NORTHERN UGANDA: CURRENT TRENDS IN PEACE PROCESS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KAMPALA 001236

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/26/2017
TAGS: PHUM PREL PGOV UG SU
SUBJECT: NORTHERN UGANDA: CURRENT TRENDS IN PEACE PROCESS


Classified By: P/E Chief Kathleen FitzGibbon for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d
).


1. (C) Summary: The Juba Peace Talks are on recess while the
Government of Uganda and Lord's Resistance Army (LRA)
undertake consultations with various stakeholders. The break
has provided many observers and the Government of Uganda an
opportunity to take stock of the process and potential
scenarios for its outcome. End Summary.

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ASSESSING THE PROCESS
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2. (C) The Government of Uganda is reviewing potential
scenarios for the peace process. These include: the talks
succeed and the LRA sign and implement a peace deal; the LRA
signs an agreement but fails to implement it; and finally,
the talks fail. The consensus of civilian and military
officials is that the LRA may sign an agreement one year from
now and fail to implement it if the process does not fail
before then. Their analysis is based on the assumption that
the LRA entered into and is using the peace process to
regroup, rearm, resupply, and rebrand itself. More
importantly, the Government also views external patrons,
Khartoum and the Ugandan diaspora, as providing the necessary
support to encourage the LRA not to give up. The
Government's assessment of potential outcomes is shared by
the International Criminal Court (ICC),major
non-governmental and human rights organizations such as
International Crisis Group and Human Rights Watch, and other
diplomatic missions.

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TIME IS ON WHOSE SIDE
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3. (C) Many close observers argue that the peace process has
given the LRA the time and space it needed to:
A) get its commanders together at Garamba under the guise of
the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement (CHA) (regroup); B)
food and medical treatment for its combatants and
non-combatants (resupply); C) a safehaven accessible for safe
military resupply (rearm); and D) the opportunity to
legitimize and "cleanse its image" for the international
community (rebrand) at the peace table. The GOU believes
that the LRA is being re-tooled by Khartoum to undermine the
Government of Southern Sudan. Santa Okot, a member of the
LRA's Juba delegation told us that the LRA believes it will
take another year to conclude a peace agreement. That puts
the process into July 2008, one year from elections in
southern Sudan and three from the referendum on southern
Sudan's independence called for in the Comprehensive Peace
Agreement.


4. (C) However, time is also on the Government of Uganda's
side. At the beginning of the process, northern Ugandans
living in squalid camps, wanted peace at any cost. At the
time, the Government's position on justice issues coincided
with public opinion in the north that traditional
reconciliation mechanisms would be enough to end the war.
The Government was unable to build enough confidence between
the LRA leadership and Museveni to get a deal in late
December. Since then, outside influences, most notably
Khartoum and the diaspora, have hardened the LRA's stance and
led to many delays in the process. The GOU wants to conclude
a deal quickly. In the meantime, northern Ugandans continue
to return to or near their homes. One year without an LRA
attack in northern Uganda could be changing northern public
opinion more in favor of justice. In August 2006, it was
common to hear that peace was the most important priority,
even over justice. Now, with one year of a peaceful
situation on the ground, northerners appear to be thinking
more about justice. The consultation process will further
illuminate current trends. Another factor working in the
Government's favor is growing economic opportunities in the
north. With each growing season, internally-displaced
persons are gaining more economic independence and are
well-placed to stock Juba's markets, which are already
dominated by Ugandan traders.


5. (C) These trends also mean that time is not on the side
of northern politicians, primarily from the opposition.
Their popularity is based upon being anti-government. With
the movement of IDPs back to or near their homes, northern
politicians will hear more and more about the needs for
services from their constituents. For now, the northern
elected leaders have been able to blame the central
government for lack of services. In time, however, these
same elected leaders will need to show that they stand for
something, not just against Museveni. Many astute northern
politicians understand this, which is why they continue to

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call for a U.S. Special Envoy on northern Uganda. They fear
that changing trends will weaken their position in the north
and view a national reconciliation conference to address the
north's marginalization as an opportunity to extract
concessions from Museveni. Without a national conference, it
will become difficult to re-adjust changing trends in power.

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COMMENT
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6. (C) Despite our continued misgivings about the importance
of the agreements reached at the peace talks at Juba, the
process has resulted in an improved security situation in
northern Uganda, and for now, southern Sudan. However, we
still do not see indications that LRA leaders Joseph Kony and
Vincent Otti, have decided what their end game is. Without
continued pressure, particularly military pressure, the LRA
leaders are growing more and more comfortable at Garamba
National Park, making alliances with other groups, and
enjoying food and medical support provided by international
donors. One journalist argues that the fact that the LRA is
getting more comfortable could actually sow the seeds of its
own disintegration as fighters become complacent and lose
their edge. While this may be happening, we would prefer to
see Kony and Otti persuaded to put an end to the conflict
before the LRA transforms itself and commits fully to being
used by external patrons in the region.
BROWNING