KOENIGS AND BOUCHER ON INTERNATIONAL COORDINATION,

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KABUL 000954

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR SCA/FO DAS GASTRIGHT, SCA/A
STATE PASS TO USAID FOR AID/ANE, AID/DCHA/DG
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CENTCOM FOR CG CFC-A. CG CJTF-76 POLAD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/08/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER EAID MARR AF IR
SUBJECT: KOENIGS AND BOUCHER ON INTERNATIONAL COORDINATION,
PAKISTAN, AND IRAN


Classified By: Ambassador Ronald Neumann for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D)

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SUMMARY
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1. (C) A special response fund to allow the United
Nations Assistance Mission to Afghanistan close
developmental cooperation with ISAF would advance
civilian-military coordination; Washington support
requested. Additionally, in a March 14 meeting
with Assistant Secretary for South and Central Asian
Affairs Richard Boucher and the Ambassador, Tom Koenigs
(the Special Representative of the Secretary General to
the United Nations Assistance Mission to Afghanistan)
asked for U.S. support in soliciting international staff
from donor governments to strengthen the Secretariat
of the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board. Boucher
urged caution in dealing with Iran and pressed Koenigs
not to raise the issue of Pakistan's role in security in
Afghanistan at the UN Security Council meeting on
March 20. End summary.

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KOENIGS REQUESTS ASSISTANCE FOR THE JOINT COORDINATION
AND MONITORING BOARD SECRETARIAT
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2. (C) As co-chair of the Afghanistan Joint
Coordination and Monitoring Board, Koenigs noted a
continuing need to strengthen the Board secretariat and
get donor governments to participate more actively in
the Board's decision-making processes. The Board's
secretariat remains weak due to a lack of capacity

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among its current employees, and Koenigs asked for U.S.
help in soliciting donor governments to identify 4-5
employees (ideally Persian/Dari-speaking expatriates)
who could serve on the Board's secretariat. Boucher
agreed to assist. To better harmonize their efforts
and keep abreast of developments, Koenigs also
mentioned that Western capitals should push
their representatives in Kabul to make more use of the
existing coordination structures. For example, he
would like to see more European countries
participating actively in the Afghan National
Development Strategy working and consultative groups
that report to the Board. In his view, only the U.S.
was effectively using these structures, including the
Ambassadors' Tea Club consultative meetings, to raise
issues requiring more focused attention.

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COORDINATING DONOR SUPPORT TO STRENGTHEN REACH OF
CENTRAL GOVERNMENT
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3. (C) A second challenge involved the United Nations
Assistance Mission to Afghanistan's interest
in strengthening integration of military and civilian
assistance efforts, particularly at the local and
provincial levels where coordination is often lacking.
Koenigs thought part of the answer to this could come
from the recent doubling of the UN's presence from 8 to
15 offices in the provinces. At the provincial level,
Koenigs also lamented the lack of a shared vision
among donor countries administering Provincial
Reconstruction Teams. He specifically noted the UK
and the Netherlands are singularly focused on Helmand
and Uruzgan (respectively) and have little interest in
the greater picture. Koenigs noted that London in
particular has weakened its Ambassador by communicating
directly with its representatives in Helmand, leaving
its Ambassador in Kabul out of the loop. According to
Koenigs, not all Provincial Reconstruction Teams "get the
message" that they should be an extension of the
central government to the people of Afghanistan,
instead allowing themselves to be seen as individual

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countries assisting the Afghan people where their own
government cannot. Koenigs pledged to push this
message during his upcoming travel to Western capitals
and suggested an independent assessment of the impact
of the Provincial Teams. Boucher agreed and suggested
that the UN's take on the role of assessing "best
practices" among the Teams.


4. (SBU) Koenigs noted that several donor countries
have not supplied adequate input to the Donor
Assistance Database (DAD) administered through the
Afghanistan National Development Strategy. He noted
that this national database should include both
governmental and military aid coming from donors.
While USAID has been feeding input into the
Donor Assistance Database, Koenigs noted that U.S.
military sources of aid have not been included.


5. (C) Koenigs also highlighted the inability of
donors other than the U.S. to provide quick
intervention assistance to affected areas in the wake
of military operations. One possibility would be for
the international community to create some sort of
"international quick response fund" for these areas
hit by military operations against the Taliban. This
could take the form of a stand-alone entity or
possibly be housed within the World Bank managed
Afghan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF).
Boucher agreed to look into pushing other NATO members
to consider a new international mechanism for quick
intervention. Koenigs noted that such funding could
be tied to the Policy Action Group (PAG) process,
which focuses on security and development in four
provinces along Afghanistan's southeastern border with
Pakistan.

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BOUCHER URGES CAUTION IN SEEKING GREATER IRANIAN
INVOLVEMENT IN AFGHANISTAN
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6. (C) Koenigs also mentioned his plans to lobby
Tehran to coordinate its assistance to Afghanistan
through the central government. On security, Koenigs
shared his belief that Iran has been more supportive
of the Northern Alliance - specifically a newly formed
political group called the National United Front
(septel) - than of the central government. "They are
not siding with the Taliban," noted Koenigs, "but they
are not fighting them either." Boucher urged Koenigs
to be cautious in dealing with Iran, as Iran has begun
to support factions in Kabul, individuals in the
provinces, and "adopting Herat." Koenigs agreed that
Iran is not only helping the Hazaras, but also the
National United Front, a new political group rumored
to be positioning itself as a political alternative to
President Karzai. He also noted that the Taliban had
grown noticeably careful in its rhetoric about the
Hazara community, likely out of fear of the Hazara
community's increasing links to Iran.

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BOUCHER URGES KOENIGS NOT TO RAISE PAKISTAN-
AFGHANISTAN ISSUE WITH UN SECURITY COUNCIL
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7. (C) When Koenigs expressed a desire to raise the
issue of Pakistan's role in security in Afghanistan at
the March 21 UN Security Council meeting, Assistant
Secretary Boucher bluntly told Koenigs not to

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push for an open discussion of Pakistan's role in
Afghan security, as it would make it harder to get
cooperation from Pakistan and disrupt the current
momentum achieved over the past several months.


8. (U) Assistant Secretary Boucher's office cleared this

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cable.
NEUMANN