PRT CHAGHCHARAN:THE COST OF ALLOWING NICE GUYS TO

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 KABUL 000622

SIPDIS

NOFORN
SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/FO GASTRIGHT, SCA/A, S/CRS, SA/PB, S/CT,
EUR/PRM
STATE PASS TO USAID FOR AID/ANE, AID/DCHA/DG
NSC FOR HARRIMAN
OSD FOR KIMMITT
CENTCOM FOR CSTC-A, CG CJTF-76, POLAD, JICCENT

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/03/2016
TAGS: PGOV PINS PREL AF
SUBJECT: PRT CHAGHCHARAN:THE COST OF ALLOWING NICE GUYS TO
FINISH LAST

Classified By: Classified by Richard Norland for reasons 1.4(b) and (d)
.


1. (C) Summary: The case of Ghor Province in Afghanistan's
mountainous center suggests that major flows of assistance to
areas of instability can have the unintended consequence of
undermining government authority in ostensibly stable areas.
Ghor province enjoys a
generally benign security environment but is seriously
underdeveloped. Given the need to address security concerns
elsewhere, Ghor has received only a modest level of outside
assistance, including from the PRT's lead country, Lithuania.
This, combined with
residents' chronic sense of abandonment as well as news of
development projects going on elsewhere, is giving rise to
resentment and criticism of government authorities.
Particularly in Ghor's vulnerable south, poverty and the lack
of development may also be opening up opportunities for the
Taliban to exploit. Given its position both as part of
Afghanistan's stable core and as a barrier to the northward
spread of Taliban insecurity, Ghor's situation is prompting
us to look more closely at whether investing a few
additional development resources in Ghor and similarly placed
"good guy" areas might be in the country's larger interest.
End
Summary.

Deep Pockets vs. Deep Needs
--------------


2. (C) Rightly or wrongly, the country leading a PRT has
come to be seen as the special benefactor of the province in
which that PRT operates. Whether it is the Spanish in
Badghis fixing Qala-i-Naw's city electric system, the Germans
spending $7 million on bringing clean drinking water and
paved streets to Kunduz City, or the U.S. military spending
significant CERP funds on its many "hearts and minds"
projects throughout eastern Afghanistan, people now look to
the PRT lead countries to provide a certain boost to
development in their provinces. Of course, our goal over
time is to shift this burden toAfghan authorities. But, in
the short term, what if a lead-country does not have the
resources to meet these expectations, particularly when
people constantly encounter media reports about development
projects undertaken elsewhere in provinces where PRTs are led
by countries with deep pockets? If Ghor Province is any
indication, what can result is a range of negative emotions
from annoyance to outright anger, a questioning of government
authority, and even a decision to withhold support.


3. (C) At his very first meeting with Ghor residents, in an
early November session with the Province's six Wolesi Jirga
members, the Poloff at PRT Chaghcharan ran squarely into this
phenomenon. Almost the first words out of the mouth of MP
Imami Ghori was a request for help
in replacing Lithuania as the lead country for PRT
Chaghcharan. He complained
about what he characterized as Afghanistan's poorest province
being assigned one of Europe's poorest countries to lead its
PRT. Since then, several other officials have made comments
along similar lines, though usually couched more delicately
in terms of Ghor's great needs and the wish that the PRT and
its lead country were in a position to do more.


4. (SBU) Exacerbating the problem is the long-standing
belief widely held by Ghor residents that their backward
province is neglected and "forgotten." Whether through
neglect or not, the province does have problems serious
enough to leave all but the most optimistic open to a sense
of grievance: extreme poverty, isolation, a propensity to
drought, severe environmental degradation, a barely
functioning economy, a lack of infrastructure (not one
kilometer of paved road anywhere in a province that is much

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larger than Maryland),and a severe shortage of educated and
trained people. Other negatives include widespread drug
trafficking, the presence of entrenched, illicit power
brokers, and a restricted reach of legitimate governmental
authority. Ghor does, though, have some things going for it:
a fairly benign security environment, a predominantly Tajik
population traditionally at odds with the Taliban and
currently still hopeful of a better future under democracy, a
few competent and dedicated government officials, and a
genuine thirst for education (this last despite the fact that
less than 10 percent of its 390 schools even have a building).

Some Assistance, But Even More Need
--------------


5. (SBU) It is inaccurate to suggest, as some Ghor residents
do, that the province has received no assistance. Last year
the Lithuanians spent about $500,000 on civil and CIMIC quick
impact projects, and their development budget for Ghor is
expected to increase to
about $2,000,000 this year. This is in addition to the
sizable costs the Lithuanians shoulder for fielding and
maintaining PRT Chaghcharan, costs which are slated to
increase substantially with their assumption at the end of
this year of those PRT support costs still being covered by
the U.S. The Lithuanians are also working hard to snare as
much as possible of the 10 million euros available from the
EC over the next three years for rule of law and alternative
livelihoods projects in provinces with EU member-led PRTs.



6. (SBU) For its part, USAID remains one of Ghor's few
consistent sources of outside help, though that agency is now
shifting out of the quick impact project (QIP) work that Ghor
still desperately needs. USAID expenditures to date have
included about $300,000 in QIPs, $2 million in funding for
seven World Vision-managed clinics (costs now assumed by the
EC),about $2 million for reconstruction of 58 kms. of
compacted gravel road adjacent to the provincial
capital, and $2 million in support for a Catholic Relief
Services drought relief and winterization project. Recent
travel around the province also suggests that World Food
Program emergency food aid, supported by significant U.S.
contributions, has had the desired impact. Ghor has also
received a bit less than $400,000 in U.S. military CERP
funds (for a school dormitory, a hospital pharmacy, and a
girls' school),provided by the former U.S. PRT in Herat in

2005.

The Anger is Palpable
--------------


7. (C) In the face of Ghor's huge developmental deficit and
the word being picked up of funds and projects going to other
provinces, Ghor residents feel shortchanged. At practically
every meeting with a PRT representative, people use the
chance to roll out their often lengthy wish lists. While
that is perhaps only to be expected, of concern is the number
of times meetings with Ghor officials and residents have
actually taken on a bitter, angry tone. Frustrated by
recurring typhoid cases in his district's snow-bound north,
the visibly incensed director of the government clinic in Lal
told PRT visitors in late December he was sick and tired of
people like them coming by to make their set speeches when no
one, he contended, was doing a thing to sink the wells and
build the local clinics that would end the typhoid outbreaks.
The chairman of Ghor's Provincial Council was practically
rude during Poloff's introductory call, castigating the PRT
for its failure to emulate PRTs elsewhere in contributing to
local development.


8. (C) In a mid-December session with PRT Chaghcharan's
commander, Momeni tribal chief Arbab Somad, holed up in his

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village redoubt in the remote southeastern tip of Daulina
district, made no bones of his disdain for the provincial
authorities, given the lack of development aid. With no
clinic, school building, police station, or decent road
within hours of his area, he scornfully declared his
unwillingness to contribute a single man for ANA or ANP duty
unless and until the government provides him with some
concrete benefit. (Note: This is the same individual who
issued a threat to a previous PRT patrol, which arrived at
his village
empty-handed, that he might just put out the welcome mat for
Taliban insurgents to spend the winter in his fiefdom. The
current PRT commander received a somewhat more cordial
reception, owing, perhaps, to the two doctors who were
accompanying him. End Note.)

An Opening for the Insurgents
--------------


9. (C) Both the Commander of PRT Chaghcharan and top
provincial authorities are especially worried about Ghor's
southernmost districts, scene last year of a rocket attack on
a police station, a sniper fire incident targeting Croatian
troops, and a number of attempted school
burnings. Seemingly confirming those concerns, in the
absence of the district administrator and police chief, the
PRT's early January patrol team to Pasaband found itself
sitting across from the deputy chief of police as their most
authoritative interlocutor, an individual provincial
authorities are trying to transfer because of his alleged
Taliban sympathies. In a subsequent visit to next-door
Taiwara (where a local mullah was murdered last year,
reportedly for opposing a Taliban propaganda campaign),the
PRT patrol encountered an almost belligerent district
administrator sharply focused on denouncing the absence of
development in his area. He warned darkly that "hungry men
are angry men" and asked why people should support the
government when schools and clinics remain so scarce. Talk
of "equality" rings hollow, he declared, when huge resources
flow to certain areas while others are ignored.Like every
other critic encountered recently, he stressed the relative
lack of security incidents in Ghor to date and the
traditionally friendly attitude of the people toward the
current government; but, he went on, how are people to remain
loyal when they continue to see resources showered on areas
beset with opposition violence.


10. (C) Further south, in Zarni village on the border with
Farah Province, the chief
elder was even blunter. "Don't bother taking notes", he told
the PRT visitors, "if there is going to be no tangible
outcome". He complained angrily that villages like his which
are surrounded by Taliban-infected territory yet support the
government are left cut off, vulnerable, and without
assistance while neighboring areas of armed resistance are
provided major resources. He insisted he was not expecting a
great deal of aid, for example on a par
with that accorded Pashtuns to the south. "After all", he
pointed out, "President Karzai is a Pashtun. But why help
only the Pashtuns? Is the PRT too on the side of the
Pashtuns"?


11. (C) Comment: The kinds of complaints being heard in
Ghor are neither unprecedented nor unique to Ghor. Also, a
case might be made that given Ghor's predominantly Tajik
makeup and traditional hostility to the Taliban, continuing
the current, relatively low level of assistance to Ghor may
not have particularly far-reaching consequences at a time
when assistance resources are needed elsewhere. On the other
hand, frustration, anger, and perhaps at some point outright
alienation can undermine the already delicate base of
provincial government authority in an environment still
populated with the likes of Arbab Somad and other alternative

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centers of arms- and tribal-based power. Particularly in
Ghor's south, lack of development can lead to more than
disenchantment. Some local authorities as well as the
provincial NDS director suggest that poverty can turn into -
and at times has already turned into - a willingness to sell
information and even commit terrorist acts for money. Until
now, Ghor has functioned as part of Afghanistan's stable core
and as a barrier to Taliban expansion to the north. Most
resources must certainly continue to flow to areas of major
insecurity. But the plight of Ghor and perhaps similar parts
of the country raises the question of whether putting even
just a few more assistance dollars in the hands of especially
disadvantaged "good guys," people who generally support the
authorities and refrain from violence, might be in the larger
interest of Afghanistan - and the United States. Embassy will
actively explore possible avenues of support involving USAID,
the U.S. military and ISAF partners.
NEUMANN