Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07KABUL94
2007-01-10 06:04:00
SECRET
Embassy Kabul
Cable title:  

PAKISTAN PM AZZIZ VISIT TO AFGHANISTAN

Tags:  PREL PGOV PTER ASEC MARR AF PK 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO3957
OO RUEHDBU
DE RUEHBUL #0094/01 0100604
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 100604Z JAN 07
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5357
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/OSD WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RHMFISS/COMSOCCENT MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 3504
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 KABUL 000094 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR SCA/FO DAS GASTRIGHT, SCA/A, S/CRS, SA/PB, S/CT,
EUR/RPM
STATE PASS TO USAID FOR AID/ANE, AID/DCHA/DG
NSC FOR AHARRIMAN
OSD FOR KIMMITT
CENTCOM FOR CFC-A, CG CJTF-76, POLAD, JICCENT

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/10/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER ASEC MARR AF PK
SUBJECT: PAKISTAN PM AZZIZ VISIT TO AFGHANISTAN

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires a.i., David Newell for reasons 1.4 (B)
and (D).

-------
SUMMARY
-------

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 KABUL 000094

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR SCA/FO DAS GASTRIGHT, SCA/A, S/CRS, SA/PB, S/CT,
EUR/RPM
STATE PASS TO USAID FOR AID/ANE, AID/DCHA/DG
NSC FOR AHARRIMAN
OSD FOR KIMMITT
CENTCOM FOR CFC-A, CG CJTF-76, POLAD, JICCENT

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/10/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER ASEC MARR AF PK
SUBJECT: PAKISTAN PM AZZIZ VISIT TO AFGHANISTAN

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires a.i., David Newell for reasons 1.4 (B)
and (D).

--------------
SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) Afghan Deputy National Security Advisor Engineer
Ibrahim characterized the January 4 visit of Pakistan Prime
Minister Azziz as a "good trip." There had not been
agreement on substance, but Azziz and Karzai held frank and
open discussions on a range of bilateral issues. Foreign
Minister Spanta's Special Advisor acknowledged the importance
of dialogue with the civilian side of the Pakistan
government, but focused on the need to engage more deeply
with the Pakistani military and ISI, the real centers of
power in Pakistan. On the Pakistani proposal to fence and
mine the border, the GOA expressed its clear opposition, not
just because of the consequences of mining for the civilian
population but because it is not an effective tool for
combatting terrorism. The real issue was command and
control. Azziz reportedly had not pressed the issue in the
meeting, which the GOA took to indicate the Pakistani
civilian side might reconsider the proposal. Afghanistan
expects a formal response on the border issue within two
weeks. The GOA sees as positive Pakistani steps to create a
Commission to prepare for the jirgas and is prepared to
engage through that agreed channel. On Musa Qala, the main
challenge for the GOA will be preventing the area from
becoming a Taliban sanctuary while offering local residents
more security, reconstruction and development. On poppy
eradication, Ibrahim said Karzai will welcome a clear plan
and a viable alternative livelihoods program. END SUMMARY

--------------
PM Azziz Visit
--------------

"A Good Visit" But the Wrong Person
--------------


2. (C) On January 6, Deputy National Security Advisor (NSA)
Engineer Ibrahim provided A/DCM a readout of Pakistan PM
Azziz,s January 4 visit to Afghanistan. Ibrahim
characterized the overall visit as a "good trip" as President
Karzai and PM Azziz had spoken openly and frankly. Karzai
strongly believes that the Prime Minister wants a peaceful
and prosperous relationship. Karzai's position, with which
Ibrahim agreed, had been that a way must be found to change
the minds of "other people", namely the Pakistan military.
They must be encouraged to think about broader goals for
Pakistan, including economic prosperity. Ibrahim said the
visit gave Afghanistan some hope that there might be changes
in Pakistani thinking and a chance for deepening relations.


3. (C) While the overall visit was positive, Karzai
reportedly took a hard line with Azziz on Pakistan's
responsibility for cross-border terrorism. Afghanistan's
position is that the border is not the issue -- command and
control is. Ibrahim said that Azziz had offered 1,000
scholarships for Afghan students to study in Pakistan, but
President Karzai refused the offer, explaining to Azziz that
there were over 200,000 students in Kandahar and in the
border regions who had no chance to go to schools because
they had been burned down by insurgents. This is the
priority. Karzai told Azziz, and repeated to the press, that
Afghanistan will know that its neighbors want peace only when
it sees an end to the burning of schools, the explosion of
bombs, and the killing of Afghan people along the border
region. An early sign of progress would be whether
Afghanistan had a peaceful or bloody spring.


4. (S) In a separate meeting with A/DCM January 8, Foreign
Minister Spanta's Special Advisor, Davood Moradian, echoed
similar views about engaging the Pakistan military. He

KABUL 00000094 002 OF 004


underlined that the structures of power in Pakistan were
different from those in Afghanistan and other countries.
Azziz was a civilian, an economist from the World Bank, who
understood economic integration and development but was not
the key person to be engaging on security and border issues.
The same could be said for FM Kasuri, Moradian said. The GOA
would now be looking for ways to engage ISI and Pakistani
military decision-makers.


5. (S) Moradian described matter of factly the consequences
of what he characterized as an unequal relationship with
Pakistan. Afghanistan was always on the defensive against
attacks from Pakistan which held the upper hand in the
relationship; the GOA was always reacting. Moradian saw the
ISI as the real policymakers in Pakistan. He joked that
other countries had an army, but in Pakistan the army had a
country. He portrayed the Pakistani military as highly
sophisticated, well-educated, and well-paid. In response,
the GOA's strategy was aimed at trying to establish relations
with a wide range of Pakistani ministries and civil society
members in an effort to help increase their police leverage.

Fencing and Mining the Border
--------------


6. (C) Deputy NSA Ibrahim reported that the Afghan response
to the Pakistani proposal to fence and mine the border was
clear ) it will not stop terrorism and will only separate
families, tribes, and clans and put the civilian population
at risk. The real issue is command and control centers in
Pakistan. Azziz had explained to Karzai that the process
would be selective -- some areas would be mined, while some
would be fenced. According to Ibrahim, Azziz had not taken a
hard line on the issue during their meeting, which sent a
signal to the GOA that civilian decision-makers may not be as
committed to the strategy as public statements might
indicate. The GOA would know in two weeks what Pakistan had
decided. Ibrahim noted that Pashtun tribes on both sides of
the border were unhappy with the proposal and have threatened
to take the GOP to court. Ibrahim thought that the border
proposal was more political in nature than about countering
terrorism. It reflects Pakistan's interest in demarcating
the Durand line.

North Waziristan Agreement
--------------


7. (C) President Karzai reportedly told Azziz that he
believed that a new state had been created in North
Waziristan, an area that used to be part of Afghanistan.
Karzai called for more concrete examples of Pakistani efforts
to crack down on the Taliban leadership in Quetta and North
Waziristan.

Jirgas
--------------


8. (C) Ibrahim stated that Azziz announced that the GOP
would shortly be appointing a Commission to start work on the
cross border jirgas. He characterized the GOP,s reluctance
to engage on Afghanistan,s proposal as "not an official
rejection, but more of a delay," and welcomed the
announcement of a Commission. The GOA is ready to engage
through that agreed channel. Delays in getting to this point
have, unfortunately, encouraged the Taliban to speak out
against the jirgas, he said. Karzai reportedly reiterated to
Azziz that the main purpose of the jirgas was political.
Karzai wanted both sides to openly discuss all the cross
border problems and focus on the sources of terrorism.

Refugees
--------------


9. (C) Asked if any decisions had been made to close refugee
camps in Pakistan, Ibrahim responded that registration of

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refugees had begun and would continue through January. The
two sides would then set a deadline for sending refugees back
to Afghanistan. He said that President Karzai insisted that
Pakistani authorities go into the refugee camps to close down
terrorist training camps. Ibrahim noted Pakistani military's
reluctance to go into the refugee camps to close down
training centers.

-------------- --
Other Issues: Musa Qala, NAC, Poppy Eradication
-------------- --

Musa Qala
--------------


10. (C) Ibrahim described the main challenge of Musa Qala as
preventing the area from becoming a sanctuary for Taliban
while respecting the needs of the local community. Governor
Wafa was now working closely with the tribal leaders in Musa
Qala and other areas including Sangin. Ibrahim saw the area
as divided between those who supported the Taliban and those
who supported the GOA. The GOA therefore needed to
demonstrate that it had more to offer in terms of security,
reconstruction and development, while showing that the
Taliban offered only more fighting and instability. The task
now was for the GOA to instill optimism, create confidence,
and set the right conditions for people to want to remain in
Musa Qala under GOA control. Evidence of reconstruction and
development and law and order would be key, Ibrahim stressed.
Spanta's Special Advisor Moradian was more critical, arguing
that the agreement was seen broadly as a concession to the
enemy. As such, it weakened ISAF in the eyes of the public.
It is critical that it not be replicated, he stressed.

NAC Meeting
--------------


11. (C) A/DCM briefed Ibrahim on the NAC,s intention to
invite Foreign Minister Spanta and Defense Minister Wardak to
the January 26 NAC in Brussels. She stressed the importance
of having both present to make Afghanistan,s case to the
Europeans.


12. (C) Ibrahim was confident that both Spanta and Wardak
would attend (FM Spanta's Special Advisor Moradian later
confirmed that Spanta planned to attend). He expressed worry
that some Europeans, with the exception of the eastern
Europeans, had become demoralized. They were now complaining
about the smallest problems or setbacks. Ibrahim was
concerned that when the Europeans made noises about leaving
Afghanistan it only helped the enemy. Ibrahim pointed to
France,s "withdrawal" which, he believed, would have minimal
impact on the ground, but sent the incorrect message to the
Taliban that the Europeans were pulling out. (Comment:
Ibrahim was apparently referring to French DefMin
Alliot-Marie's mid-December announcement that France was
withdrawing its 200 Special Forces that had been deployed
under OEF in RC-East. France is however maintaining its ISAF
commitment of approximately 1,000 troops in the Kabul area.
End Comment) Ibrahim said the Afghan message to NATO would
be to "stay strong", keep fighting terrorism, and help
Afghanistan. A/DCM responded that it would be useful for the
NAC to hear this message directly from Spanta and Wardak.

Poppy Eradication
--------------


13. (C) Ibrahim stressed the importance of approaching poppy
eradiation with a clear plan. In particular, he argued for
better programs for alternative livelihoods. He said that
Presidential Economic Advisor Nadiri and the Agriculture
Ministry were working on a concrete plan for alternative
livelihoods, e.g., substituting cotton production in Helmand
for poppy cultivation. Ibrahim also called for the arrests
of traffickers who were enticing farmers to grow poppy. He

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said that Russia had expressed interest in assisting with
eradication in response to the influx of heroin into Russian
cities and the increase in drug addicts in the country.

Comment
--------------


14. (C) Despite differences over the border fencing and
mining issue which Karzai has pointed to as evidence of a
widening gap, the GOA was generally satisfied with the visit
and the open and frank exchanges that took place. It is,
however, being realistic about the ultimate impact of such
visits. It delivered a clear message about its needs and
expectations. The GOA is still pinning hopes on the cross
border jirgas to help resolve cross-border tensions. The
jirgas take on greater urgency now as one way to obviate the
need for what it sees as draconian border measures being
pushed by Pakistan. Press reports indicate that Pakistan has
decided to go forward with fencing and mining which will only
inflame tensions on both sides of the border.
NEWELL