FOREIGN MINISTER ON INTERIM GOVERNMENT, THREAT TO

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KATHMANDU 000560

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/16/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV PREF ASEC PTER BH NP
SUBJECT: FOREIGN MINISTER ON INTERIM GOVERNMENT, THREAT TO
U.S., BHUTANESE REFUGEES


Classified By: Ambassador James F. Moriarty for reasons 1.4(b/d).

Summary
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1. (C) Foreign Minister K.P. Oli suggested to the Ambassador
March 15 that the Interim Parliament might vote March 16 to
endorse Prime Minister Koirala and accept his oath of office.
Oli was not certain if the PM would then announce the
formation of an interim government. The Ambassador expressed
grave concern that Maoist leader Prachanda's claims of a
royalist plot to assassinate U.S. officials had placed U.S.
mission personnel at risk. If the current government
remained through April, Oli said, he would discuss refugees
with his Bhutanese counterpart at the SAARC Summit in New
Delhi April 3-4. Oli suggested that might be the final
bilateral meeting between Nepal and Bhutan on this issue. On
urban refugees, Oli indicated that his government wanted to
verify UNHCR's determination of refugee status before
providing exit permits.

Prime Minister To Take Oath of Office
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2. (C) On March 15, the Ambassador asked Foreign Minister
Krishna Prasad Oli about the prospects for an interim
government. Oli replied that the Interim Parliament might
vote March 16 to endorse Prime Minister Koirala and accept
his oath of office. Oli was uncertain whether the PM would
then announce formation of an interim government, but said
that the Maoists had not met the pre-conditions the PM had
set. He emphasized the need to prevent Maoist entry into an
interim government until they had renounced violence and the
instruments of violence. "If they renounce violence, then
the door would open for further agreement," Oli said. Maoist
use of violence was a reflection of Maoist policy, which had
not changed despite the peace process. The Ambassador noted
that Maoist leader Prachanda's comment March 12 that armed
Maoist combatants remained outside the cantonments was not
surprising. The Maoist objective was to demonstrate that the
UN-monitored arms management and cantonment program was a
farce in order to sustain the environment of fear and
intimidation throughout the country, the Ambassador pointed
out.

Prachanda's Claim of Royalist Plot Must Be Debunked
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3. (C) The Ambassador expressed grave concern that
Prachanda's public statement March 8 claiming the Royal
Palace was plotting to assassinate U.S. officials in Nepal
had put U.S. mission personnel at risk. By doing so,
Prachanda had, in effect, told his cadre that if they killed
a U.S. official, the Maoists would blame it on the Palace.
The Ambassador said he had requested the Government of Nepal
(GON) to demand evidence from the Maoists regarding the plot
and, if none existed, for the GON to make a statement to that
effect. More importantly, Prachanda needed privately to
direct Maoist cadre not to target U.S. Embassy personnel. It
was reassuring that PM Koirala had publicly noted that the
GON had received no evidence from the Maoists. That said,
the Ambassador noted, he had received neither evidence nor
assurances that the Maoists had issued the required
instructions. "We will hold the Maoists responsible for any
attack on U.S. officials in Nepal," he added. Oli was
sympathetic, but replied that he was not in contact with the
Maoists. The Ambassador requested Oli to tell Home Minister
Sitaula that the U.S. still awaited a response from the Home
Ministry on this issue.

Nepal-Bhutan Meeting on Bhutanese Refugees Possible at SAARC
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4. (SBU) The Ambassador asked whether a meeting between Nepal
and Bhutan on the Bhutanese refugee issue was likely at the
upcoming SAARC Summit in New Delhi April 3-4. Oli replied

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that, if the current Cabinet remained in office through
April, he intended to meet with his Bhutanese counterpart.
"This could be a conclusive meeting," he said, indicating
that the GON would move on other solutions if the Royal
Government of Bhutan (RGOB) showed no willingness to move on
the refugees. The Ambassador informed Oli that the Core
Group of donor governments intended to deliver a demarche to
Bhutan prior to the SAARC Summit urging Bhutan to repatriate
eligible refugees. He recounted his meeting March 10 with PM
Koirala in which the PM said he looked forward to the
resettlement program moving ahead. The Ambassador assured
Oli that the U.S. would continue to push for repatriation,
but was also interested in beginning resettlement as early as
July/August. "We can do that," Oli replied, as long as the
Nepal-Bhutan bilateral meeting occurred before then. If
Bhutan allowed for repatriation, Nepal would be very pleased.
But if Bhutan did not change its mind on repatriation, then
Nepal would start the resettlement program, he added. The
Ambassador also urged Oli to process the 36 Bhutanese
vulnerable cases that UNHCR submitted January 4 to the GON.

Nepal Not Processing Urban Refugees
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5. (SBU) The Ambassador asked Oli to allow the 50 urban
refugees that the U.S. had accepted for resettlement to
depart Nepal. Oli responded that the GON was displeased with
how UNHCR had failed to collaborate with the government
before issuing refugee determinations. (Note: UNHCR Nepal
currently has registered 390 urban asylum seekers and
refugees. According to UNHCR Resident Representative
Abraham, the GON has demanded that UNHCR cease processing any
urban asylum seekers. End Note.) The Ambassador stressed
that these individuals could not return to their countries of
origin and that the U.S. had a humanitarian interest in their
fate. Oli suggested that the GON wanted to assess the urban
refugees' asylum claims itself before issuing exit permits.
He also indicated this was the purview of the Home Ministry,
not Foreign Ministry.

Comment
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6. (C) It is unclear when the Interim Parliament will vote
upon, and accept, the Prime Minister's oath of office. We
agree with FM Oli that the Maoists should be kept out of an
interim government until they have demonstrated improved
behavior. Unfortunately, Oli's enmity with the Maoist
leadership, as well as with the leadership of his own
CPN-UML, may result in his replacement as a member of the
Cabinet. Oli is not only tough on the Maoists, but is also
forward leaning on Bhutanese refugees and appears sincere in
wishing to conclude this issue once and for all with the
RGOB. We will continue to encourage the Home Ministry and
UNHCR to develop a mutually acceptable mechanism to process
the urban refugee caseload.

MORIARTY