Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07KATHMANDU1227
2007-06-21 11:37:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Kathmandu
Cable title:  

NEPAL GOVERNMENT AND UNHCR MUST ACT QUICKLY ON

Tags:  PREF PREL PGOV BT NP 
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INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 5871
RUEHLM/AMEMBASSY COLOMBO PRIORITY 6176
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RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA PRIORITY 0216
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RUEHCI/AMCONSUL KOLKATA PRIORITY 3609
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA PRIORITY 1732
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 2791
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KATHMANDU 001227 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/20/2017
TAGS: PREF PREL PGOV BT NP
SUBJECT: NEPAL GOVERNMENT AND UNHCR MUST ACT QUICKLY ON
BHUTANESE REFUGEES


Classified By: Ambassador James F. Moriarty. Reasons 1.4 (b/d).

Summary
-------

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KATHMANDU 001227

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/20/2017
TAGS: PREF PREL PGOV BT NP
SUBJECT: NEPAL GOVERNMENT AND UNHCR MUST ACT QUICKLY ON
BHUTANESE REFUGEES


Classified By: Ambassador James F. Moriarty. Reasons 1.4 (b/d).

Summary
--------------


1. (SBU) In a briefing for donors on June 18, visiting UNHCR
Field Security Advisor Leigh Hollingsworth lamented that the
Government of Nepal (GON) had failed to communicate to local
officials and security forces in Jhapa District its policy to
support third-country resettlement of Bhutanese refugees.
Although many refugees were ready for resettlement, a small
but violent anti-resettlement group was having a powerful
impact on the security in the camps, intimidating those
expressing interest in resettlement. The GON has agreed that
more security in the camps was needed, but had not yet taken
concrete steps in that direction, Hollingsworth noted. UNHCR
had halted its information campaign on durable solutions
after the GON requested UNHCR not to discuss resettlement in
the refugee camps, a UNHCR communication consultant added.
The Kathmandu-based Core Group agreed June 21 to urge Prime
Minister Koirala to communicate the GON resettlement policy
down to the district and camp level as well as to increase
security in the camps.

GON Resettlement Policy Not Reaching the Local Level
-------------- --------------


2. (SBU) Leigh Hollingsworth, visiting UNHCR Field Security
Advisor who had been posted to the UNHCR sub-office in Damak
from February 2005 to February 2007, reported to the donors
June 18 that the Chief District Officer (CDO) in Jhapa had
told him that no instructions had been sent from Kathmandu
regarding the GON policy on third-country resettlement of
Bhutanese refugees. As a result, local officials were not
able to move forward with outreach and planning. (Note: When
UN High Commissioner for Refugees Antonio Guterres visited
Jhapa District in May, the same CDO said publicly that the
GON, including his office, supported resettlement. End
Note.) To reestablish law and order in the refugee camps,
Hollingsworth said, the GON needed to clearly convey its
support for resettlement to the refugees, local
administrators, and security forces.


Hard-Line Anti-Resettlement Group Threatening Refugees
-------------- --------------


3. (SBU) Hollingsworth stated that the majority of refugees
would return to Bhutan if they could do so under favorable
conditions, such as compensation for land seized and
guarantees of civil rights. Recognizing that the Royal
Government of Bhutan would not likely meet either of these
conditions, many of the refugees were open to resettlement as
an option. A small but violent anti-resettlement group,
however, was having a powerful impact on the security in the
camps. Some reports indicated that militant refugees were
running around the camps at night with masks and knives,
intimidating refugees who had expressed interest in
resettlement. The militant groups, Hollingsworth noted,
viewed resettlement as an obstacle to their ultimate goal of,
and recruitment for, revolution in Bhutan.

Still No Action After Three Weeks
--------------


4. (SBU) According to Hollingsworth, a GON-nominated
committee tasked to investigate recent violence in the camps
had been in place for over three weeks, but has not yet
released any findings or convicted any perpetrators --
despite the fact that those who committed acts of violence
are known to the refugees. The lack of accountability sent a
powerful and negative message to the refugees, Hollingsworth
bemoaned. Following the May 27 - 29 riots in Beldangi 1
camp, the police had vacated these camps. Home Ministry

KATHMANDU 00001227 002 OF 003


officials and UNHCR had agreed that a larger security
presence was needed, perhaps by employing up to 25 police
officers per camp. UNHCR believed that the GON needed to
maintain a security presence in the camps at night and to
patrol the camps by day. The Ambassador concurred, stating
that the violent elements in the camps had to be isolated to
ensure that the majority of refugees could freely express
their interest with respect to resettlement.

UNCHR Information Campaign Halted
--------------


5. (SBU) A UNHCR communications consultant told the donors
that a three-phase communication strategy was needed to
address the perception among refugees that UNHCR was offering
resettlement unilaterally. The three phases included: 1)
messages that reassured refugees that law and order would be
restored and perpetrators of violence brought to justice; 2)
an information campaign focused on UNHCR's mandate to find
durable solutions for refugees; and 3) a detailed outreach
effort on the resettlement process for the Bhutanese
refugees. UNHCR planned to use radio broadcasts and other
information dissemination options to reach as broadly as
possible within the camps. She said that all communications
would emphasize that the GON and UNCHR were on the same side.
UNHCR Resident Representative Abraham Abraham said that
UNCHR would not distribute information on resettlement until
the security situation in the camps improved. The Ambassador
concurred, but added that rejectionist elements should not be
given a veto over future progress toward resettlement.

Core Group Agrees To Urge Prime Minister To Take Action
-------------- --------------


6. (SBU) At a meeting June 21, Australian Ambassador and
Kathmandu-based Core Group Chairman Graeme Lade recommended
that the Core Group urge the Prime Minister to improve
security in the refugee camps and instruct the GON
bureaucracy to convey its resettlement policy to the
refugees. Ambassador Moriarty and RefCoord attended along
with Danish Ambassador Finn Thilsted, Norwegian Charge
d'Affairs Kikkan Haugen, Canadian Cooperation Officer Ed Doe,
UNHCR Resident Representative Abraham Abraham, and WFP
Country Director Richard Ragan. Thilsted noted that, despite
Prime Minister Koirala's commitment to allow third-country
resettlement, the message had not trickled down to the
bureaucrats. Thilsted agreed that a meeting with the Prime
Minister was needed. He did not believe the problem was lack
of political will, but rather the Home Ministry's failure to
secure law and order in the camps. Lade noted that, in his
last meeting, the Prime Minister had asked why resettlement
could not move forward more quickly. Lade believed the Core
Group needed to explain to the Prime Minister that insecurity
in the camps would prevent rapid progress on resettlement.
Thilsted requested UNHCR to provide the Core Group a list of
concrete steps the GON needed to take to allow resettlement
to proceed. The Core Group could then urge the GON, through
the Prime Minister's office, to take action.

Maoists Must Be Warned To Back Off
--------------


7. (C) The Ambassador expressed concern that Nepal's Maoists
were influencing the Communist Party of Bhutan (CPB),whose
members were threatening refugees favoring resettlement. He
requested UNHCR to engage the militant refugee youth in
constructive dialogue to make them understand that violent
action would close doors of opportunity. Norwegian Charge
Haugen noted that senior Maoist leader Baburam Bhattarai
would travel to Oslo the week of June 25 and agreed to add
third-country resettlement of Bhutanese refugees to the
bilateral agenda. Lade expressed reluctance about giving the
Maoists an opportunity to block the resettlement program.

KATHMANDU 00001227 003 OF 003


The Ambassador agreed that the Norwegians should not open the
issue for debate, but should stress to Bhattarai that the
Maoists must not treat the refugee camps as a recruitment
ground to export their revolution to Bhutan.

Possible To Hire Security For Camps?
--------------


8. (C) The Ambassador asked whether there was a precedent
within UNHCR to hire security guards for refugee camps.
Abraham acknowledged that UNHCR, with donor support, had
employed security forces in Zaire and Tanzania. WFP's Ragan
suggested that the GON and UNHCR could agree to hire
ex-British Gurkhas for security, similar to what had been
done for the Maoist cantonment sites. The Core Group members
agreed to request their capitals to consider this possibility.

Comment: Next Steps
--------------


9. (SBU) For the U.S. resettlement program to proceed, UNHCR
must be able to seek expressions of interest in resettlement
from the refugees. Once the GON conveys its resettlement
policy to the refugees, Post believes UNHCR will be able to
open its doors in Damak and in Kathmandu to accept
expressions of interest. UNHCR will only be able to continue
its information campaign and hold mass meetings about
resettlement in the camps after security forces are
reintroduced -- a process which could take months. We
anticipate, however, that a joint Core Group demarche urging
the Prime Minister to accomplish these tasks, and perhaps
offering financial support, may speed up the process. We
also might encourage UNHCR to take a more proactive approach
in engaging the militant refugee youth in dialogue to
forestall further violence until the GON is able to provide
sufficient security.

MORIARTY