NORWEGIAN AMBASSADOR ACKNOWLEDGES PEACE PROCESS AT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KATHMANDU 000589

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/21/2017
TAGS: PTER MARR PREL PGOV PREF UN BH NP
SUBJECT: NORWEGIAN AMBASSADOR ACKNOWLEDGES PEACE PROCESS AT
RISK

Classified By: Ambassador James F. Moriarty for reasons 1.4(b/d).

Summary
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1. (C) Ambassador Moriarty encouraged Norwegian Ambassador
Tore Toreng March 19 to support fully Prime Minister
Koirala's efforts to prevent Maoist entry into an interim
government until Maoist behavior improved. Toreng worried,
however, that the widening credibility gap between the
Seven-Party Alliance (SPA) and Maoists and further delay of
an interim government would derail the peace process. Toreng
hoped the Maoists genuinely intended to operate from within a
multi-party democracy and supported giving the Maoists more
time to transform themselves from violent insurgents to
mainstream politicians. The Ambassador argued that Maoist
intentions were to seize total state power as demonstrated by
continued violence and intimidation. Maoists, not the SPA,
were to blame for the current stalemate. Both agreed that
Constituent Assembly elections were critical to the peace
process, although flawed elections would do more harm than
good.

Maoists Could Pursue One of Three Options
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2. (C) In a meeting March 19 with Norwegian Ambassador Tore
Toreng, Ambassador Moriarty described the three likely
outcomes of the existing stalemate between the SPA and the
Maoists. First, the Maoists could agree to compromise,
improve their conduct, and enter an interim government.
Second, if Government of Nepal (GON) will collapsed, the
Maoists could bully their way into an interim government in a
move to consolidate state power behind a legitimate facade.
Third, the Maoists could take advantage of anti-monarchical
sentiment and political confusion to seize control
illegitimately through "street power." While the first
option, Maoist compromise, was preferable, up until now
Maoist actions suggested it was not that likely, the
Ambassador concluded. On the other hand, if the GON allowed
the Maoists into an interim government before a noticeable
change in behavior, the peace process would be at risk.
Therefore, the international community had to support Prime
Minister Koirala's effort to prevent Maoist entry into an
interim government until their behavior changed. Ambassador
Toreng acknowledged that if the Maoists attempted to use
street power to seize control that would be the effective end
of the peace process.

Maoists More Problematic Outside
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3. (C) Toreng agreed that the Maoists needed to improve their
conduct in order to overcome a widening credibility gap, but
opined that keeping them out of government threatened the
peace process more than allowing them entry. Toreng detailed
his meeting March 17 with Maoist leader Prachanda, who was
frustrated that the GON had established the Electoral
Delineation Commission without consulting him. "The Maoists
regarded this as provocative," he said. In anger, Prachanda
had threatened to stay out of an interim government even
though, Toreng believed, the Maoists were eager to join.

Maoists Don't Deserve Benefit of The Doubt
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4. (C) The Ambassador said that Prachanda's recent claim that
thousands of armed Maoist combatants remained outside the
cantonment sites was intended to show the people in the
villages that UN-monitored arms management was a farce and
thereby maintain a high level of fear and intimidation.
Toreng averred that Prachanda's comment was a serious mistake
primarily intended to show his support for the Maoists. The
Ambassador pointed out that Prachanda's statement only showed
that Maoists did not intend to abandon violence and continued

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to seek a monopoly on state power. Continuing violations by
the Maoists of their commitments almost a year after the
toppling of the King argues that we should not continue to
give the Maoists the benefit of the doubt, he said. Although
Toreng conceded that the Maoists' long-term goal might be
total state control, he believed the Maoists understood that
they would not win a majority (although they believed they
would receive the highest numbers of votes) in an election
and would have to work within a coalition government.

Peace Process Above All
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5. (C) Toreng emphasized the need to support the peace
process, which should be "by Nepalese, for Nepalese." The
Ambassador agreed, but argued that it was the Maoists that
had abandoned the peace process and it was up to the Maoists
to put the process back on track. The Ambassador suggested
that a stronger message holding the Maoists accountable for
their continued abuses would be helpful. While Norway was
not interested in allowing the Maoists to get away with
violating their peace commitments, Toreng replied, the
decision to allow Maoists to enter an interim government was
a Nepali decision. It should not be overly influenced by
outsiders. The Maoists continued to seek inclusion in an
interim government and to support elections and the formation
of a Constituent Assembly; Toreng felt these Maoist
objectives needed to be encouraged.

How Long Do We Wait?
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6. (C) The Ambassador detailed recent accounts of Maoist
abuse in Kathmandu, including the March 18 extortion and
assault on a reputable hotel owner. He asked Toreng if he
honestly had witnessed any progress in Maoist behavior.
Toreng claimed that progress had been made in that Maoists
were not killing people. "Peace does not mean the absence of
conflict," the Ambassador replied, adding that the Nepali
people were living in a state of fear, not peace. Maoist
threats and extortion had not abated and, at the same time,
the government had not successfully re-imposed law and order.
If the price was handing power to the Maoists, then the
process was not worth it. Toreng agreed that the Maoists
were not preparing for a free and fair election, but
suggested that it would take longer than twelve months for
Maoists to transform their psychology from one of violence to
one of peace. The Ambassador wondered how long the
international community should allow Maoist atrocities to
continue unchecked.

Prachanda Losing Control of Maoist Party?
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7. (C) Toreng claimed that Prachanda was a solid politician,
not someone prone to speaking in ideological terms, and
seemed genuinely to understand the need for compromise.
Toreng believed that Prachanda was struggling to maintain
control of the Communist Party of Nepal - Maoist (CPN-M) and
needed to balance his public statements with Maoist actions
in the countryside. Toreng argued that keeping the Maoists
out of an interim government would only ensure a failed peace
process. The Ambassador replied that the recent nationwide
creation of the Maoist Youth Communist League (YCL) reflected
a central-level decision that demonstrated clearly that
Prachanda had a tight grasp on the CPN-M. Worringly, the
center also equally intended to use the YCL as "street
thugs." Toreng agreed that YCL activities ran the risk of
ruining the peace process and said that he had told Prachanda
the YCL would negatively affect elections unless used
constructively. Toreng suggested that Prachanda did not have
complete control over the CPN-M and needed the legitimacy of
joining an interim government to ensure his cadre complied
with the peace commitments.


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CA Election -- An Important Step in the Peace Process
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8. (C) Toreng claimed that he had seen little evidence of
under-age recruits in the Maoist cantonment site he had
visited recently. He pointed out that UN registration of
Maoist combatants and their arms was critical to demonstrate
the Maoist commitment to the peace process and that the CA
polls were not an end-game but rather the beginning of
another important phase in the peace process. The Ambassador
believed that, along the current trajectory, flawed elections
seemed inevitable and would also derail the peace process.
Toreng agreed that the Maoists needed to convince the world
that they were committed to the peace process. "Eventually
we would reach a point where we can no longer support the
peace process," he said. The most important goal now was
holding elections as soon as possible, he said. Toreng said
this was why it was so important to include the Maoists now
in the interim government so that an election date could be
announced. Toreng believed the Maoists intended to join the
political mainstream and that it was just a matter of time.

Norway Pleased With Progress on Bhutanese Refugees
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9. (SBU) The Ambassador detailed recent progress on Bhutanese
refugees, including Prime Minister Koirala's commitment to
allow third-country resettlement, the upcoming Core Group
(CG) demarche urging Bhutan to repatriate eligible refugees
and the possible Nepal-Bhutan meeting on the margins of the
SAARC Summit. Noting the importance of coordinated CG
action, the Ambassador suggested that a joint CG meeting with
the Home and Foreign Ministers be discussed at the next CG
meeting March 22. Toreng was pleased to hear of the progress
and proposed that Norway might renew its commitment to
resettle between 250 and 300 Bhutanese refugees. The
Ambassador stressed the need to secure Government of Nepal
buy-in in order to avoid a rollback on this issue. Toreng
agreed that Bhutanese refugees were not likely high on the
Maoist priority list, but said he would discuss this issue
directly with the Maoist leaders.

Comment
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10. (C) While well-intentioned, the Norwegian Ambassador has
a view of the Maoists that is both myopic and dangerous. By
continuing to give the Maoists the benefit of the doubt and
failing to hold them accountable for continued abuses, Norway
is encouraging further Maoist violations of their peace
commitments. That said, Norway continues to play an
important role in supporting the UN arms management process
and is eager to remain engaged in Nepal's democratic
transition. We also hope Norway will be supportive of the
U.S. agenda to promote third-country resettlement of
Bhutanese refugees.
MORIARTY