SCENESETTER II: US-AFGHAN STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP

S E C R E T KABUL 000805

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DOD FOR USDP EDELMAN
STATE FOR SCA/FO A/S BOUCHER AND DAS GASTRIGHT, SCA/A,
S/CRS, SCA/PB, S/CT,
EUR/RPM
STATE PASS TO USAID FOR AID/ANE, AID/DCHA/DG
NSC PASS TO AHARRIMAN
OSD FOR KIMMITT
CENTCOM FOR CFC-A, CG CJTF-76, POLAD, JICCENT

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/26/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER ASEC MARR AF
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER II: US-AFGHAN STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP
BILATERAL MEETINGS MARCH 13-14

REF: KABUL 804

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires a.i., Richard Norland for reasons 1.4
(B) and (D).


1. (SBU) Reftel reported scenesetter for the March 13
U.S.-Afghan Strategic Partnership Plenary meeting. This
message provides points for March 13-14 bilateral meetings in
Kabul (in order of the meeting schedule).

FOREIGN MINISTER SPANTA
--------------


2. (S) Under constant pressure from Karzai to deliver more,
FM Spanta should be reassured that the U.S. continues to
strongly support his efforts to put relations with Pakistan
on a realistic footing that will intensify cooperation
against terrorism. We should encourage him to make this his
major focus over the coming year, including making greater
effort to have frequent meetings and regular contact with his
GOP counterparts. Spanta is also focused on Iran. He
correctly understands that Iran can do far more to hurt us
(and the Afghans) than we can counter. Spanta may seek
reassurances that we would exclude Afghanistan from
obligations to enforce sanctions, much as we did for years
with Jordan or Turkey on Iraq. The GOA welcomes Iranian
economic assistance and investment, but shares our concerns
about intelligence activities and cultural dominance.


3. (S) Points for Spanta include:

-- Enhanced Afghan-Pakistan cooperation is key to improving
regional and cross-border stability, as well as U.S.
security. U.S. willing to be helpful.

-- The U.S. supports the cross-border jirga initiative --
did anything come out of the two jirga commissions?

-- We hope that the Foreign Ministry will focus on this as a
top priority over the next year. You need a multi-faceted
approach to the problems. There is no silver bullet.

-- The U.S. shares Afghanistan's concerns about Iran. We
understand the need for Afghanistan to have normal relations
with its neighbors but will not tolerate Afghanistan being
used as a platform for anti-coalition activities.

MINISTER OF DEFENSE WARDAK
--------------


4. (S) Minister of Defense Wardak deeply values the
U.S.-Afghanistan Strategic Partnership, perhaps more than
most. He was the only minister to attend an entire
Strategic Partnership Working Group in preparation for the
Plenary. He continues to emphasize the importance of the
bilateral security relationship with the U.S., citing the
U.S. treaty relationship with the Republic of Korea as a
model. Wardak is not yet confident of NATO, due to what he
sees as the complex decision-making, caveats, vacillation,
and involvement of capitals in the NATO policy process.


5. (S) Wardak is committed to Afghan National Army (ANA)
force development, including improving retention and
reenlistment rates. Wardak's long-term vision for the ANA is
to be capable of independently neutralizing any internal or
external threat. He acknowledges the need for the GoA to
take on ANA sustainability in the long-term but has said that
during the transitional period the Afghan government will
need to share the burden with Coalition forces. In a recent
meeting with PDASD Shinn and the OSD delegation, Wardak
proposed moving control of the Afghan Border Police back to
the Ministry of Defense from the Ministry of Interior, where
it has resided since the 2002 Bonn Conference limited the ANA
to 70,000 personnel. However, others in the ANA leadership
fear that incorporating ABP personnel into ANA ranks would

seriously dilute the professionalism and capability of the
ANA. Wardak will welcome a discussion about Afghanistan's
relations with its neighbors. In particular, he believes
that the Pakistanis are playing a double game, but that if
the U.S. is able to ensure Pakistan's sincerity, the Afghans
will do everything they can to support a cooperative
relationship.


6. (S) Points for Wardak:

-- The U.S. remains committed to a long-term partnership with
Afghanistan. We are fully committed to supporting
Afghanistan as it gradually takes on full responsibility for
its own security.

-- Seek Minister Wardak's view how he sees the military
situation developing over the next several months.

-- Seek Wardak's views of recent actions taken by Pakistan
government, e.g. the arrest of Mullah Obaidullah and whether
more can be done through the mechanism of the Tripartite
Commission and other military-military channels to foster
increased cooperation between Afghanistan and Pakistan in
countering the insurgency.


NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR RASSOUL
--------------


7. (S) NSA Rassoul would benefit from hearing directly from
USDEL about our interest in expanding Karzai's personal
engagement on corruption, good governance and interagency
cooperation, counter-narcotics and public outreach to take
the initiative away from the Taliban. Rassoul says he is
willing to try being less vocal about Pakistan's role in
Afghanistan in order to give a chance for other pressure to
work. He says Pakistan sees a stable Afghanistan as a
threat, that Afghans are willing to persuade them otherwise,
but merely extending Pakistani influence into Afghanistan is
unacceptable.


8. (S) Key messages to Rassoul:

-- Americans and Congress are expecting more progress on
tackling corruption, good governance, and counter-narcotics.
$10.2 billion supplemental is a vote of confidence but we
need to see early results.

-- On jirgas, Rassoul and senior GOA leadership needs to be
more proactive in reaching out to Pakistani counterparts.
Explore his view of next steps now that the two Commissions
have agreed to meet March 10.

-- Rassoul does not believe the problem with Pakistan is a
border issue, but one of sanctuaries, training camps, and
madrassas. Convey strong U.S. support for closing down these
sources of terrorism, working with Pakistan. Seek Rassoul's
views on more effective approaches to Pakistan and how to
make greater use of Karzai as the most effective public
spokesman for countering the insurgency.

PRESIDENT KARZAI
--------------


9. (S) Your meeting with President Karzai will be an
opportunity to assure him of our commitment to the
U.S.-Afghan partnership and ask for more vigorous
leadership on a range of issues. Reassure him that we
continue to be willing to help facilitate full Pakistani
participation in the cross-border jirgas and more effective
action against Taliban leadership in Quetta and Peshawar.
Intel supports Karzai's conviction that the North Waziristan
agreement is not working, and he may want to know what we
plan to do about it. Karzai is also concerned about
controversial legislation, already adopted in both houses of



Parliament and awaiting his signature, that would grant a
blanket amnesty to warlords and human rights abusers for
crimes committed during the Anti-Soviet jihad and afterwards.
Karzai is maneuvering to kill the measure for "Afghan"
reasons, without appearing as a puppet of international human
rights advocates. With the change of seasons also comes
uncertainty surrounding the anticipated Taliban spring
offensive which has already started. Its intensity, as well
as the Afghan and coalition response, will shape the
political environment in the coming months. Karzai is all
for strong military action but remains concerned about
civilian casualties.


10. (S) The meeting with President Karzai will be a good
opportunity to convey the following messages:

-- The U.S. and ISAF are committed to securing the South.
The GOA needs to be seen out front in consolidating gains
through active reconstruction and development. (He'll tell us
donors need to work faster.)

-- Getting the auxiliary police program up and running has
been a positive step in improving security without simply
resorting entirely to militias. We are committed to working
with the MOI to expand the program rapidly to the East, but
need to be careful to ensure that auxiliary police are
recruited individually and thoroughly vetted.
-- Karzai must show greater leadership in fighting
corruption, much of which is related to drug trafficking,
that is poisoning efforts to build a capable and credible
governance system. Corruption is fast becoming systematic at
the central and provincial levels. This is the most
important issue for building confidence in the government.
Karzai should use his authority to remove corrupt officials
from office (including his drug-running brother Ahmad Wali
Karzai, in Kandahar) through a transparent process, support
his Attorney General to imprison and remove ineffective and
corrupt provincial and district officials using proper legal
procedures, act upon the recommendations of Supreme Court
Chief Justice Azimi's forthcoming anti-corruption report,
push his ministers to include anti-corruption efforts in
their strategic plans, and urge ratification of the UN
Convention on Corruption (a London Compact Benchmark).

-- Police reform is prerequisite to persuading Afghans to
look to the central government as the sole provider of
security and guarantor of justice. Police are the face of
the GOA at the local level. It is critically important to
continue appointing to leadership positions police officers
who are professional, competent, active, and not corrupt.

-- The GOA has to take much stronger action against poppy
cultivation and the traffickers who profit from it. Helmand
is headed for another record crop, which risks negating the
gains made in other parts of the country. In Helmand in
particular, the President, the Governor, and the police must
take much stronger action to eradicate the crop that has
already been planted and arrest major traffickers in the
province.

-- Karzai should reach out more to the public across
Afghanistan. He should encourage his Ministers to do the
same, as well as to take a stronger leadership role in
ministerial-provincial coordination. The government needs to
show its presence and extend its reach throughout the
country, particularly cracking down on corruption and
demonstrating success on development and police recruitment.

-- We understand the delicate political issues raised by
the controversial amnesty legislation. The U.S. continues to
support the National Action Plan on Truth, Justice, and
Reconciliation.

BREAKFAST WITH COMISAF GENERAL MCNEILL
--------------



11. (S) General McNeill assumed command of ISAF X on February

4. He had previously served in Afghanistan as the head of
the operational command at Command Joint Task Force 180 (now
CJTF-82). Thus, he understands the situation on the ground
and has strong personal relationships with senior Afghan
leaders. General McNeill's "commander,s intent" for the
upcoming campaign season is to retain the initiative. This
is not intended to result in large-scale military
engagements, but rather it will be a series of more focused
efforts. The primary elements will consist of targeting
insurgent leaders, engagement with local key leaders,
development and reconstruction, and ensuring freedom of
movement for ISAF and Afghan forces. ISAF X Headquarters
faces challenges of fully integrating and staffing the
disparate NATO elements. This is compounded by the fact that
for the first time in ISAF history it is a composite
headquarters, and still faced with some growing pains.


12. (S) Points for General McNeill:

-- Seek General McNeill's view of how the military situation
will develop over the next several months.

-- Are NATO and Coalition forces, to include the U.S.,
sufficient to counter the insurgency this year?

-- How does he see cooperation with the international
community in Kabul in support of security objectives?

-- Seek his thoughts on the Tripartite Commission
(AFG-PAK-NATO mil-mil forum),and how he envisions further
developing it to strengthen the trilateral relationship and
improve AFG-PAK cross-border coordination.

UNSRSG KOENIGS
--------------


13. (S) Your meeting with Special Representative of the
United Nations Secretary General (SRSG) Tom Koenigs will be
an opportunity to affirm UNAMA's important role and
accomplishments in Afghanistan, as well as to encourage UNAMA
to find ways to improve its communication with EU and NATO
opinion leaders. Despite doubts expressed by the French and
some others, Koenigs is doing a pretty good job. As co-chair
along with the Afghan Government of the Joint Coordination
and Monitoring Board (JCMB),which oversees implementation of
the Afghanistan Compact, UNAMA has generated real activity on
the ground in support of a process that must be led in Kabul
to be effective. Koenigs brings the right donors and Afghan
parties together to identify problems, remove roadblocks, and
develop agreed strategies on how to make progress in key
sectors. Koenigs' successful role as SRSG and as JCMB
co-chair has affirmed Karzai's preeminent role and
facilitated a smooth Afghan/international effort on the
ground. Points for Koenigs:

-- Ask SRSG Koenigs for UNAMA's general
assessment of the situation on the ground, Pakistan,
governance and corruption, and the appropriate role of the UN
in Afghanistan.

-- Given its efforts and accomplishments in Afghanistan,
how can UNAMA work more on the information campaign,
especially with NATO and EU opinion leaders?

-- SRSG Koenigs will want to hear your views on Pakistan,
jirgas, and President Karzai.


NORLAND