NEPAL: REINTEGRATION OF EX-COMBATANTS A WORK IN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KATHMANDU 001334

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/12/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER MARR KOCI NP
SUBJECT: NEPAL: REINTEGRATION OF EX-COMBATANTS A WORK IN
PROGRESS

REF: A. KATHMANDU 1204


B. KATHMANDU 1314

C. KATHMANDU 1298

Classified By: A/DCM Robert L. Hugins. Reasons 1.4 (b/d).

Summary
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1. (SBU) Representatives from several child-focused
international NGOs reported to Emboffs in late June that they
and other similar NGOs under the leadership of the UN
Children's Fund were poised to assist with reintegration of
former Maoist child combatants. They had devised a standard
reintegration package and had divided up responsibility for
different parts of the country among themselves. Debate
continued, however, over how a separate Government of Nepal
assistance package would be administered. The NGO
representatives indicated that planning and preparation for
reintegration of other types of Maoist "combatants,"
including new recruits who were found to be ineligible to
remain in the camps, was lagging. The participants also
highlighted that roughly 40 percent of the Maoist People's
Liberation Army (PLA) were women. Addressing reintegration
of the children and new recruits expelled from the camps
during the verification process represents only the first
phase of future reintegration efforts and even more difficult
issues with former PLA militia remain to be tackled.

NGOs Planning for Reintegration of Children
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2. (SBU) In a meeting in late June, representatives from
Save the Children, the International Rescue Committee (IRC),
and World Education explained to Emboffs that, under the UN
Children's Fund (UNICEF) chairmanship, a Children Associated
with Armed Groups and Armed Forces Working Group (CAAFAG) had
been meeting regularly over the past nine months to plan for
reintegration of former Maoist child combatants. CAAFAG had
devised a standard reintegration package for children that
included formal education and/or income generation activities
and material support (not cash) for the children to
re-establish themselves in their communities. Responsibility
for different geographic zones of the country had been
divided up among the CAAFAG member NGOs. However, the World
Education representative reported that his organization would
not be responsible for a zone, but would instead provide
technical assistance to UNICEF on education modules for the
children. The NGO representatives highlighted that their
reintegration efforts focused both on children (under 18) who
would be released from the camps through the verification
process, as well as the hundreds of children who had already
left the cantonments or who were never cantoned.

GON Has Its Own Reintegration Package for Children
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3. (SBU) The NGO representatives highlighted that the
standard CAAFAG donor package for released child combatants
was different from a planned Government of Nepal (GON)
package. Debate within the GON continued over how the GON
assistance package of NR 80,000 (approximately USD 1,230)
would be distributed to each child. CAAFAG had made
recommendations to the GON and to the UN Mission in Nepal,
including steps to ensure transparency and avoid direct
payment to the children, but the NGO representatives
expressed concern that the GON had not sufficiently thought
through the possible implications of the distribution process.

Minimal Access to Camps But Camp Mobility High
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4. (SBU) The NGO representatives told Emboff that, of the
various child protection agencies, UNICEF was the sole
organization with access to the camps, although even UNICEF
fell under UNMIN's umbrella. For example, all UNICEF staff
visiting the camps were required to wear UNMIN T-shirts
(although they were permitted to wear UNICEF caps). The NGO
representatives conceded that, out of necessity, they had

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relied on information from UNICEF and the UNMIN team in
designing their programs. The Save the Children
representative emphasized that mobility in and out of the
camps was high; those cantoned came and went as they pleased.
Without a fence or barrier, it was difficult to keep track
of combatant movement to and from local communities.

Ensuring Children Are Not Re-Recruited
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5. (SBU) Emboff asked how the NGOs were protecting against
the re-recruitment of children into the Maoist Young
Communist League (YCL) or other armed groups. The Save the
Children representative responded that they were monitoring
recruitment within communities and working with child
protection committees at the Village Development Committee
(VDC) level. Community sensitization, IRC said, would be
essential to ensure sustainable reintegration of former child
combatants. IRC described a program underway to use "foster
families" as a "half-way home" for child combatants until
they were able to re-establish themselves in their
communities.

What About New Recruits? And Women?
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6. (SBU) When asked what plans were in place for
reintegration of other, non-child "combatants" expelled from
the camps during verification, the NGO representatives
replied that no coordination mechanism similar to CAAFAG
existed for new recruits or others who did not qualify to
remain in the camps. However, the UN Development Program
(UNDP) would likely take the lead. The NGOs also reported
that the debate within the GON on how to handle reintegration
packages for non-child combatants continued. All of the NGOs
present expressed a willingness to look at reintegration
programming for a wider cross-section of those deemed
ineligible to remain in the camps, but as U.S. organizations,
they needed further guidance on how to stay within the
parameters of the U.S. law banning material support to the
Maoists as a designated terrorist group. The participants
also highlighted that roughly 40 percent of the Maoist
People's Liberation Army (PLA) were women and there had been
recent reporting of numerous pregnancies in the camps. To
date, there was no clear strategy on how to handle the
reintegration of women.

And then Reintegration of Ex-PLA? Militia?
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7. (C) A recent USAID funded report by the Academy for
Educational Development (AED) addresses an even more
challenging integration question, namely integration of
Maoist PLA into the Nepal Army (NA). The report noted that
integration of the PLA into a "New Nepal Army" figured
prominently in the peace negotiations in late 2006. The
November peace agreements, however, were vague on the topic.
The agreements only mentioned that persons discharged from
the camps would be ineligible for later integration and
called for a special committee on integration and
rehabilitation of Maoist combatants (Ref B). The report went
on to point out that, with 95,000 plus soldiers, many
observers believe that the NA was already bloated. However,
according to AED, the PLA is of the view that a new national
army should include roughly half of their combatants, ranging
upward from 30,000, including representation at leadership
levels. Meanwhile, the NA has repeatedly argued that the
Maoists should be allowed to join the NA only if they meet
basic recruitment standards. The Chief of the Army Staff,
taking a hard position, argues that integration of Maoists
into the NA should not occur for at least five years. AED
also reported that the NA believes that the PLA is pushing
for military integration to undermine the capacity of the
Army.

Comment
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8. (C) The UN Mission in Nepal's work to verify the 30,000

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Maoist "combatants" is currently on hold. On June 30, Maoist
Chief Pushpa Dahal ("Prachanda") demanded that the process be
suspended after UNMIN provided the details of its examination
of the members of the Maoist First Division in Eastern Nepal.
According to sources at UNMIN, the Maoists balked because
UMNIM had disqualified larger numbers of the alleged
combatants than the Maoist anticipated on the grounds that
they were new recruits or children. If the process resumes,
thousands of children and new recruits who are deemed
ineligible to remain in the cantonments will require
reintegration options. The progress made by CAAFAG is
heartening. However, if the needs of new recruits remain
unaddressed, they could pose one of the largest threats to
security in the lead-up to the Constituent Assembly election.
These unemployed and recently trained, largely young, men
and women represent ideal recruits for the Young Communist
League and other armed groups. Addressing the initial wave
of those expelled through verification marks only the
beginning of the challenges for Nepal.


9. (C) An immense hurdle looms ahead, as those combatants
remaining in the cantonment camps, Maoist militia and other
former fighters, seek options for a return to civilian life
or integration into GON security forces. Demobilization,
disarmament, and reintegration experience worldwide points to
the need to tailor reintegration packages to fit local
economies and the needs of ex-combatants to protect against
re-recruitment and further conflict. These packages must
include plans for women combatants and the Maoist militia. A
first step would be to encourage UNDP to undertake a
multi-donor assessment on reintegration options (Ref C).
Post will urge the new special committee on integration to
operate in a transparent manner, focusing on democratization
of the security forces, but avoiding any co-option of the
Army for Maoist political aims. Unless and until Maoist
change their behavior and renounce violence, we can see only
token integration of combatants into the NA. Post will also
push for greater international pressure and support on
devising viable options to transition former combatants.
MORIARTY