AFTER PUSHING FOR AN INTERIM GOVERNMENT, INDIANS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KATHMANDU 000739

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/10/2017
TAGS: PGOV PTER PREL PREF BT IN NP
SUBJECT: AFTER PUSHING FOR AN INTERIM GOVERNMENT, INDIANS
NOW ADMIT OBSTACLES TO ELECTIONS

Classified By: Ambassador James F. Moriarty for reasons 1.4(b/d).

Summary
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1. (C) Indian Ambassador Shiv Shankar Mukherjee agreed with
the Ambassador April 9 that the re-appointment of Krishna
Prasad Sitaula as Home Minister would exacerbate existing
tensions in the Terai and make it more difficult to impose
law and order. They also agreed that problems remained with
the inclusion of marginalized groups in the political
process. The Ambassador reassured Mukherjee that U.S.
support for the Madhesi People's Rights Forum (MPRF) was
based on the need to include marginalized groups in a
national dialogue and did not extend to condoning violence.
India would support a decision by the Seven Party Alliance
(SPA) and Maoists to postpone the Constituent Assembly
election if the decision was reached jointly by all eight
governing parties, Mukherjee stressed. He appeared visibly
worried that a recent U.S. assessment indicated that
political parties remained unable to conduct party business
freely in 80 percent of Nepal's districts. The Indian
Ambassador agreed that a flawed election would need to be
condemned broadly and publicly. According to Mukherjee,
India's Prime Minister had told Prime Minister Koirala that
India supported third-country resettlement of the Bhutanese
refugees. Once resettlement had progressed significantly,
India might assist in repatriating the residual population.

Home Minister's Re-appointment Sent Wrong Message
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2. (C) In a meeting April 9 with Indian Ambassador Shiv
Shankar Mukherjee, the Ambassador emphasized that the
formation of an interim government with Krishna Prasad
Sitaula as Home Minister had exacerbated tensions with the
Madhesi rights movement in the Terai and made it more
difficult to impose law and order across the country.
Mukherjee agreed, noting that every Madhesi he had contacted
felt "insulted" by the PM's decision to retain Sitaula. The
Government of India (GOI) supported legitimate Madhesi
grievances but believed Madhesis needed to play a more
responsible role, come into the process and participate in
elections. The Ambassador pointed out that the Government of
Nepal (GON) had not yet allowed Madhesis into the political
process. Mukherjee agreed that inclusion remained a problem.

U.S. Support for the Madhesi People's Rights Forum
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3. (C) Mukherjee reported that he had reports that the
Madhesi People's Rights Forum (MPRF) President Upendra Yadav
had claimed that he had the backing of the United States and
thus did not need India's help. Mukherjee appeared worried
that the U.S. was attempting to undermine the Maoists by
supporting the MPRF. The Ambassador assured him that the
U.S. was not providing the MPRF with anything but moral
support. The Embassy had issued a public statement in the
wake of the Gaur massacre condemning violence on both sides.
The Ambassador said it was important that the diplomatic
community continued to press the GON to more adequately
include marginalized groups, including the MPRF, in the
political process.

India Would Support GON Decision To Delay Election...
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4. (C) Mukherjee noted that there had been increased talk of
delaying the Constituent Assembly (CA) election scheduled for
June 20. The GOI would support any decision by the Seven
Party Alliance (SPA) and the Maoists to postpone the CA
election, but that the eight parties should jointly announce
and publicly support any such decision. The international
diplomatic community, Mukherjee averred, should not publicly
push for an election delay. The Ambassador agreed, with the
caveat that the environment for elections needed to be free
and fair or else face condemnation.

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...But Agreed That Flawed Elections Were Possible
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5. (C) The Ambassador described a recent National Democratic
Institute (NDI) assessment that concluded that Nepali
political parties were unable to work freely in 80 percent of
Nepal's districts due to Maoist intimidation and the
instability in the Terai. Mukherjee appeared visibly worried
when the Ambassador described how political party workers
were only allowed to work in the countryside as long as they
abided by Maoist rules, which included not criticizing the
Maoists. The Ambassador explained that he was urging the
international community to declare publicly that, if Maoists
failed to improve their behavior in the run-up to elections,
elections could not be free and fair. Mukherjee agreed that
flawed elections would need to be denounced broadly and
publicly.

India Told Nepal to Proceed with Bhutanese Refugee
Resettlement
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6. (C) The Ambassador said he was not pleased that Prime
Minister G.P. Koirala had told Assistant Secretary Richard
Boucher in New Delhi that third-country resettlement of the
Bhutanese refugees would only happen after some repatriation
to Bhutan had begun. The Ambassador said that he had warned
Finance Minister Ram Saran Mahat on April 8 that the U.S. was
not willing to support Nepal's political gamesmanship with
Bhutan; if resettlement were indefinitely postponed, the U.S.
might begin reducing its assistance to the refugee camps.
Mahat had indicated that the GON intended to pursue both
repatriation and resettlement simultaneously, but wanted
international condemnation of Bhutan, the Ambassador said.
Mukherjee also related Indian Prime Minister Man Mohan
Singh's discussion with PM Koirala on the margins of the
SAARC Summit; Singh had encouraged Koirala to move ahead with
resettlement now, adding that after resettlement had
progressed significantly, India might help with repatriating
the residual population.

Comment
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7. (C) Compared with India's strong push for an interim
government and desire to move ahead quickly toward a
Constituent Assembly election, the GOI now seems to have
begun to acknowledge that some delay in the election might be
required. Perhaps the GOI has realized that, with continuing
unrest in the Terai and Maoist threats and intimidation
unabated, flawed elections are likely and could entirely
derail the peace process.
MORIARTY