Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07KATHMANDU447
2007-02-28 11:16:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Kathmandu
Cable title:  

NEPAL: NO OBJECTION TO RESETTLEMENT OF BHUTANESE

Tags:  PREF PREL PGOV CH BT NP 
pdf how-to read a cable
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FM AMEMBASSY KATHMANDU
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RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA PRIORITY 1528
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 2457
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KATHMANDU 000447 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/27/2017
TAGS: PREF PREL PGOV CH BT NP
SUBJECT: NEPAL: NO OBJECTION TO RESETTLEMENT OF BHUTANESE

REFUGEES

REF: KATHMANDU 317

Classified By: Ambassador James F. Moriarty for reasons 1.4(b/d).

Summary
-------

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KATHMANDU 000447

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/27/2017
TAGS: PREF PREL PGOV CH BT NP
SUBJECT: NEPAL: NO OBJECTION TO RESETTLEMENT OF BHUTANESE

REFUGEES

REF: KATHMANDU 317

Classified By: Ambassador James F. Moriarty for reasons 1.4(b/d).

Summary
--------------


1. (C) In separate meetings on February 26, the Ambassador
briefed Foreign Minister K.P. Oli and Home Minister K.P.
Sitaula on Prime Minister Koirala's February 7 approval of
U.S. plans to resettle Bhutanese refugees (reftel). Both
ministers were noncommittal, but raised no objections to the
U.S. plan. The Ambassador also reiterated the long-standing
U.S. request that Nepal allow Tibetans with U.S. immigration
benefits to depart. The Foreign Minister indicated that no
movement on Tibetan refugees would occur until after
Bhutanese refugee resettlement began. The Home Minister, on
the other hand, appeared more willing to allow small groups
of Tibetan following-to-join cases to depart for the U.S.
The Ambassador also asked both Ministers to expedite the
departure of approximately 50 urban refugees that the U.S.
had approved for resettlement.

Bringing the Foreign and Home Ministers Up To Speed
-------------- --------------


2. (C) In separate meetings with the Foreign and Home
Ministers on February 26, the Ambassador recapped his
February 7 meeting with Prime Minister Girija Prasad Koirala
at which the PM approved third-country resettlement of
Bhutanese refugees. He informed the ministers that the U.S.
intended to move ahead with resettlement plans on that basis.
The Ambassador also provided both ministers with copies of
PRM Assistant Secretary Sauerbrey's letter to the Prime
Minister as well as the U.S. resettlement fact sheet. He
explained that identifying an implementing partner and
setting up a processing office for resettlement would take
two months or more and agreed that no public announcements
would be made for some weeks yet. However, the Ambassador
noted, recent security problems in the Sanischere camp
between refugees and local Nepalese highlighted the need to
move forward quickly with resolving the Bhutanese refugee
issue.

Possible Nepal-Bhutan Meeting in late March

--------------


3. (C) Foreign Minister Oli replied that he first wanted to
conclude one more meeting with the Royal Government of Bhutan
(RGOB) before beginning a large-scale resettlement program.
FM Oli objected to the RGOB's perceived disinterest in
resolving the refugee situation, questioning how Bhutan could
honestly democratize without resolving the lives of nearly 20
percent of its population. Oli reiterated Nepal's position
that the refugee issue was one between the RGOB and its
people, not Nepal, which he said had drawn criticism from
Prime Minister Wangchuk. Still recovering from his illness,
Oli said he would return to Bangkok for a medical checkup on
March 12, after which he might visit Thimpu to meet with his
RGOB counterpart.

Home Minister On Board
--------------


4. (C) Home Minister Sitaula appeared to accept the proposed
U.S. plan and asked whether donor countries would be able to
resettle the entire refugee population. The Ambassador
replied that between the U.S., Canada and Australia, the vast
majority of refugees could be resettled, but not all. Some
refugees might be easily integrated locally due to family
ties in Nepal, he added. The Ambassador looked forward to
working with the Home Ministry on procedural issues related
to a large-scale resettlement program.

Maoists Do Not Support Third-Country Resettlement
-------------- --------------

KATHMANDU 00000447 002 OF 002




5. (C) FM Oli commented that the Maoists did not support
third-country resettlement. That was precisely why we would
like to move now, the Ambassador said, to remove the
possibility that the Maoists could block a comprehensive
solution. Oli feared that if he were to move forward with a
Bhutanese refugee resettlement program, the Maoists might
attempt to reverse the program after entering an interim
government, particularly if Oli did not retain his Cabinet
seat. The Ambassador acknowledged this risk, but believed
the Bhutanese refugees were not a priority issue for the
Maoists, who were more concerned about positioning themselves
for the upcoming elections.

No Traction on Tibetan Asylees
--------------


6. (C) The Ambassador again raised the long-standing U.S.
request that the Government of Nepal (GON) allow roughly 180
Tibetan asylees with U.S. immigration benefits to depart
Nepal and join their families in the U.S. FM Oli was
reluctant to tackle two refugee issues at one time, opining
that Nepal's movement to resolve the Bhutanese refugee issue
would upset the Indians while allowing Tibetan resettlement
would anger the Chinese. (Comment. Despite Oli's concerns,
Indian Ambassador Mukherjee seemed pleased that a
comprehensive solution for the Bhutanese refugees was on the
horizon. End Comment.) Sitaula, however, appeared more
willing to consider this issue, suggesting that small groups
of the Tibetan asylees might be allowed to depart Nepal at a
time.

Home Ministry Opposes Designation of Urban Refugees
-------------- --------------


7. (C) The Ambassador requested the GON to allow roughly 50
urban refugees whom the U.S. had approved for resettlement to
depart Nepal. Both ministers appeared unfamiliar with the
issue, but Home Secretary Mainali, who was present for the
Ambassador's meeting with Sitaula, replied that the GON had
serious reservations about the way UNHCR had identified these
individuals as refugees without properly informing the Home
Ministry. "Nepal does not want to be a magnet for refugees,"
Mainali added. The Ambassador explained that the group
comprised Pakistani, Iraqi and Somali refugees and questioned
the GON interest in keeping them in Nepal. (Note. The U.S.
approved this group of refugees for resettlement in December
2006, but so far the GON has refused to issue them exit
permits. In earlier meetings, Home Ministry officials had
indicated that Nepal did not want UNHCR to process any urban
refugees whatsoever. End Note.) In an aside to Mainali,
Sitaula asked what these urban refugees were doing in Nepal
and said "let's send them."

Comment
--------------


8. (C) Having recently returned to work after a prolonged
illness, FM Oli seemed unaware of the Prime Minister's
decision to proceed with third-country resettlement of
Bhutanese refugees. Oli himself admitted that he had not
spoken much with the Prime Minister in recent weeks, other
than short conversations about the peace process. Oli also
seemed to think that he might not be part of an interim
government. However, neither Oli nor Sitaula raised
objections to U.S. resettlement plans. On Tibetan refugees,
the primary obstacle appears to be from within the Foreign,
not Home, Ministry. We will continue to push for their
departure of the Tibetans. The delayed departure of urban
refugees to the U.S. appears largely to be a bureaucratic,
not political, obstacle that we hope can be overcome in the
near future.
MORIARTY