HOME MINISTER SAYS TRUST IS BIGGEST HURDLE WITH

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KATHMANDU 000582

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/20/2017
TAGS: PGOV PTER PREF BH NP
SUBJECT: HOME MINISTER SAYS TRUST IS BIGGEST HURDLE WITH
MAOISTS


Classified By: Ambassador James F. Moriarty. Reasons 1.4 (b/d)

Summary
--------------


1. (C) Home Minister Sitaula told the Ambassador March 17
that the biggest difficulty the Government of Nepal (GON)
faced in forming an interim government with the Maoists was
"biswas" (trust). He noted that the Maoists had started to
return some land they had seized but continued to violate
many of their peace process commitments. The Ambassador
asked when the GON intended to start arresting Maoists found
carrying illegal weapons. Sitaula insisted it would be
possible to make such arrests after the Maoists joined an
interim government. Home Secretary Mainali explained that
the 61 Maoists who were currently in jail had been arrested
since the April 2006 People's Movement. The Ambassador
emphasized that voters needed to be reassured. If arrests
were not made of Maoists flouting the law, the peace process
and the planned Constituent Assembly elections would fail,
which would put the GON in an even more difficult spot. The
Home Minister noted that the Maoists were still pushing for
key ministries such as Defense, Home and Finance, but
concurred with the Ambassador that this was probably just a
negotiating tactic. The Ambassador also urged the Home
Minister to do what he could to expedite the processing for
third-country resettlement of 36 vulnerable Bhutanese
refugees.

A Problem of Trust
--------------


2. (C) On March 17, Home Minister Krishna Prasad Sitaula
remarked to the Ambassador that the most difficult challenge
the GON faced in dealing with the Maoists was "biswas"
(trust). The Maoists wanted to join an interim government
but were still not acting as they should. They were not
giving the Seven-Party Alliance much reason to trust them.
The Home Minister noted that the Maoists had returned some of
the property they had seized during the insurgency, citing
examples in Dang District in Mid-West and Parsa in Central
Nepal. But they continued to violate other commitments they
had made in the peace agreements.

When Will Arrests Start?
--------------


3. (C) The Ambassador asked when the GON intended to start
arresting Maoists who were carrying illegal weapons. He
mentioned specifically the large number of Chinese pistols
that Maoist cadre were reportedly carrying. Sitaula and Home
Secretary Mainali admitted that the issue of small arms was a

SIPDIS
problem. The Home Minister insisted, however, that the GON
was prepared to arrest anyone found carrying an illegal
weapon. He added, in response to a question from the
Ambassador, that the GON would be able to enforce the ban on
illegal weapons once the Maoists joined the Interim
Government. Mainali noted that the 61 Maoists who were
reportedly in jail at present had been arrested since the
People's Movement in April 2006. The Home Secretary stated
that the GON was in the process of reviewing their records to
determine the nature of their crimes. They might be released
as a good will gesture toward the Maoists. Sitaula pointed
out that it was perhaps unfair to keep these low-level
Maoists in jail when the chief Maoist, and lawbreaker,
Prachanda was free.

Peace Process Will Fail If No Law Enforcement
--------------


4. (C) The Ambassador said that he recognized the GON might
have to take some steps to move the peace process forward,
but it was crucial to reassuring Nepali voters and the Nepali
public that the GON enforce the rule of law. Maoists were
roaming the country with weapons with impunity: this was
unacceptable. The Ambassador warned that if the law was not
enforced and violators arrested, the peace process would

KATHMANDU 00000582 002 OF 002


fail. The same was true of the planned Constituent Assembly
elections. The international community wanted to assist the
GON in holding an election which was free and fair. If,
however, it became apparent that the election had not met
that standard, the international community would be obliged
to say so publicly. A flawed election would put the GON in
an even more difficult predicament domestically and
internationally. The Ambassador urged the Home Minister to
do what he could to prevent such an outcome.

Maoists Pushing for Key Ministries
--------------


5. (C) The Home Minister stated that the Maoists were
continuing to push strongly for several of the key ministries
in the Interim Government, including Defense, Home and
Finance. They wanted a Deputy Prime Ministership, and had
mentioned the Foreign Ministry as well. Sitaula reported
that Prime Minister Koirala had no intention of giving them
those key ministries. The Ambassador speculated that the
Maoists were doing so in order to put pressure on the GON for
the ministries they really wanted. The Home Minister
concurred. Sitaula also characterized periodic threats by
the Maoists to stay out of the Interim Government as another
Maoist negotiating tactic.

Help With Vulnerable Bhutanese Refugees Requested
-------------- --------------

6.(C) The Ambassador asked the Home Minister for his
assistance in processing as soon as possible the 36
additional vulnerable Bhutanese refugees that the Office of
the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) had presented
to the GON for resettlement. Home Secretary Mainali noted
that 16 vulnerable Bhutanese refugees had already left. The
Ambassador said they were part of a previous group of
vulnerable refugees; three of them had gone to the United
States. The Ambassador added that he recognized that the GON
had a number of issues with processing urban refugees but he
trusted that the GON would not have any issues with the 36.
The latter group was a simple humanitarian issue.

Comment
--------------


7. (C) Home Minister Sitaula has heard the message repeatedly
from us that the law needs to be enforced if the peace
process and the elections are going to succeed. Whether he
is willing to do so remains to be seen. Ultimately, it may
take a new Home Minister to change the GON's policy of
tolerating Maoist impunity that has largely prevailed here
since the peace process began in 2006.
MORIARTY