UGANDAN PRESIDENT MUSEVENI FLEXIBLE ON "PLAN B"

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KAMPALA 001895

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/14/2017
TAGS: PHUM PREL PGOV UG SU CG
SUBJECT: UGANDAN PRESIDENT MUSEVENI FLEXIBLE ON "PLAN B"

REF: KAMPALA 1779

Classified By: P/E Chief Kathleen FitzGibbon for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d
).


1. (C) Summary: President Yoweri Museveni does not believe
that Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) leader Joseph Kony wants
peace, but is willing to allow the peace process to continue
until March. On December 14, Museveni complained to U.N.
Special Envoy for LRA-Affected Areas Joachim Chissano that
Kony was a coward and recent intelligence indicated he had no
intention of surrendering. Former GOU negotiator Betty
Bigombe told Museveni that time was on Uganda's side, not
Kony's, and advised that the GOU should not rush to Plan B
until all avenues of reaching Kony were exhausted and as many
women and children were out of the bush as possible. End
Summary.

U.N. SPECIAL ENVOY IN REGION
--------------


2. (C) On December 13, U.N. Special Envoy for LRA-Affected
Areas Joachim Chissano met with donors, who urged him to
persuade President Museveni to be flexible on the deadline
for the peace process. Chissano agreed to raise the issue
with Museveni. He advised the donors to hold off on a
proposed press statement urging a flexible timetable until he
had met with President Kabila on December 14. Chissano said
that it would be detrimental to the peace process if the
rumors were true about Kony's intention to move to Central
African Republic and abduct children. Chissano also said
that it was important for Kony to demonstrate a commitment to
the Juba process, and that Kony may need time to reorganize
his forces and delegation in the wake of Vincent Otti's
killing.


3. (C) Chissano expressed his opposition to MONUC's
encouragement of LRA defections. In his view, MONUC should
receive and repatriate defectors to Uganda, but not actively
participate in encouraging them. His fear is that the LRA
would splinter into groups that would join others and create
problems in the future. Chissano was trying to see Kony, but
did not believe that "Kony was in a mood to meet" before
seeing his own delegation with the results of its
consultations in Uganda. Nonetheless, Chissano would
continue his efforts to communicate with Kony.


4. (C) Chissano raised the issue of the deadline with
President Museveni later in the day. According to African
observers who attended the meeting, Museveni said information
emerging from the "terrorist holiday center" at Garamba
National Park indicated that Kony was not interested in the
peace. They said that it was clear the Museveni was prepared
to exercise a military option after the deadline, or before
if Kony began moving or abducting children. Museveni told
Chissano that the LRA could have one month beyond the January
31 deadline that he agreed with Congolese President Kabila.
(Note: LRA negotiating delegation leader Martin Ojul told
donors that the talks could be wrapped up by March 1. He
later told P/E chief March 15. End Note.) Museveni stated
that Uganda had to launch its military operation before the
onset of the rainy season and could not wait any longer than
mid-March.


5. (C) Museveni expressed outrage to Chissano that Kony had
killed Otti. Andre Kapanga, the Congolese observer to the
talks, said that Museveni spent the bulk of the meeting
complaining about Kony's cowardice. Museveni was angry that
someone like Kony, who he claimed ran away from battles and
abused children, could kill Otti, a battle-hardened leader
and excellent strategist. Kapanga said that Museveni acted
as if he were personnally insulted by Otti's execution.

BIGOMBE MEETS MUSEVENI
--------------


6. (C) Former GOU negotiator Betty Bigombe also met with
Museveni for a few hours on December 13. Bigombe had given
P/E chief a read-out of an earlier lunch with Chief of
Defense Forces Aronda in which Aronda said Plan B was the
only option given the new information emerging from Garamba.
Aronda said that military operations were needed to kill or
capture Kony, who he said had no intentions of surrendering.
Bigombe also said that Museveni was convinced that Plan B was
inevitable. He asked Bigombe for her advice. She explained
to Museveni that for now, time was on the GOU's side. The
GOU should encourage the defections and rescue as many women
and children as possible. Bigombe stated that the GOU's
patience had paid off through the softening of international
opinion about Museveni's actions in northern Uganda, and that
the LRA's own actions were undermining it among northern
leaders and residents. Bigombe argued that the GOU should

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demonstrate it had exhausted all the options available before
launching a military strike. For example, a last ditch
attempt to communicate with Kony directly would bolster
Uganda's actions in the event of a military strike.
CHRITTON