Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07KABUL662
2007-02-28 14:21:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Kabul
Cable title:  

OSD DELEGATION DISCUSSES PAKISTAN, IRAN, AND

Tags:  PREL MARR PGOV SNAR NATO AF 
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VZCZCXRO0348
PP RUEHDBU
DE RUEHBUL #0662/01 0591421
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 281421Z FEB 07
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6446
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE
RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/OSD WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 3692
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 3491
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KABUL 000662 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR SCA/FO DAS GASTRIGHT, SCA/A, S/CRS, S/CT,
EUR/RPM, INL/CIVPOL
STATE PASS TO USAID FOR AID/ANE, AID/DCHA/DG,
NSC FOR AHARRIMAN
OSD FOR SHIVERS
CENTCOM FOR CSTC-A, CG CJTF-76, POLAD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/03/2016
TAGS: PREL MARR PGOV SNAR NATO AF
SUBJECT: OSD DELEGATION DISCUSSES PAKISTAN, IRAN, AND
STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP WITH SENIOR GOA OFFICIALS

Classified By: Political-Military Counselor Carol Rodley, for reasons 1
.4 (b),(d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KABUL 000662

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR SCA/FO DAS GASTRIGHT, SCA/A, S/CRS, S/CT,
EUR/RPM, INL/CIVPOL
STATE PASS TO USAID FOR AID/ANE, AID/DCHA/DG,
NSC FOR AHARRIMAN
OSD FOR SHIVERS
CENTCOM FOR CSTC-A, CG CJTF-76, POLAD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/03/2016
TAGS: PREL MARR PGOV SNAR NATO AF
SUBJECT: OSD DELEGATION DISCUSSES PAKISTAN, IRAN, AND
STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP WITH SENIOR GOA OFFICIALS

Classified By: Political-Military Counselor Carol Rodley, for reasons 1
.4 (b),(d)


1. (C) Summary: In February 13-15 meetings, a
delegation from the Office of the Secretary of Defense
discussed Pakistan, Iran, Afghan security forces
development, and the Strategic Partnership with key
leaders in the Afghan government. National Security
Advisor Rassoul advised that the GOA is willing to
cooperate with Pakistan but remains skeptical of
Pakistan,s motives. He noted that Iran is preparing
for a broader international confrontation by stepping
up its activities within Afghanistan. Minister of
Defense (MOD) Wardak emphasized the importance of the
Strategic Partnership to Afghans and the Afghan
commitment to improving the quality and capability of
the Afghan National Army. Minister of Interior (MOI)
Moqbil Zarar discussed the process of rank reform and
the need to develop qualified personnel and the
systems to support them, as well as institutionalizing
the primacy of the rule of law within the Afghan
National Police. End summary.


2. (U) Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of
Defense James Shinn and Senior Advisor on Central Asia
Mitchell Shivers led a delegation to Kabul on February
12-15. The primary purpose of the trip was to
participate in the Strategic Partnership Security
Working Group talks on February 15 (reported septel).
The delegation met with National Security Advisor
(NSA) Rassoul, MOD Wardak, and MOI Zarar Moqbil
(reported below). They also met with the Ambassador,
the leadership of Combined Security Transition
Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A),and the Country Team,
and visited the Kabul Military Training Center and the
National Military Command Center. Embassy polmiloff
and representatives from CSTC-A participated in the

meetings and Working Group session.

Afghan National Security Advisor
--------------


3. (C) NSA Rassoul told the delegation that the
Government of Afghanistan (GOA) has been working for
the last two to three years for a recognition of the
role of Pakistan in the political situation. He said
that although there are internal problems within
Afghanistan that have helped foster the insurgency, we
need to work on Pakistan as well, since without the
help of the Pakistan Government there can be no real
improvement. He noted that the GOA has been asked by
the international community to be less vocal on
Pakistan, and is willing to give a chance for pressure
to work. He said that there is a difference of
opinion within the GOA with regard to Pakistani
motivations. If the Pakistanis see a stable
Afghanistan as a threat, the Afghans are willing to
try and persuade them otherwise. If, however, they
want to extend Pakistani influence into Afghanistan,
that is unacceptable. When pressed by PDASD Shinn,
Rassoul said that there is no consensus within the GOA
as to which of these motivations is the true one.


4. (C) PDASD Shinn asked whether Pakistani support for
the Taliban was directive or permissive. Dr Rassoul
answered that the involvement of the ISI (Inter
Services Intelligence) at the local level was very
direct. He said that the GOA had solid information
that the ISI is involved in recruiting, paying, and
equipping the Taliban, and is supporting their
planning and logistics. He noted that the Taliban are
good fighters but they are not capable of organizing
or planning. At a higher level, Rassoul said the
support is permissive, i.e., that the Pakistani

KABUL 00000662 002 OF 003


military leadership is aware of what is going on and
is not stopping it. He gave the example of a meeting
at New York before the 2005 Parliamentary elections
when President Karzai requested Pakistani help in
limiting cross border incursions. "Cross border
activity stopped like a watch," Rassoul said, "and
then after the election it went back up. This proves
that the Pakistanis could act if they want."


5. (C) Senior Advisor Shivers asked about the
relations between Afghanistan and Iran. Rassoul
replied that like Pakistan, Iran also has a vision of
what it wants in Afghanistan. It has always wanted a
zone of influence. Increasingly, it is expanding its
attention to get the support of the Sunni population.
However, the GOA does not see this activity as
destabilizing so far - it can be controlled. Rassoul
noted also that Iran-Afghanistan relations will depend
on Iran,s international position. The Iranians are
preparing themselves for a confrontation. To that
end, they are revitalizing old contacts, reactivating
intelligence networks, and spending money. Dr.
Rassoul added that at the Munich Conference on
Security Policy (9-11 Feb 07) Iran,s Foreign Minister
invited him to go to Iran and he agreed.

Ministry of Defense
--------------


6. (C) In a February 14 meeting, MOD Wardak told the
delegation that he considered the Strategic
Partnership to be a very important step forward in the
long-term relationship. He said that Afghanistan
continues to rely very heavily on its bilateral
relationship with the U.S. and that he is not yet
confident of NATO, due to the complex decisionmaking,
caveats, changing minds, and involvement of capitals
in the NATO policy process. With regard to Afghan
National Army (ANA) force development, Wardak said
that the Afghan side is committed to fulfilling its
part of the requirement, i.e. providing recruits,
discipline, transparency, good leadership, and
improving retention and reenlistment rates. He
acknowledged the need for the GOA to take on ANA
sustainability in the long-term, but said during the
transitional period the Afghan government will share
the burden commensurate with the development of the
national economy. He pointed out that an
international contribution to sustainment would be
cheaper than the cost of international deployment to
Afghanistan, as well as saving soldiers, lives. He
reiterated that the long-term aim of the ANA has to be
that it can independently neutralize any internal or
external threat. He noted that the U.S.-Afghanistan
Strategic Partnership is not a treaty arrangement, and
cited the U.S.-Republic of Korea relationship (Treaty
of Mutual Defense) as an option for empowering the
Afghan military while dealing with a common threat,
although he believed it may be unfeasible.


7. (C) MOD Wardak used this opportunity to present a
proposal to move control of the Afghan Border Police
back to the Ministry of Defense. The Afghan Border
Police (ABP),Wardak explained, initially resided in
the MOD, until responsibility was assigned to the
Ministry of Interior after the ANA was limited to
70,000 members at the 2002 Bonn Conference. However,
the ABP has shown itself to be incapable of enforcing
a 5,500 km border. (Note: while MOD Wardak supports
the ANA taking on this task, others in the ANA
leadership fear that incorporating ABP personnel into
ANA ranks would seriously dilute the professionalism
and capability of the ANA. Adding an additional
18,000 ANA to the proposed 70,000 objective is also

KABUL 00000662 003 OF 003


not realistic within the needed timeframe. MOI and
CSTC-A are working on revitalizing the ABP recruitment
and training program to alleviate some of the problems
associated with the border police. End note.)


8. (C) In response to PDASD Shinn,s question about the
role of Pakistan, MOD Wardak said that he has heard a
lot from Westerners about how Pakistan will cooperate.
He said that Afghanistan has no objection if Pakistan
is willing to cooperate. However he is totally
opposed to the theory that there are rogue elements
within ISI. ISI is part of the Pakistani military
chain of command and its officers are regular army
officers on detail assignments. He believes that the
Pakistanis are playing a double game, and that they
are uniting with "other regional countries" to gain
influence. However, he said, the GOA does not want to
create complications if they do not actually exist.
If the U.S. is able to ensure Pakistan,s sincerity,
the Afghans will do everything they can to support a
cooperative relationship.

Ministry of Interior
--------------


9. (C) MOI Zarar focused his remarks on the reform of
the MOI and the Afghan National Police (ANP). He
noted that there has been some progress since reform
began in earnest in late 2005. The Probation Board
process was important in gaining the trust of the
people and selecting professional cadres. The MOI
replaced 40 ANP Generals who were local powerbrokers.
Phase III rank reform will close out local powers and
bring big changes to the district level. The rank
reform program is bringing an institutional framework
to the ANP. Through it, the MOI will be able to
increase capability, quality, and capacity of ANP
officers. Zarar noted that two significant obstacles
remain that will take time to resolve: 1) There is a
lack of qualified professional personnel in the ANP;
and 2) The MOI needs to create a system to support the
institution. The police force needs to operate on the
basis of rule of law, and that takes time to develop.
PDASD Shinn agreed with the Minister, noting that the
U.S. is committed to a long-term relationship and that
there needs to be long-term planning to build
institutional strength.


10. (U) PDASD Shinn has cleared this cable.
NEUMANN