ANP PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT ACCOUNTING COMMENCES

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 KABUL 000855

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

STATE FOR SCA/FO DAS GASTRIGHT, SCA/A, S/CRS, S/CT,
EUR/RPM, INL/CIVPOL
STATE PASS TO USAID FOR AID/ANE, AID/DCHA/DG,
NSC FOR AHARRIMAN
OSD FOR KIMMITT
CENTCOM FOR CSTC-A, CG CJTF-82, POLAD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/03/2016
TAGS: MARR SNAR PGOV AF
SUBJECT: ANP PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT ACCOUNTING COMMENCES


Classified By: POLITICAL MILITARY COUNSELOR CAROL RODLEY FOR REASONS 1.
4 (B) AND (D).

(C/REL ISAF)Subject: ANP Personnel and Equipment Accounting
Commences

1.(C/REL ISAF) Summary: The inability to identify the
actual numbers of Afghan National Police (ANP)
operating within the country has long frustrated
the international community, Combined Security
Transition Command - Afghanistan (CSTC-A)and the
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF).
The lack of basic knowledge, including the
numbers of police and quality of weapons and
other equipment, has resulted in many requests
from the Government of Afghanistan and
international community, most notably in the
Policy Action Group (PAG),for a full accounting
of the policemen serving in each province.
Previous attempts to gather this information were
inconclusive and flawed due to the poor
infrastructure, a lack of transportation assets,
and especially the lack of security in the south.
The Dyncorp ID Unit has gathered some data on the
number of police by registering patrolmen and
issuing ID cards, however, this process is
ongoing and still incomplete. Task Force Phoenix
(TF Phoenix) recently began an accountability
initiative to do a baseline assessment of the
numbers of police operating in each region and
province. This initiative may provide long-
awaited data on the number of police forces and
could also provide a partial measurement of the
quality of the ANP. However, assessments down to
the district level are needed to ensure
accountability and adequately evaluate the ANP,s
ability to enforce the rule of law and provide
security for the citizens of Afghanistan.



Unquantifiable Police Numbers
-------------- --------------

2.(C/REL ISAF) Over four months ago, the Ministry of
Finance, Security Operations Group (SOG) and
Policy Action Group (PAG) requested a country-
wide count of the ANP. This audit was scheduled
to start in Zabul province and then proceed to
other provinces. However, because of
insurmountable logistical challenges and an
inability to travel within the province, this
initial attempt to count policemen and validate
the quantity and quality of ANP equipment failed.
The data was inconclusive and was unable to
answer the most basic question: How many police
are operating in Zabul? It also could not
identify the quantity of weapons and
communications equipment present or the
operational capability of the deployed police
forces.

3.(C/REL ISAF) Except for Dyncorp,s current effort to
register and provide police ID cards, there is no
process in place to reliably determine the number
of Afghan National Police (ANP) serving
throughout the nation. By contrast, the Afghan
National Army (ANA) benefits from the presence of
Embedded Tactical Training Teams and Operational
Mentoring Liaison Teams, which operate from Corps
to Company levels, and greatly assist with the
tracking of ANA soldiers. Additionally, the ANA

KABUL 00000855 002 OF 004


operates in relatively large groups at forward
operating bases (FOBs) which also makes accountability
slightly easier. Although the Police Academy and
Regional Training Centers can accurately track the
number of policemen trained, once the patrolmen leave
the training centers, maintaining accountability
becomes problematic and in many cases the
individuals vanish into the districts and
accountability is lost. The ability of the
provincial headquarters to properly track the
number of police in the districts is also suspect
due to incomplete, manual records which often
contain errors. The shortage, at the district
level, of civilian police and military mentors is
yet another obstacle that hinders adequate and
accurate ANP tracking.

4.(C/REL ISAF) The lack of mentors, coupled with the poor
infrastructure and elevated security situation,
which makes travel to remote districts extremely
dangerous, increases the difficulty of
establishing and maintaining proper
accountability. Without this data, it is not
possible to determine ANP retention rates or the
number of policemen absent without leave. Even
using pay records to establish accountability is
unreliable as many policemen are still paid by a
trusted agent and widespread corruption still
interferes with the maintenance of accurate pay
records.

5.(C/REL ISAF) Dyncorps currently implements a program to
register patrolmen and provide police ID cards.
While this program will eventually help reduce
the number of "ghost" police, until the ID cards
are linked to the pay system, it only provides a
partial answer to how many policemen are
operating within the country. To date, the
Dyncorp effort has registered 50,065 policemen of
which 2,844 are Afghan National Auxiliary Police.
Of this, 34,397 police ID cards have been printed
for personnel belonging to the ANP. ID Cards
have not yet been printed for the ANAP because
the MoI is behind in producing the required and
certified vetting documents which are required to
prove the identity of the ANAP patrolmen prior to
the issuance of an ID card. Another very
important benefit of this program is that it is
building a national data base which currently
does not exist. In the future, this data base
could also incorporate award and evaluation data,
training course completion dates and other
personnel information which would make this a
very powerful research and management tool.
However, the most significant problem with this
program continues to be obtaining the data from
the MoI and from the provincial headquarters.

Impact on Security and Enforcing the Rule of Law
-------------- --------------

6.(C/REL ISAF) The inability to identify the number of
operational police precludes an accurate
assessment of the ANP,s impact on the security
situation throughout the nation. Lacking this
knowledge, it is not possible to determine if the
police presence is sufficient to enforce the rule
of law and provide adequate security to the
populace. While the international community may
think that there are enough trained policemen at
the district level to provide security and
prevent the populace from passively or actively

KABUL 00000855 003 OF 004


supporting the insurgency, lacking a realistic
accounting, there really is no way to ascertain
the true situation. Moreover, although
provincial Chiefs of Police may claim that they
have 100% of their personnel authorizations, this
cannot be proven. It is often beneficial for the
Chief of Police to exaggerate his unit's manning status
as it often results in him receiving
additional, unauthorized salaries from "ghost"
policemen which goes directly into his pockets.
Exaggerated numbers of ANP also provides a false sense
of security and does not necessarily equate to
greater protection for the citizens of
Afghanistan or a greater ability to enforce the
rule of law; in many cases it simply serves to
increase the personal wealth of corrupt police
leaders.

Baseline Assessment Initiated
-------------- --------------

7.(C/REL ISAF) In an attempt to identify the numbers of
deployed and operational ANP, TF Phoenix recently
deployed 4 10-man teams to the East, West,
Central and North. The most recent of these
teams was successfully deployed during the last
week of February. Their goal is to record the
number of Officers, Non-Commissioned Officers and
Patrolmen serving at the regional and provincial
levels. They will also focus on the manning and
equipping of the Border Police brigades and
battalions. Additionally, the team intends to
assess the tribal composition of the police units
and the percentage of trained versus untrained
patrolmen. The teams will note the quantity and
quality of on-hand equipment (weapons, radios,
vehicles, and uniforms),the status of
operational headquarters and buildings used to
feed and house the police, the pay status of the
patrolmen, and finally will make a subjective
evaluation of the individual and unit operational
capabilities. The operational capabilities
assessment will attempt to identify how the
police track the locations of additional ANP
forces and other friendly forces operating in the
same area, how they track and report threats, and
finally their ability to report significant
events to a higher headquarters. Since the
Western Region has only 4 provinces, this team is
expected to finish its assessment first and will
then redeploy and complete an assessment of the
provinces in the South. The initiative is on
track to be completed by April 22, 2007.

8.(C/REL ISAF) This initiative is more likely to succeed
than past attempts to ascertain ANP accountability
because of Task Force Phoenix,s use of ANA FOBS
and assets. Past assessments relied on the use
of military air to transport teams to and from
provincial centers and did not have the vehicles
or logistics to support long-term operations and
movement within the provinces. A significant
advantage of the current plan is that by using
the ANA FOBs, the teams will have access to
security personnel that are already in place and
therefore are familiar with the local area.
Finally, the FOBs will provide a central location
from which the teams can operate and return to
upon completion of their assessments.
Logistically, this plan more wisely uses the
available assets to promote extensive operations
throughout the regions. The ability to operate

KABUL 00000855 004 OF 004


for a longer period within the provinces should
result in a greater ability to more reliably
determine the number of operational police and
their operational capabilities.

Comment.
--------------
9.(C/REL ISAF) Although this initiative is long overdue
and is a good first step, it will still only provide
a partial solution due to its focus at the
regional and provincial levels. Even if
successful at the regional and provincial levels,
the omission of district-level information will
still prevent any realistic analysis of
recruiting retention rates and AWOL rates.
However, this initiative should provide a more
comprehensive picture of the ANP,s manning and
equipping status than is currently available.
This initiative is more likely to succeed than
past attempts due to TF Phoenix,s plan to use ANA
Forward Operating Bases to overcome the logistics
and security challenges. However, the only way
to attain true accountability is by placing
substantially more civilian police and military
mentors than are currently available at the
district levels. Until district level
assessments are done, we will not know whether
there are enough ANP deployed to combat the
insurgency and if the available ANP is strong
enough to enforce the rule of law and protect the
citizens of Afghanistan. The approval of
additional military and civilian police mentors
will be essential to successfully accomplishing this
task. Additionally, the presence of "ghost" policemen
and corruption will continue to detract from the
development of a professional ANP. For the coalition
to defeat the insurgency, we need to know that sufficient
ANP forces are deployed and that they are capable of
protecting local populations and preventing the
insurgents from coercing support out in the villages.
NEUMANN