UGANDA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS TEMPLATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KAMPALA 001159

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/18/07
TAGS: PGOV PREL BY CG RW UG
SUBJECT: UGANDA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS TEMPLATE

REF: STATE 88842

Classified By: P/E Chief Kathleen FitzGibbon for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d
).


1. (C) Summary: Ugandan military and civilian officials
view the U.S.-facilitated Tripartite Plus process as
important for confidence-building between the parties and for
keeping pressure up on neighbors to rein in negative forces.
Ugandans argue that the process has resulted in
behind-the-scenes progress on the negative forces, even if
not apparent to the U.S. We do not believe it is time to
bring the Tripartite Plus process to a close. However, it
could be time to consider how the Tripartite Plus process
could be continued without U.S. facilitation under the rubric
of the Great Lakes Security Pact. End Summary.


2. (C) The Chieftaincy of Military Intelligence Leopold
Kyanda, Commander of Uganda's Land Forces Lt. General Katumba
Wamala, the Deputy Director of the External Security
Organization (ESO) Robert Masolo, and the Ministry of Foreign
Affair's Director for East African and the Ring States Julius
Kagamba Singomba all told emboffs that the Tripartite Plus
process continues to build confidence among the parties.
They believe that regular meetings are a useful, neutral
forum for airing political differences, even if they are not
resolved publicly at the meetings. Military officers report
that the Chief of Defense Forces' meetings and smaller
bilateral meetings on border security are building a
foundation and expectation of cooperation that had been
lacking in the past.


3. (C) Tripartite Plus keeps up the pressure on the parties
to take action on issues, even if it is behind-the-scenes,
according to Kagamba. He told P/E Chief that even though it
appears that there is a disagreement or stalemate at the
table over the issue of the Peoples' Redemption Army (PRA),
the Rwandan Government has been making moves against many of
the people on the Ugandan list. The Ugandan Government is
pleased with some of the actions, but does not want to make
those actions public at the table because of the sources of
the information. Kagamba said that Uganda believes that
Rwanda is trying to disengage itself from the PRA. Moreover,
one result of the Tripartite Plus process is that Congo must
pay constant attention to the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA)
even if it lacks the capacity to take action against them.
While the lack of action might be misinterpreted, the
presence of the LRA on the regional agenda limits any type of
support the Congolese might consider giving them. Congo is
more uncomfortable with the LRA than it was before, according
to Kagamba.


4. (C) Uganda continues to push for a regularization of its
relationship with Congo bilaterally as well as through the
Tripartite Plus forum. Foreign Minister Kutesa raised the
issue of agrement for the Ugandan Ambassador in Kinshasa with
his Congolese counterpart at the African Union Summit in
Accra. The Congolese Foreign Minister told Kutesa that
Uganda needs to address the issue of the 10 Billion dollar
judgment against it by the International Court of Justice
first. Nonetheless, Ugandan ministers travel to Kinshasa to
address important issues as needed. The Ugandans are
pressing for a reinstatement the Joint Permanent Commission
to handle border issues, refugees, joint exploitation of
natural resources, trade, tourism, and illegal arms flows.
Regular meetings between Ugandan and Congolese military
officials also occur.


5. (C) On the Fusion Cell, our military and intelligence
interlocutors argued that a virtual cell might work better
than the center in Kisangani. Kyanda and Kagamba expressed
concern over the cost of maintaining a person at Kisangani.
Quarterly meetings of the focal points might accomplish the
objectives of the Fusion Cell with less costs. The Ugandans
also expressed appreciation for the visits of Colonel Orth
and Africa Bureau Deputy Assistant James Swan in between
Tripartite Plus meetings to informally keep things moving
between formal gatherings.


6. (C) Kagamba stated that the criminalization of harboring
negative forces in each of the Great Lakes Security Pact
countries is one way to resolve the issue of illegal arms
flows. He argued that prosicution of arms suppliers by host
countries could contribute to deterring illegal arms
deliveries. He also asked if the U.S. can donate old radar
systems to monitor the 17 airstrips in Congo that MONUC has
identified as possible transit points for illegal weapons.
This type of verification could deter arms traffickers.


7. (C) Uganda will raise (at the next meeting) the issue of
adding Kenya and Tanzania as Tripartite Plus observers. They
are already part of the Great Lakes Security Pact troika.

KAMPALA 00001159 002 OF 002


Kagamba also requested an invitation for the Great Lakes
Executive Secretary Ambassador Liberata Mulamula, based at
the Secretariat Headquarters in Bujumbura.

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COMMENT: LOOKING AHEAD
- - - - - - - - - - - -


8. (C) From our perspective, it is not yet time to bring
the Tripartite Plus process to a close. The Ugandans have
pointed out a number of positive behind-the-scenes
developments that indicate that some of the difficult issues
are being addressed, even if these do not manifest themselves
in the deliverable form that we prefer. Nevertheless,
considering how to transition the Tripartite Plus into the
Great Lakes Security Pact process could begin by bringing in
key players as observers to begin preparing the groundwork
for an eventual and clean hand-off. At the next Tripartite
Plus meeting, discussion of a hand-over could begin and the
parties asked to decide on what they want to achieve prior to
a hand-over. We also suggest not adding new issues that can
be handled bilaterally and sticking to the three existing
areas of restoring diplomatic relations, addressing negative
forces, and negotiating extradition treaties. These
deliverables create the framework for dealing with other
issues. Illegal arms, for example, are a symptom, not a root
cause or mechanism for resolving poor relations between the
parties. We also recommend that the relevant Political
Officers and Defense Attache personnel from the U.S. Missions
in the Tripartite Plus countries be invited to each
Tripartite Plus meeting. This will help posts better
understand the issues and relationships, improve follow up,
interpret events and analyze progress on the ground, and
provide U.S. support when the U.S.-facilitation phase of the
process does come to a close.



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