Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07KHARTOUM1144
2007-07-23 12:11:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Khartoum
Cable title:  

EGYPT VERIFIES COUP PLOT, "OBJECTS" TO UNSCR,

Tags:  PREL PGOV PINR KPKO UN AU SU EG LY 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO9801
OO RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #1144/01 2041211
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 231211Z JUL 07
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7964
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI IMMEDIATE 0215
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA IMMEDIATE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 001144 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, AF S/E NATSIOS, AF/SPG, AND
NEA/ELA
NSC FOR PITTMAN AND SHORTLEY
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/22/2012
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINR KPKO UN AU SU EG LY
SUBJECT: EGYPT VERIFIES COUP PLOT, "OBJECTS" TO UNSCR,
WARNS NOT TO RUSH PEACE

REF: KHARTOUM 01109

KHARTOUM 00001144 001.2 OF 002


Classified By: CDA Alberto Fernandez, Reason: Sections 1.4 (b) and (d)

--------------------------
Egypt Asserts Coup Was Real
---------------------------

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 001144

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, AF S/E NATSIOS, AF/SPG, AND
NEA/ELA
NSC FOR PITTMAN AND SHORTLEY
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/22/2012
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINR KPKO UN AU SU EG LY
SUBJECT: EGYPT VERIFIES COUP PLOT, "OBJECTS" TO UNSCR,
WARNS NOT TO RUSH PEACE

REF: KHARTOUM 01109

KHARTOUM 00001144 001.2 OF 002


Classified By: CDA Alberto Fernandez, Reason: Sections 1.4 (b) and (d)

--------------
Egypt Asserts Coup Was Real
--------------


1. (C) Meeting with Poloff on July 22, Egyptian Deputy Chief
of Mission Osama Shaltout (strictly protect) asserted that
the alleged coup by Umma Reform and Renewal Party leader
Mubarak Al Fadil and a group of retired military officers was
a true attempt to destabilize the Sudanese Government
(reftel). Alluding to intelligence reporting, Shaltout
claimed that Egypt had verified the weapons caches cited by
Sudan as evidence of the coup plot. He also corroborated
reports that Libya had warned Sudan of the coup. Libya's
intention, said Shaltout, was to pressure Khartoum by showing
that it had the power to influence Sudan's internal dynamics.
Shaltout said that several members of Al Fadil's Umma
faction had requested meetings with him and Egyptian
Ambassador Mohammed Al Shazli but that Cairo had ordered no
official contact with the party members.

--------------
Cairo Objects to UNSCR, Kind of
--------------


2. (C) Turning to the Darfur crisis, Shaltout expressed vague
Egyptian "objections" to the current draft of the UN Security
Council resolution to authorize the UN/AU hybrid
peace-keeping force. The international community should
recognize that Sudan had "made a lot of progress" in recent
months. When pressed for what specific language Egypt
opposed, Shaltout gave no specifics. Poloff underscored that
Sudan had the opportunity to demonstrate its sincerity in
accepting the UN/AU hybrid by encouraging members of the
Security Council and neighboring countries to pass a
resolution that would guarantee a strong and effective force,
with UN command and control and a clear Chapter VII mandate,
that could quickly end the violence in Darfur. (Comment: A
normally candid interlocutor, Shaltout's weak defense of
Sudan's efforts to dilute the UNSCR likely indicate an order
from Cairo to deliver stock talking points. When Poloff
explained the U.S. position, Shaltout nodded as if almost in
agreement. End comment.)

--------------
Can't "Rush" Political Process
--------------


3. (C) Egypt was leery of recent alleged statements by
prominent Western officials that an agreement between the
Sudanese Government and the Darfur rebel groups should be
concluded by August, according to Shaltout--who mentioned
Special Envoy Natsios by name. Cairo believed that such
rhetoric reflected domestic political deadlines in the U.S.
and that the Bush Administration wanted to "solve" Darfur
before the end of the President's term. Shaltout warned that
this view was unrealistic, and while bringing the Darfur
rebel groups to an agreement with the Government was
important, a political solution to the conflict "could not be
rushed." Shaltout anticipated that the Egyptian Government
would communicate a similar message to UN/AU Joint Special
Representative Rudolphe Adada during his visit to Cairo
around Aug. 4 when he would meet with Foreign Minister Ahmed
Aboul Gheit and Arab League Secretary General Amr Moussa.
Poloff said that the USG sought a lasting political agreement
to end the conflict and supported theqQN05IbQQ|bring peace, with the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) as the
basis of negotiations. He outlined the "shuttle diplomacy"
model for negotiations, which Shaltout welcomed.

--------------
Comment
--------------


4. (C) Shaltout was an accurate conveyer of Cairo's views on
the situation in Sudan. Egyptian diplomats here have
consistently downplayed Khartoum's obstructionism and
exaggerated "progress." According to Egyptian officials in
Khartoum, their chief motivation continues to be fears of
destabilizing the political situation in Sudan, which could
lead to the break-up of the country and the rise of
ungovernable and much more radical successor regimes poised

KHARTOUM 00001144 002.2 OF 002


on Egypt's southern border. End comment.


4. (U) Tripoli minimize considered.
FERNANDEZ