SUDAN OFFICIALS DIFFER ON DARFUR PKO, POLITICAL

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 KHARTOUM 001090

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR AF A/S FRAZER AND AF/SPG
NSC FOR PITTMAN AND SHORTLEY
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/12/2012
TAGS: PREL PGOV KPKO UN AU SU US ER CD LY
SUBJECT: SUDAN OFFICIALS DIFFER ON DARFUR PKO, POLITICAL
PROCESS IN MEETINGS WITH SE NATSIOS


KHARTOUM 00001090 001.2 OF 004


Classified By: CDA A. Fernandez, Reason: Sections 1.4 (b) and (d)

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Summary
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1. (C) On July 12, Special Envoy Natsios met separately with
Foreign Minister Lam Akol, Presidential Advisor Nafie Ali
Nafie, and Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs (and UN/AU
hybrid negotiator) Mutriff Siddiq to discuss deployment of
the hybrid peace-keeping force and bolster UN/AU efforts to
achieve a comprehensive political settlement to the crisis in
Darfur. Indicative of continuing tensions within the
National Congress Party (NCP),government interlocutors
offered conflicting views on necessary next steps on the
hybrid in the UN Security Council. While seeking Sudanese
officials' thoughts on advancing the political process, SE
Natsios agreed that Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA)
non-signatory leaders remained an obstruction to peace. His
interlocutors remained divided on Eritrea's role in the peace
process. Each of the officials denied or pled ignorance to
widespread reports of the resettlement of foreign Arabs in
Darfur, and Nafie virulently opposed U.S.-funded security
sector transformation for the Sudan People's Liberation Army
(SPLA),claiming that this was not provided for in the
Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). Akol suggested a visit
to Washington for Siddiq to ease the bilateral relationship.
End summary.

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Mixed Messages on UNSCR
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2. (SBU) Meeting with Foreign Minister Lam Akol, Assistant to
the President Nafie Ali Nafie, and Undersecretary of Foreign
Affairs Mutriff Siddiq on July 12, SE Natsios stated that the
U.S. welcomed Sudan's acceptance of the UN/AU hybrid
peace-keeping force for Darfur but urged that Sudan follow
through fully with its commitment to allow deployment. The
U.S. was concerned that Sudan's allies in the UN Security
Council would "play games" with the language of the UN
Security Council Resolution (UNSCR). SE Natsios urged quick
action in the Council and warned against Sudanese delays. He
asked officials for their views of the UNSCR draft, which the
Government had just received.


3. (C) Akol commented that "the kind of language used by the
British drafters is divisive to say the least." The UNSCR
should look forward not backwards. It should avoid
condemnation of past Sudanese Government actions and instead
"tell us what we should do." A narrowly defined Chapter VII
resolution was "not a big problem for us," said Akol. UNSCR
1591 included Chapter VII language, and "you cannot have a
peace-keeping operation that can't defend itself." CDA
Fernandez clarified the Sudanese Government position as
objecting only to language that put the Sudanese Government
"on the defensive," to which Akol agreed. (Note: In a press
conference following his meeting with Akol, SE Natsios
welcomed Sudan's agreement to the UN/AU hybrid and said it
was "important that the Sudanese Government facilitate its
implementation urgently." End note.)


4. (C) Nafie objected to any resolution that contained
language beyond the June 12 Addis Ababa agreement among the
UN, AU, and Sudan. "We will abide by that agreement, which
was a compromise." According to Nafie, Sudan opposed UNSCRs
1591 and 1706 and would not accept Chapter VII language.
(Note: Following the meeting with Nafie, the MFA Director of
the Americas Department told CDA that Nafie's comments were a
"personal opinion" and did not reflect the official position
of the Government. This was also implied by Siddiq, who took
a more nuanced view toward the resolution. End note.)


5. (C) The Government has convened an inter-agency committee
staffed by those present in Addis Ababa to study the text
more closely, and Siddiq, an architect of the June 12
agreement among the UN, AU, and Sudan, had just spoken with
the UK Ambassador in Khartoum about the draft. Siddiq
offered preliminary concerns on the text -- that it
overreached with references in the preamble to earlier
"irrelevant" UNSCRs and that language on a Status of Forces
Agreement (SOFA) and demobilization, disarmament, and
reintegration was intermingled with a Chapter VII mandate.
Although clear that the Undersecretary considered it to be a

KHARTOUM 00001090 002.2 OF 004


less-then-ideal draft, he noted that "the essence will be
manageable if there is will" to act on Sudanese requests for
corrections. Siddiq asserted that a broadly defined Chapter
VII mandate remained a non-starter. Siddiq reiterated the
Government's flexibility without committing them to a
specific decision at this point.


6. (C) In response to queries about command and control,
Siddiq maintained that the command and control structure
would be "clarified in the course of its implementation,"
claiming that Tripartite discussions since the June 12
Statement of Conclusions have already refined a structure in
which the AU would "borrow" existing UN assets and referenced
the UN's role as a backstop to the AU. Siddiq emphasized
Khartoum's sensitivity to the need for UN oversight of the
logistical and administrative components of a peacekeeping
force, but stressed the AU should be left with "the rest"
(military and protection duties) which served functions that
were "less urgent." Siddiq underscored Khartoum's
willingness to deviate from past requests for a peacekeeping
force that was "solely African in character" should available
resources preclude it, citing Egyptian, Pakistani, and
Chinese assistance to the Heavy Support Package (HSP).

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Sudanese Officials Differ on Political Solution
-------------- --


7. (SBU) Throughout his meetings, SE Natsios explained that
the focus of his trip was the Darfur political process. The
President and the Secretary believed that a near-term
political solution to the crisis in Darfur is imperative.
The elections in 2009 had the potential to either stabilize
or destabilize the country, said the Special Envoy. If the
Darfur crisis was not resolved beforehand, it would "become
very difficult for Sudan." He acknowledged that the disunity
and duplicity of the rebels were major impediments to
negotiations. He reviewed recent U.S. efforts to pressure
rebels to participate in the AU/UN-led political process,
specifically the sanctioning of Justice and Equality Movement
(JEM) leader Khalil Ibrahim and his personal attempts to
persuade Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM) leader Abdulwahid
al-Nur to modify his stance toward the Darfur Peace Agreement
(DPA). SE Natsios characterized a recent meeting in Paris
with Abdulwahid as "difficult." Abdulwahid feared that any
meeting of political leaders or commanders under the UN/AU
would "remove him from power." Based on his recent
discussions in Darfur, SE Natsios said that core demands
differed among the military commanders, the
internally-displaced persons, and the political leadership.
The USG supported the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue's
(CHD) efforts to consolidate the remnants of the SLM in
preparation for negotiations led by the UN/AU. He
underscored the importance of avoiding large, formal
negotiations, which would turn into a "circus" like the Abuja
talks. To avoid a "bidding war" between the parties, the
UN/AU could shuttle between the DPA non-signatories and the
Government to resolve key issues prior to final, brief
negotiations. Eritrea was not a neutral actor, and the
Sudanese Government should push Asmara to adhere to the
UN/AU-lead.


8. (C) Akol agreed that the Darfur crisis could only be
resolved through a political solution and "that all mediation
should converge on the UN and AU." Prior to a recent meeting
between Pekka Haavisto, the senior advisor to UN Envoy Jan
Eliasson, and First Vice President Salva Kiir, Eritrean
officials had "snuck in to see" Kiir and secure his agreement
for Eritrean-led talks. Akol had later told Kiir that "he
should be very clear that mediation is UN/AU." Akol agreed
that Abdulwahid was an impediment to the peace process.
"Eliasson and Salim's real problem is bringing the other side
to the table," said Akol. "There are a lot of permutations."
Some non-signatories were in Eritrea, others in Chad, still
others in Europe. Abdulwahid was opposed to travel to Sudan
for security reasons. Ahmed Abdulshafi refused to travel to
Asmara. Ibrahim wanted talks only in East Africa or the
"liberated areas" of Darfur. Akol suggested that the
upcoming Tripoli summit tackle these difficulties and decide
a venue for negotiations.


9. (C) Nafie asserted that "for the NCP, nothing could be
more important than having a political agreement before
elections." He asserted that the NCP "intends to sweep the

KHARTOUM 00001090 003.2 OF 004


elections" and wanted to avoid a delay in the 2009 elections
or the exemption of Darfer beCause of phe cgnflict Gh)leQ
tle NCTsupnbtdd#Tld Q5d`N,ukPdesdiQeqQrwo Afkmmlt7QQR`LO) QnlQk`dgi `a\aQfwQ,&md.a`vh&Qwo5Q-c(Q#Qb$SwQh}xasQi Qhl(zCdzvj&Ma=kQQQeBv3pN>^Qc1 NpSQ\W9R]9FQy&L3dZxion would lead to the rise of more
intransigent rebel leaders. "We will have another Khalil,
another Suleiman Jamous, another Abdulwahid -- this is
endless." He said that the UN/AU was recognizing the
political leaders but neglecting the field commanders.
Eritrea, however, had a dedicated team that traveled
frequently to Darfur, which gained them more influence on the
movements than Chad or Libya (or Western mediators). Nafie
suggested that the UN/AU and Eritrea reconcile their
initiatives and said it would be counter-productive for Sudan
to ask Eritrea to "stand down."


10. (C) Siddiq called for a convergence of initiatives under
the UN/AU and firm leadership by the two bodies. "If the
AU/UN political process does not start in August, it will
never start," he maintained. Siddiq said he had passed the
same message to Haavisto within the last two weeks. "There
must be a deadline, an end-point," Siddiq continued, "by
which engagement by others not under the AU/UN umbrella must
cease." The DPA failed as a result of competition between
regional actors. "Chad and Eritrea aborted the DPA, yet
Khartoum paid the price." Siddiq argued for strict deadlines
for external actors' "assistance" to resolve the conflict and
for rebel groups who opt out of the final annex. Groups not
adhering to an "annexed DPA" would be subjected to forced
disarmament. Political opponents of an agreement were
welcome to compete in the 2009 elections. Natsios noted U.S.
attempts to contain Libya and constraints in U.S. engagement
with Asmara. Siddiq acknowledged the difficulties posed by
Eritrea, noting Asmara's initial collusion with Chad, and the
fact it still harbored an "Eastern cell" of JEM. In light of
ongoing difficulties facing the Eastern Sudan Peace Agreement
and dealing with a fractured Eastern Front, Khartoum was
growing less enamored with Asmara's pressure tactics employed
in the name of peace. "I have personally attempted to
discourage this approach," Mutriff noted, expressing both
skepticism about Asmara's chances for success and doubts as
to Eritrea's motivations. "I think they have hit a wall," he
said.

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Bilateral Relationship: Sudanese Officials to Visit U.S.?
-------------- QEQQ[QQ6omeetings for Sudanese officials in Washington.
Supportive of the idea, SE Natsios asked for names that he
could "take back to Washington." Akol suggested Siddiq, "not
to melt the ice but to let it float." SE Natsios noted that
in principle this was a good idea. (Note: In response to
questions from the Special Envoy about his willingness to
travel to the United States, Siddiq said he hoped a future
visit would garner meetings with Congressional leaders,
particularly Congressman Donald Payne. End note.)

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Nafie Denies Resettlement of Foreign Arabs
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12. (C) SE Natsios expressed U.S. concern at widespread
reports of the resettlement of Chadian and Nigerien Arabs
into Darfur under the supervision of the Sudanese Government.
While noting the ethnic complexity of Darfur, Nafie
virulently denied accusations of Government-organized
resettlement. "Absolutely, this not even entertainable
morally or ethically. As a Muslim, how could I allow this?"
He acknowledged considerable cross-border migration of
Chadian and Sudanese Arabs (who belong to the same tribes)
but characterized the resettlement reports as a "plot" and
the next effort by the West "to keep the pot boiling on
Sudan." Akol said he was unaware of the reports.

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KHARTOUM 00001090 004.2 OF 004


Objections to SST for the South
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13. (C) Regarding recent public NCP complaints about U.S.
assistance to the SPLA, SE Natsios said that the President
and former Secretary Powell had agreed to support security
sector transformation (SST) of the SPLA as part of the
Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). "This is not a secret,"
stated the Special Envoy, who said that the U.S. would
welcome the opportunity to brief the Ministry of Defense and
the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) on the program. He also
repudiated recent press reports that the SST was a result of
the U.S. wanting to distract Sudan from Darfur. Nafie
angrily denied that a SST program was permitted under the
CPA. "Whatever you call this now, you are definitely
building an army for the South. This is obvious to us."
Akol was supportive of U.S. interaction with the Ministry of
Defense on this issue.


14. (U) This message was cleared by SE Natsios' staff.


15. (U) Tripoli minimize considered.
FERNANDEZ