PRT HERAT: IRAN INCREASES VISIBILITY IN WESTERN

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/25/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER ASEC MARR AF IR
SUBJECT: PRT HERAT: IRAN INCREASES VISIBILITY IN WESTERN
AFGHANISTAN

Classified By: A/PolCouns Martin Murphy for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D).


1. (C) SUMMARY: Iran has recently taken steps to establish
"operational centers" for police cooperation in three
provinces in western Afghanistan: Nimroz, Herat and Farah.
These new centers complement Iranian efforts to establish
relations with Afghan security forces and increase the range
of their cooperative agreements with Afghanistan. Senior
Afghan officials, such as the Minister of Interior (MOI) and
provincial officials, including Governors and Provincial
Council leaders, appear receptive to these new overtures.
END SUMMARY.

New Operational Centers
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2. (C) GOA officials in late January concluded an agreement
with Iranian security counterparts on police cooperation.
The new agreement covers a range of fields, including border
management, exchange of information, and establishment of new
border checkpoints. The three police bilateral operational
centers would be established in the provincial capitals of
Herat, Farah and Nimroz and are designed to focus on
counter-narcotics and illegal migrants. Iranian officials
claim that these issues are the chief obstacles to improving
bilateral Afghan-Iranian relations.

Reaction in Herat
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3. (C) Iranian officials have sought to deepen their links
with Afghan security forces, including the ABP and NDS.
PRToff's senior Herati contacts who include senior GOA
officials conveyed their sense that Iranian officials feel
they have missed an opportunity to be more deeply involved in
Afghan police training activities and now appear to be
playing catch-up. Most police training for Afghans currently
takes place primarily at the five Regional Training Centers
(RTCs) that are operated by DynCorps under a contract from
State/INL. The operational centers the Iranians are
establishing are designed to create new inroads with a new
cadre of Afghan police officers. The Iranian effort is
directed at ordinary policemen rather than high-level
officials.

Similar Pattern in Kabul
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4. (C) In Kabul, Embassy contacts at the Ministry of
Counter-Narcotics (MCN) inform us that the Iranians have
expressed interest in becoming a major donor. Their
purported engagement ranges from an offer to pay for new MCN
provincial offices in six provinces -- including in Herat --
all the way up to a potential "buy-out" of the Ministry,
where the Iranian government would replace the salary
supplements that the UK has been paying since establishing
the Ministry. According to this offer, the Iranians would
also participate in capacity building programs at the MCN.
While we regard the offer of establishing provincial offices
more likely than the "buy-out", we have heard from several
reliable sources that Minister Qaderi has been shopping the
MCN around town (including to the U.S. Embassy) in an effort
to replace the UK funding. An Iranian suitor would make a
lot of sense and is consistent with actions observed in
Afghanistan's western provinces.

Comment
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5. (C) Iranian influence in western Afghanistan is visible
and growing daily. Much of this influence is subtle, i.e.,
cultural and commercial. On the other hand, overtures, such
as police cooperation initiatives, are more overt and

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official and represent stepped up Iranian government efforts
to line up key support for their policies and initiatives in
the region. While Heratis and Afghans in general are
receptive, it is clear that they favor economic and cultural
over security cooperation given Iran's historical dominance
of the region.
NEUMANN