Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07KATHMANDU1945
2007-11-06 07:01:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Kathmandu
Cable title:  

AS SAUERBREY'S MEETINGS WITH PRIME MINISTER AND

Tags:  PREF PREL PHUM CH BT IN NP 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KATHMANDU 001945 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/06/2017
TAGS: PREF PREL PHUM CH BT IN NP
SUBJECT: AS SAUERBREY'S MEETINGS WITH PRIME MINISTER AND
REFUGEE LEADERS

REF: A. KATHMANDU 1944 B. KATHMANDU 1943

Classified By: Ambassador Nancy J. Powell. Reasons 1.4 (b/d).

Summary
-------

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KATHMANDU 001945

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/06/2017
TAGS: PREF PREL PHUM CH BT IN NP
SUBJECT: AS SAUERBREY'S MEETINGS WITH PRIME MINISTER AND
REFUGEE LEADERS

REF: A. KATHMANDU 1944 B. KATHMANDU 1943

Classified By: Ambassador Nancy J. Powell. Reasons 1.4 (b/d).

Summary
--------------


1. (C) In a meeting with Assistant Secretary for Population,
Refugees, and Migration Sauerbrey November 3, Prime Minister
Koirala expressed concern about four aspects of the
resettlement program for Bhutanese refugees: the citizenship
status of the refugees, speed of the resettlement program (he
would prefer a one-year program),transparency of who goes
when, and the lack of physical separation between those
opting for resettlement versus repatriation. The Prime
Minister was not receptive to Assistant Secretary Sauerbrey's
request to issue exit permits to 500 vulnerable Tibetan
refugees or 59 extremely vulnerable Bhutanese refugees prior
to the start of general processing. The Assistant Secretary
heard another plea to put pressure on Bhutan to allow
repatriation. Later the same day prominent Kathmandu-based
leaders of the Bhutanese refugees, among them, Tek Nath
Rizal, urged the U.S. to host a meeting with Nepal, India,
and Bhutan to promote repatriation but were suprisingly
moderate in their stance on resettlement -- both with the
Assistant Secretary and later with the media.

Four Concerns About Resettlement Program
--------------


2. (C) Prime Minister Koirala expressed concern about four
aspects of the U.S. resettlement program for Bhutanese
refugees: the citizenship status of the refugees, speed of
the resettlement program, transparency of who gets resettled
when, and the lack of separation between those opting for
resettlement versus repatriation. The Prime Minister was
concerned the refugees would remain temporarily stateless
although they would become eligible for legal permanent
residency after one year and could apply for citizenship
after five years. He also thought that the refugees should
be resettled quicker than the four to five years foreseen by
the U.S. Both Koirala and his former Foreign Policy Advisor
Dr. Suresh Chalise (now Ambassador-designate to the U.S.) who

participated in the meeting stated that Nepal's exit permit
process would not slow down U.S. processing. The Assistant
Secretary replied that the U.S. could only process and take

SIPDIS
in about 20,000 refugees per year, but reminded the PM that
resettlement offers by other countries would further reduce
the numbers in the refugee camps. Sauerbrey explained that
among those first to be resettled would be those first to
arrive in the camps, and then those first to file for
resettlement. Prime Minister Koirala found this to be a
clear and reasonable policy. The Prime Minister said that he
favored those opting for resettlement being housed at a
separate location so they would not face conflict within the
camps. Sauerbrey replied that would delay the program and
further disrupt refugees' lives, but we would monitor the
safety of those who want to be resettled.

No Progress on Tibetans or EVIs
--------------


3. (C) Prime Minister Koirala declined Assistant Secretary
Sauerbrey's request for the Government of Nepal to allow 500
vulnerable Tibetan refugees to leave. He stressed the
Chinese were very sensitive about this prospect and the GON
would prefer if the Tibetans simply crossed the open border
with India, and then proceeded to the United States. (Note:
Tibetans arriving in India from Nepal without documents from
the GON cannot legally obtain exit permits from the GOI.)
Koirala grudgingly admitted the GON might be willing to
address the cases of a handful of Tibetan refugees (two to
four, not five hundred),but reiterated that the GON's first
priority was to resolve the Bhutanese refugee situation.
Once significant progress had been made with the Bhutanese,
then the GON would be willing to revisit the issue of Tibetan

KATHMANDU 00001945 002 OF 003


refugees. The Prime Minister was similarly reticent about
the Assistant Secretary's request to allow the 59 extremely
vulnerable individuals (EVIs) among the Bhutanese refugees to
be promptly granted exit permits. Instead, the Prime
Minister preferred that the EVIs be included with the first
group of refugees processed from the camps.

Request to Put Pressure on Bhutan and India
--------------


4. (C) As GON officials had done in her meetings on October
31 (reftel A),Prime Minister Koirala urged the U.S. to put
pressure on the Royal Government of Bhutan (RGOB) to accept
repatriation of the refugees and to not displace additional
Nepali speakers. As he has stated previously to the local
press, the Prime Minister would like as many refugees as
possible to be repatriated before the RGOB holds its first
democratic election in 2008. Koirala was frustrated that the
Government of India (GOI) had taken little interest in the
Bhutanese refugees. If both the U.S. and the GOI put
pressure on Bhutan the Prime Minister hoped some progress
could be made. Dr. Chalise volunteered that Nepal was
willing to take part in tripartite talks with the RGOB and
GOI. The Assistant Secretary replied that she would convey
these messages on her upcoming trips to Bhutan and India.

Bhutanese Refugee Leader Takes Moderate Stance
-------------- -


5. (C) In a meeting later November 3 with the Kathmandu-based
Bhutanese Movement Steering Committee (BMSC),led by Tek Nath
Rizal, Rizal continued to push repatriation as the best
option but also affirmed that the BMSC would not oppose
resettlement for those who chose that option. Rizal again
floated his suggestion that the U.S. should host a tripartite
meeting with Nepal, Bhutan, and India to make repatriation
possible. Assistant Secretary Sauerbrey did not address this
proposal but she did state that she was going on to Bhutan
and India in order to discuss both repatriation and the
international community's firm opposition to any further
expulsions from Bhutan. Press reports quoting Rizal
following the meeting were consistent with the relatively
moderate position he took during the meeting with the
Assistant Secretary.

Good Meetings with Tibetans
--------------


6. (SBU) The Assistant Secretary toured the Tibetan Refugee
Reception Center (TRCC) and met with recent arrivals,
including a group that had been shot at by Chinese police on
the Nanpa Pass (reftel B). TRCC Director Kelsang Chung
explained the process and challenges facing new arrivals at
the TRCC to the Assistant Secretary. At a private lunch with
a human rights activist with the International Campaign for
Tibet, Tibetans briefed the Assistant Secretary on ongoing
human rights issues faced by Tibetans in Tibet and Nepal.

Comment
--------------


7. (C) The Assistant Secretary addressed most of the Prime
Minister's immediate concerns about the U.S. resettlement
process for Bhutanese refugees, but we believe he is going to
be disappointed if he thinks large numbers of refugees will
return to Bhutan in time to participate in their upcoming
election. The PM's comments about Tibetans and Chinese
sensitivities were not unexpected. We welcome the Prime
Minister's clear and strong assertion that the issuance of
exit permits will not pose a problem, but we are not taking
any chances. The Ambassador informed Koirala that she and
UNHCR Representative Abraham would be requesting an
appointment with him in the near future to discuss details of
the exit permit process. Although Rizal and the other BMSC
representatives were surprisingly moderate in their stance
toward resettlement with the Assistant Secretary and with the

KATHMANDU 00001945 003.2 OF 003


media, in contrast to their prior statements, it also remains
to be seen if they will use their influence in the camps to
temper some of the more extreme elements opposed to
resettlement.

8.(C) Assistant Secretary Sauerbrey cleared an early draft of
this cable.
POWELL