap positions. The
SPLM deserved credit for rooting out corruption early in the
tenure of the Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS). The
economy, however, was "not under control," and Juba looks
like a "frontier town," with charlatan businessmen from
Uganda, Kenya, and the Congo driving the economy. Ban would
spend one night in Juba--the first overnight by a UNSYG in
Southern Sudan--and hoped to focus on CPA-related issues
throughout this trip. One such issue would be the
redeployment deadline for the SPLA and Sudan Armed Forces
(SAF) troops. Taye suggested that the issue was a "matter of
terminology:" while the vast majority of SAF forces had been
redeployed North, demobilized, and relieved of their weapons,
some were still receiving salaries from Khartoum.

--------------
Another Failed SPLM Initiative for Darfur?
--------------


6. (C) The SPLM's attempts to organize a Darfur initiative
exemplify its disorganization. According to Taye, First Vice
President Salva Kiir and Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS)
Vice President Riek Machar are at odds on the SPLM's role,
and both have been disconnected from the SPLM's Darfur
Taskforce. "My money is that they'll fail again, and I don't
know how they'll take that," said Taye, adding that the
Darfur rebel movements had lost patience with the SPLM after
several delayed meetings in Southern Sudan following the
Arusha conference in late July.


7. (C) Taye warned that Eritrea--"who is not happy about the
UN/AU process"--was using the SPLM for its own purposes.
Asmara is hosting rebel political leaders "that don't amount
to much and are bereft of any link to the commanders" and
hope to utilize the SPLM conference to bring military
elements under the control of their designated proxies. The
international community could not warn the SPLM about
Eritrea's motives, but the U.S. could emphasize that the SPLM
coordinate with the UN and AU per the Tripoli Consensus and
find a narrow role for its initiative under the broader peace
process. "They don't have an agenda," said Taye, "they just
want to be accepted as a genuine player."
FERNANDEZ