NEPAL: PEACE NEGOTIATOR EXPECTS FORMATION OF

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KATHMANDU 000653

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/29/2017
TAGS: PGOV PTER EAIR ETRD SAARC NP
SUBJECT: NEPAL: PEACE NEGOTIATOR EXPECTS FORMATION OF
INTERIM GOVERNMENT AFTER SAARC SUMMIT

Classified By: Ambassador James F. Moriarty. Reasons 1.4 (b/d)

Summary
--------------


1. (C) Pradip Gyawali, the Communist Party of Nepal - United
Marxist Leninist (UML) representative on the Government talks
team with the Maoists, told the Ambassador March 28 that he
expected the formation of an interim government would be
delayed until after the South Asian Association for Regional
Cooperation (SAARC) Summit. Gyawali, who is also Minister of
Culture, Tourism and Civil Aviation, said the Maoists had not
yet decided whether to join the government. He noted that
the Maoists realized they would not fare well in the
Constituent Assembly elections. The Ambassador stressed our
concern about the large number of Maoists who had recently
begun working as porters at the cargo terminal at Kathmandu's
Tribhuvan International Airport. This created legal issues
for U.S. entities who would have to pay them fees, and
created the risk that the U.S. organizations would have to
stop using the airport. The Civil Aviation Minister promised
to take corrective action. In response to a question from
the Ambassador, Gyawali praised Boeing's record as a supplier
of aircraft to Nepal's national carrier and ventured that a
final decision on the purchase of a two aircraft might be
announced in the coming days.

Formation of Interim Government Likely Delayed Until After
SAARC Summit
-------------- --------------


2. (C) In a meeting March 28, Pradip Gyawali, who is the
UML's representative on the Government of Nepal (GON) talks
team with the Maoists, informed the Ambassador that, despite
all the pressure to form an interim government before the
April 3-4 SAARC Summit in New Delhi, he thought the process
would be delayed. He agreed with the Ambassador that the
Maoists should not be allowed to join the Interim Government
until they changed their behavior and fulfilled their peace
process commitments. But he added that not bringing the
Maoists into the government would create its own set of
problems. Gyawali commented that the Maoists themselves had
not yet decided whether they wanted to join the Interim
Government. As the Ambassador noted, this was reportedly one
of the principal questions the Maoist Central Committee,
which was currently in session in Kathmandu, was discussing.
The peace negotiator, who is also Nepal's Minister of
Culture, Tourism and Civil Aviation, said that the Maoists
had to make a choice: whether to change their behavior and
join the GON or stay outside and pursue terror.

Explaining Ongoing Maoist Abuses
--------------


3. (C) The UML Minister admitted that a fundamental problem
was the gap between Maoist commitments and practice. He
speculated that one reason for the ongoing abuses might be
the top Maoist leaders' inability to control their
rank-and-file. Gyawali described many of the latter group as
uneducated, untrained and uncultured; they had joined the
Maoist ranks for personal advantage. He ventured that time
and the environment might change Maoist misbehavior. The
Ambassador responded that he was skeptical. Every time he
saw a Maoist Central Committee decision it was at direct odds
with the Maoist commitments in the peace process. That had
been the case in November 2006 when the Central Committee
ordered mass recruitment of pseudo-combatants to go into the
UN-monitored cantonments and again in early 2007 when they
had stood up the militant Youth Communist League (YCL). The
Minister admitted that these actions by the Maoists gave the
GON great concern also. He remarked that a large number of
actual combatants were outside the camps and concurred that
YCL intimidation posed a big challenge to the political
parties.

Maoist Facing Increasing Public Dissatisfaction
-------------- --


4. (C) The peace negotiator claimed that the Maoists would

KATHMANDU 00000653 002 OF 002


ultimately have no alternative. They would have to change.
The public would demand it. If they did not change, they
would face even greater opposition than they were currently
experiencing from the Madhesis in the Terai. Gyawali said
the Maoist leaders recognized that their ongoing abuses were
damaging their public image and agreed with the Ambassador
that their prospects in the Constituent Assembly polls were
decreasing. The Culture Minister said Nepal's ethnic
communities in particular had become disenchanted with the
Maoists.

U.S. Concern About Maoist Porters At the Airport
-------------- ---


5. (C) The Ambassador alerted Gyawali, in the latter's
capacity as Minister of Civil Aviation, to reports that the
Maoists had in recent months compelled the Civil Aviation
Authority to add a large number of their cadre as porters at
the cargo terminal at Kathmandu's Tribhuvan International
Airport. Under a U.S. Executive order, U.S. entities were
barred from providing money to Maoists, either directly or
indirectly. The presence of these Maoist porters, who now
made up perhaps half of the pool of porters, created the real
risk that the U.S. would have to stop using Tribhuvan Airport
for cargo. The Civil Aviation Minister said he was aware of
the problem and took it extremely seriously. He had done a
preliminary investigation, but asked for additional time to
collect more details. He promised then to take corrective
action. As he pointed out, there was no good alternative to
Tribhuvan Airport for transporting cargo in and out of Nepal.
Other airports simply did not have the required facilities.

Boeing Favored In Aircraft Tender
--------------


6. (SBU) The Ambassador also took the opportunity to follow
up on a letter he had sent to the Prime Minister (and copied
to Gyawali) in December 2006 on the tender by the
government-owned Nepal Airlines Corporation (NAC) for one
wide-bodied and one narrow-bodied airplane. The Civil
Aviation Minister emphasized that Nepal had had an excellent
experience with Boeing aircraft and that its facilities and
personnel were all set up to operate Boeing aircraft. He
added that he was in close touch with Boeing reps; a final
decision on which aircraft the NAC would buy might be
announced in the coming days.

Comment
--------------


7. (C) The head of Minister Gyawali's party, UML Secretary
General M.K. Nepal, has been one of the most outspoken Nepali
leaders in favor of the quick formation of an interim
government with Maoist participation, so it is noteworthy
that Gyawali thinks the process will wait until, at least,
after the SAARC Summit. Gyawali's view that the Maoists have
to change is a common one, as is his view that Maoist deeds
and words have yet to match up. We will see what action he
is prepared to take to deal with the Maoist issue at the
airport. His ministry controls the issuance of airport
passes, so he could cancel those, if he so chooses. His
comments on Boeing aircraft came as good news, but with a
tender for new aircraft on hold for almost a decade, we would
not be surprised if the decision is put off again.
MORIARTY