IDPS, URBANIZATION AND THE CHANGING FACE OF AFGHAN

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 KABUL 000099

SIPDIS

SIPDIS, SENSITIVE

STATE FOR PRM/FO (DAS GREENE),PRM/ANE, SCA/FO, S/CRS, SCA/A, STATE
PASS TO USAID FOR AID/SAA (KEYVANSHAD),
REL NATO/AUST/NZ/ISAF

E.O. 12958 N/A
TAGS: PREF PREL PGOV AF

SUBJECT: IDPS, URBANIZATION AND THE CHANGING FACE OF AFGHAN
POVERTY


1. SUMMARY: Ebbing and flowing tides of Internally Displaced
Persons (IDPs) have been a constant feature of the Afghan landscape
for, at least, the past thirty years. Events in recent years seem
only to mirror, in many ways, similar displacements following the
Soviet invasion, the civil strife under the mujaheddin in the 1990s
and the Taliban's seizure of power. These events drove over five
million Afghans into exile and displaced millions more. A
fundamental difference this time, however, is that there are other
forces at work. These forces, coupled with the continuing conflict
in the south, southeast and east of the country, may be pushing
Afghanistan to the brink of a chronic "displacement/urbanization"
crisis, a crisis which will have important implications for the
efforts of the Afghan Government and the U.S.-led international
donor community to achieve political stability and economic
development. END SUMMARY
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SOURCES OF DISPLACEMENT
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2. Given Afghanistan's recent history, it is a tragic irony that
the displacements generated by the effects of the on-going
insurgency in the south are, in strictly numerical terms, dwarfed by
other long-term factors. The most recent UNHCR-supplied figures
(October 2006) estimate that 20,000 families (approx. 134,000
people) have been displaced by recent ISAF offensives aimed at
uprooting Taliban from areas of the south and east. Though tragic,
these numbers pale by comparison to the number of people displaced
by Afghanistan's on-going drought and by the number driven from
their place of origin in search of livelihood as a result of the
destruction visited upon Afghanistan's economy by thirty-plus years
of warfare and instability.


3. Though exact numbers are hard to come by in a place such as
Afghanistan, one has only to look at certain subjective indicators
to realize the multidimensional nature of the crisis afflicting
Afghanistan's population. The first such indicator is the current
state of Afghan agriculture and agricultural infrastructure.


4. Prior to 1979, 85% of Afghanistan's people made their living
from agriculture. The neglect and often-intentional destruction
that thirty years of warfare have wrought upon Afghanistan's
agricultural infrastructure will take generations to repair.
Hundreds of miles of irrigation canals, built up over centuries,
were intentionally destroyed or have fallen into disrepair and been
left to fill with weeds and gravel. The skills needed to maintain
these underground systems have, in many cases, been lost. The
importance of these structures, a critical element in the sort of
"dry land" agriculture traditionally practiced throughout
Afghanistan, cannot be underestimated. Once known as the
"breadbasket of Afghanistan," the Shomali Plains, are now a
semi-wasteland, scarred by years of war, landmines and drought.
Throughout the country, thousands of hectares of orchards have been
destroyed, used for firewood or allowed to go wild. Rangelands that
were once used to raise hundreds of thousands of goats, sheep and
dairy and beef cattle have been seeded with landmines and allowed to
go sere and useless.


5. Couple this destruction with the results of an on-going drought
which, according to a recent UNDP estimate, has left 1.9 million
people in 22 provinces facing chronic food and water insecurity. As
a result, agriculture, the traditional economic mainstay for the
majority of Afghans, can no longer provide a viable source of
livelihood for anything like the percentage of the population it
once supported. Afghanistan has become a country in which a large
segment of the population now faces a decision; whether to stay in
place and depend indefinitely upon assistance (especially food
assistance) to support their family or to uproot their family,
abandon their traditional lifestyle and seek their livelihood
elsewhere. The dramatic growth of Kabul stands as evidence of the
choice being made.
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THE CITY
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6. A century ago, Kabul was a city of, perhaps, 50,000 people. As
recently as 1990, after a decade of conflict had left the
countryside ravaged, the city's population was approximately
1,000,000. The population dropped to well below a million during
the Civil War in the mid 1990s when Kabul was on the front lines.
Today, the population is fast approaching - if it hasn't already
surpassed -- 4,000,000. Some less formal estimates put the
population at 4.5 million. The city's population grew by an average
of 15% per year between 1999 and 2002. The return of 4.7 million
refugees from Pakistan and Iran since 2002 has accelerated that rate
significantly. Afghanistan's annual population growth rate is 2.6%.
The rural growth rate, however, stands at only 2.3% while the urban
growth rate is 4.7%. These figures principally reflect the growth
of Kabul, as Afghanistan's other urban centers (Kandahar, Herat,
Mazar-e-Sharif, Jalalabad and Kunduz) have seen some growth, but
nothing of a similar magnitude.


7. A June 2006 World Bank report on urban poverty in Afghanistan
estimated that 80% of Kabul's population (covering 70% of the city)
is "informally" housed in unplanned neighborhoods which the
municipal government does not recognize, often with no clear land
title and little or no access to basic services and social
infrastructure. Most have no access to basic health care, to
education or, even, to safe drinking water. The same study notes
that, in 2004, only 0.5% of Kabul's population was officially
considered to be "homeless" (with 10,000 living in tents and another
5,000 living in abandoned, destroyed government buildings). This
percentage of "homeless" has undoubtedly grown in the two
interceding years, as in-migration has continued while housing and
construction costs have soared. The great majority of these urban
poor relies upon informal employment which lacks protection and
income security. Most often this entails casual, hourly labor or
self employment. The two fastest growing sectors, construction and
retail, rely heavily upon such labor.
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ONE PART OF THE PROBLEM
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8. Many efforts, such as USAID's, are underway to address various
aspects of this dislocation. USAID's Ag Program has made some
inroads in addressing the damage done to Afghanistan's agricultural
infrastructure. Strides have been made in improving irrigation,
rebuilding farm-to-market roads and repairing irrigation structures.
Six hundred and five kilometers of irrigation canals have been
rehabilitated, and 22,000 Afghans are employed in cash-for-work
projects. Significant efforts have been undertaken to establish a
micro-credit system for Afghan farmers and to rebuild the marketing
infrastructure destroyed by thirty years of conflict. USDA, working
with USAID and the PRTs, has focused upon watershed, dam and canal
construction and repair, karez (cistern) replenishment and cleanout,
and general irrigation projects. These efforts also benefited
thousands of rural residents. These efforts are critical but their
impact will not come soon enough to address the immediate needs of
many of Afghanistan's rural poor. As in most sectors, the sheer
magnitude of the task dwarfs the resources available.
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ANOTHER PART
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9. There is also a cultural shift at work here. This is
particularly, but not exclusively, noticeable among refugee
returnees, most of whom spent their exile in urban or semi-urban
settings. In January 2004, an "unexpectedly high" 42% of returnees
reported that they intended to settle in urban areas upon their

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return to Afghanistan. Many (46% according to a recent UNHCR/ILO
report) acquired new skills while in exile; all acquired new
expectations. The same January 2004 UNHCR report noted that, "Many
refugees have got used to an urban life style, no matter how
rudimentary, and [upon their return to Afghanistan] they are
congregating, as would be expected, in urban areas. [...] Further,
continuing conflict is also likely to spur some internal migration
to Kabul and other towns. If the recent experience of Iran and
Pakistan is any indicator, Afghanistan is facing a major urban
expansion, fueled partly by the return of refugees."
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COMMENT
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10. While a significant majority of Afghans continue to reside in a
rural setting, that percentage is steadily declining. For a number
of structural and sociological reasons - including the
aforementioned destruction and changing cultural expectations - it
is logical to assume this trend will continue well into the future.
Rural poverty remains the central feature in the Afghan equation
but, as a result of the dislocations noted above, urban poverty is
becoming an increasingly important component. Most poverty
alleviation programs funded by international donors focus,
disproportionately, upon restoring Afghanistan's agricultural
sector. Focusing assistance programs only upon rural poverty risks
missing the dynamic part of the needs picture in Afghanistan. As
has happened in much of the developing world, the urbanization of
poverty is fundamentally altering the picture in Afghanistan and
reshaping the challenges ahead.