BHUTANESE REFUGEES: LAYING THE GROUNDWORK

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KATHMANDU 000078

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/11/2017
TAGS: PREF PREL PGOV BH NP AS
SUBJECT: BHUTANESE REFUGEES: LAYING THE GROUNDWORK

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Classified By: Charge Nicholas Dean for reasons 1.4(b/d).

Summary
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1. (C) In recent meetings with Acting Foreign Secretary
Bhagirath Basnet, UNHCR Representative Abraham Abraham, and
Core Group Chair and Australian Ambassador Graeme Lade,
RefCoord promoted coordinated donor action to encourage the
Government of Nepal (GON) to adopt a resettlement policy.
Basnet confirmed that the GON intended to hold at least one
last bilateral with the Bhutanese government before agreeing
to third-country resettlement. UNHCR Abraham reported that
the census of Beldangi II camp was complete and that the
census of all seven camps would finish in mid- to late April.
Abraham welcomed coordinated donor action to encourage the
GON to agree to resettlement. Ambassador Lade agreed in
principle to send the same message to the GON on resettlement
and believed other Core Group members, such as the Canadians
and Dutch, would also be supportive. Lade believed that
support for resettlement was widespread, but indicated that
Australia would wait until after completion of the census to
make a formal resettlement offer.

Acting Foreign Secretary Gives Nothing Away
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2. (C) In a January 8 meeting, Acting Foreign Secretary
Bhagirath Basnet could not predict when the Government of
Nepal (GON) would hold the next bilateral discussion on
Bhutanese refugees with the Royal Government of Bhutan
(RGOB),noting it would be a political decision and would
have to wait until the interim Government had been formed.
RefCoord suggested that the GON pursue two tracks of
negotiations -- one with the Bhutanese government on
repatriation and the other with Core Group members on
resettlement. (Note: Earlier, Foreign Ministry Joint
Secretary Dinesh Bhattarai had suggested this possibility.

SIPDIS
End Note.) Basnet replied that only after the bilateral was
held could the GON make a decision on resettlement. In a
later meeting, Australian Ambassador Graeme Lade noted his
discussions with Basnet had also "drawn a blank," revealing
no progress on scheduling the GON-RGOB bilateral or movement
on adopting a resettlement policy.

UNHCR Reports Progress on Census, Urges Core Group
Coordination
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3. (SBU) In a January 9 meeting with UNHCR Country
Representative Abraham Abraham, RefCoord learned that,
although the UNHCR - GON census in the camps had been running
efficiently, the census would likely finish in mid- to late
April rather than the earlier target of mid-March. Abraham
praised the GON's high level of cooperation, noting that
local Home Ministry officials had gone out of their way to
ensure a smooth operation. Abraham hoped to finalize the
census assessment report by the end of May.


4. (SBU) RefCoord explained that the U.S. might soon extend a
formal offer to the GON, and seek concurrence for a U.S.
resettlement program. Abraham welcomed this news, opining
that additional pressure on the GON to move forward with
resettlement was necessary. He stated his preference for
coordinated Core Group action on this proposal.

Australian Ambassador Supportive of U.S. Message
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5. (C) On January 10, RefCoord met with Australian Ambassador
to Nepal (and Core Group Chair),Graeme Lade at his
invitation to discuss coordinated Core Group action to urge
the GON to formulate a resettlement policy. RefCoord
described the U.S. intention to make a formal resettlement
offer and asked whether Australia might soon make a similar
offer. While Lade said his government was not ready to make

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a concrete offer, he agreed in principle to sending the same
message to the GON that it should move forward soon on
resettlement. He noted the GON's desire to hold at least one
last bilateral meeting with the RGOB before moving forward on
resettlement, however. Lade agreed with RefCoord that, if
Foreign Minster K.P. Oli were to keep his Cabinet position in
an interim Government, the bilateral would be a box-checking
exercise, after which the GON would likely move forward with
resettlement. The assumption was that the GON had little
hope of securing RGOB agreement on repatriation.

Growing Support For Resettlement
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6. (C) Lade believed that there was growing support from all
sides of the issue for a resettlement program. Specifically,
he described a recent communication to the Australian High
Commission in New Delhi from the RGOB supporting
third-country resettlement. (Note: The RGOB has also
communicated the same in a written letter to the Danish
Embassy in New Delhi. End Note.) He also noted that, during
the November Core Group visit to the refugee camps in
southeastern Nepal, the seven camp Secretaries had appeared
united in their support for third-country resettlement.
RefCoord, however, noted the set back from the Bhutanese
Foreign Minister's recent comments to Bhutan's Parliament
that repatriation of Bhutanese refugees would be equivalent
to importing terrorists. Within the refugee community, this
had re-ignited the desire to hold the RGOB accountable for
the expulsion as well as negative feelings towards
resettlement.

More Resettlement Numbers Needed
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7. (C) RefCoord noted that the ongoing census in the camps
would not result in a dramatically reduced number of
refugees; contrary to previous predictions, and that the Core
Group needed to find a solution for roughly 105,000 persons.
With the U.S. offer to take 60,000 and perhaps another 20,000
to Canada and Australia, the fate of roughly 25,000 refugees
remained undecided. Lade indicated that his government would
wait until after the census was complete before offering to
resettle a specific number of Bhutanese refugees. However,
he suspected that Australia would eventually agree to a
four-year program processing between 1,000 - 3,000 refugees
annually. Lade agreed to press the GON on resettlement and
believed that other Core Group members, such as the Dutch and
Canadians, would also be supportive.

Comment
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8. (C) In previous meetings with the Ambassador, Foreign
Minister K.P. Oli had agreed that, after one more bilateral
discussion with the RGOB, he would be ready to support
development of a resettlement policy. A formal U.S. offer to
resettle 60,000 Bhutanese refugees would provide FM Oli with
ammunition to take to the Council of Ministers, would place
additional pressure on the GON to move forward with
scheduling the bilateral, and would eliminate a frequent GON
claim that the U.S. has not informed Kathmandu "officially"
of our resettlement offer. Post believes a formal U.S.
request now for GON agreement on resettlement is necessary to
get the ball rolling. The GON bureaucracy is world class --
we should expect the formulation of a resettlement policy to
take six months or longer. Australia's support for a common
Core Group message advocating formulation of a GON
resettlement policy is positive; Australia could be a
potential ally in Geneva. Post will continue to coordinate
actions with Core Group members in Kathmandu to the maximum
extent possible.
DEAN