Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07KABUL581
2007-02-21 13:15:00
SECRET
Embassy Kabul
Cable title:  

SOUTHERN GOVERNORS OUTLINE MAJOR SECURITY

Tags:  PGOV PTER EAID NATO MARR AF 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO4593
PP RUEHDBU
DE RUEHBUL #0581/01 0521315
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 211315Z FEB 07//CORRECTED COPY/PARA MARKINGS/PARA 13//
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6275
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/OSD WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 3675
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 3478
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 KABUL 000581 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR SCA/FO GASTRIGHT, SCA/A
STATE PASS TO USAID FOR AID/ANE, AID/DCHA/DG
NSC FOR HARRIMAN
OSD FOR SHIVERS
CENTCOM FOR CSTC-A, CG CJTF-76, POLAD
RELEASABLE TO NATO/ISAF/AUS/NZ (AS RECOMMENDATION)

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y -PARA MARKINGS, PARA 13

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/03/2016
TAGS: PGOV PTER EAID NATO MARR AF
SUBJECT: SOUTHERN GOVERNORS OUTLINE MAJOR SECURITY
CHALLENGES

KABUL 00000581 001.2 OF 003


Classified By: Political-Military Counselor Carol A. Rodley, for reason
s 1.4 b, d.

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 KABUL 000581

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR SCA/FO GASTRIGHT, SCA/A
STATE PASS TO USAID FOR AID/ANE, AID/DCHA/DG
NSC FOR HARRIMAN
OSD FOR SHIVERS
CENTCOM FOR CSTC-A, CG CJTF-76, POLAD
RELEASABLE TO NATO/ISAF/AUS/NZ (AS RECOMMENDATION)

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y -PARA MARKINGS, PARA 13

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/03/2016
TAGS: PGOV PTER EAID NATO MARR AF
SUBJECT: SOUTHERN GOVERNORS OUTLINE MAJOR SECURITY
CHALLENGES

KABUL 00000581 001.2 OF 003


Classified By: Political-Military Counselor Carol A. Rodley, for reason
s 1.4 b, d.


1. (C/REL ISAF) SUMMARY: During a February 6
introductory meeting in Kandahar with COMISAF, the
governors of Helmand, Kandahar and Zabul pressed for
increasing police salaries and getting more police
officers into the Southern provinces to provide
leadership to new recruits. ANA 205th Corps Commander
Major General Raoufi urged governors to replace ANA
troops with ANP, so that the ANA could get the
training it needed. The governors and ISAF officials
agreed that close coordination was imperative to
defeating the insurgency. COMISAF Gen McNeill
promised the governors that ISAF would help to rebuild
Afghanistan, while laying down a marker that ISAF
would fight when necessary. END SUMMARY.


2. (U) On February 6, RC-South Commander MG Van Loon
(Dutch) hosted governors from Helmand, Kandahar and
Zabul at Kandahar Air Field to discuss security,
governance and development. Uruzgan Governor Monib
was invited but was unable to attend. Also present
for the security discussion were ANA 205 Corps
Commander Major General Raoufi and new Regional Police
Chief Zazai. Gen McNeill, making his first visit to
KAF as COMISAF, attended briefly. (Other issues
reported septel.)


3. (C/REL ISAF) Van Loon assured the governors that
ISAF would work together with them to address
problems. Cautioning that ISAF could not be
everywhere, all the time, Van Loon looked to the
governors to help him set priorities. It was crucial
that ISAF and the governors speak frankly -- "it
doesn't do us any good to be nice to each other, we
must be honest," Van Loon said. While noting that the

security situation in Kandahar had improved since
December, Van Loon stated that it was imperative to
make sure that Kandahar's problems did not simply
migrate to other areas in the South. Equally, current
instability in Helmand could not be allowed to affect
its neighbors.


4. (C/REL ISAF) Addressing the capabilities of the ANA
and ANP, Van Loon stressed training as the key to the
future. In the short term, he warned, the new
training cycle (red-amber-green) would have a negative
effect on security, as fewer ANA troops would be
available for operations. Nevertheless, he asked
governors to support ANA training, in part by working
to establish good police forces in the provinces. It
was vitally important, he emphasized, to have trusted
police -- they were the face of the GoA, because the
people saw them on the job. The ANP represent you,
Van Loon emphasized to the governors, and if they are
ineffective (or corrupt),it will reflect on you.


5. (C/REL ISAF) ANA 205th Corps Commander Major
General Raoufi echoed Van Loon's statements on the
importance of training the ANA. There seemed to be
"plenty of time for fighting, but not for training for
the future," he said, asking the governors
to support the removal of some ANA troops from the
battlefield for training purposes. Raoufi asked
governors to support this by replacing these ANA with
ANP.


6. (C/REL ISAF) Speaking first for the governors,
Helmand Governor Assadullah Wafa agreed that a well-
trained ANA was very important. He then turned
immediately to problems in Helmand, underscoring the
relationship between the drug trade and the
insurgency. Pointing to Helmand's 160-km border with
Pakistan, Wafa warned that the town of Baram Chah was

KABUL 00000581 002.2 OF 003


a major transit area for drugs and insurgents. There
was no ANA, no ISAF to stop them.


7. (C/REL ISAF) Wafa also cited corruption as a major
problem facing the ANP. He urged that the southern
provinces be prioritized to receive trusted officers
to lead provincial policemen. New Regional Police
Chief Zazai acknowledged there were problems with
police in the South, and admitted there were gaps in
coverage. Like Raoufi, Zazai called for more training
for the ANP, more equipment, and higher salaries,
recommending also that police receive deployment pay
in addition to their base salary. (Embassy/CSTC-A
Note: The bulk of RC South,s remaining equipment
authorization is presently arriving and is being
pushed south as quickly as possible. At present, ANP
in selected high risk provinces are authorized to
receive USD 70/mo hazardous duty pay from the MOI,s
recurring budget, however it appears that few
patrolmen actually receive it. If hazardous duty pay
were distributed as authorized, deployment pay would
not be needed. End Embassy/CSTC-A Note.) Zazai said he
was prioritizing pay equity between the ANA and the
ANP. (Embassy Note: it is not clear what Zazai meant
by this, since any decision would be taken in Kabul.
End Embassy Note.)


8. (C/REL ISAF) All three governors supported
strongly Zazai's call to improve police salaries.
Kandahar Governor Assadullah noted the initiative to
pay police directly through the banks, but pointed out
that many parts of the South lacked banks. He
acknowledged that there was a paymaster system in
place, but still claimed some police in remote areas
had to pay to travel to Kandahar and back in order to
receive their pay. (Embassy/CSTC-A Note: There are
provisions in the MOI recurring budget under which MoI
can reimburse ANP who must travel to receive their
pay, but they are generally not implemented . End
Embassy/CSTC-A Note).


9. (C/REL ISAF) Governor Arman of Zabul stated that
all of the southern provinces shared the need for a
strong police force. He agreed that the police should
keep the peace and serve as a bridge between the
government and the people. If we had strong, well-
trained police, he said, we would not have some of the
problems we have. Supporting Wafa's call for more
officers, Arman said he was constantly faced with the
removal and replacement of district chiefs of police.
The police lack leadership, as only 15 percent of
abul's police force is officers. They do not get paid
enough, or on time. Finally, Arman said that police
equipment was often non-functioning (e.g., guns that
won't fire). (CSTC-A Note: In order to fix this type
of problem, a national weapons maintenance contract
commenced this month in Kabul and regional centers.
End CSTC-A note.) Arman pressed Van Loon to support
joint ANA-ANP-ISAF patrols as a way to overcome these
shortcomings. None of the three alone could turn
around the security situation, but together they might
make a difference.


10. (C/REL ISAF) Kandahar Governor Assadullah said
ISAF and the GoA had worked together to pacify the
Panjwayi/Zhari districts of western Kandahar, and had
been successful because of good coordination. He,
too, drew attention to problems with the police, but
focused mainly on the need for exceptionally close
coordination among NATO, the ANP and ANA and the NDS,
and among the provinces -- for everything, he said --
but especially security. "We have provincial
(bureaucratic) boundaries to shape the way we work,"
he noted, "but the enemy does not. The enemy can move
from Helmand through Kandahar to Uruzgan and Zabul.

KABUL 00000581 003.2 OF 003


We can only defeat the enemy together."


11. (U) COMISAF made brief remarks, stressing that
ISAF would support the rebuilding of Afghanistan, but
it would fight when necessary. He credited Van Loon
with the good coordination in the South, and urged the
governors to continue to work closely with RC-South.
(COMISAF attended the forum briefly before traveling
to Sperwan Gar (in Kandahar province) and Kajaki.)


12. (C/REL ISAF) Following COMISAF's departure, the
governors returned to the theme of coordination, with
a focus on the Provincial Coordinating Committee
(PCC). Assadullah complained that his PCC was "weak,"
and ineffective. Kandahar's PCC often could not get
answers from ISAF in a timely manner, he claimed.
While in principle a good idea, Assadullah said the
PCC needed higher-ranking representatives who were
empowered to make decisions. Governor Arman agreed.
The PCC had not turned out to be a mechanism for
immediate action. As an example, he said that while
he could pass to the PCC any information on the
whereabouts of a group of Taliban, the PCC would not
take any action. Wafa and Arman nodded in agreement
when Assadullah said "We don't ever act -- we are
always defensive, never offensive." Arman added,
"We've lost the initiative. Getting it back (from the
Taliban) is the only way to assure stability." Wafa
chimed in with "Even though we have lots of forces, we
still wait for the enemy to attack us." Wafa pointed
again to Baram Chah -- "we know what it is (center for
drugs and insurgents) -- what are we going to DO about
it?"


13. (S/REL ISAF) COMMENT: What the governors shared
during this session is reflective of the challenges
faced by RC(S) due to weak governance just now getting
stronger, a resilient insurgency which enjoys
operational sanctuary, thin NATO force presence, and a
still-developing ANSF. At the GoA policy level, the
PAG continues to deal with the issues the governors
outlined. The train and equip mission of CSTC-A is
focused on these issues as well, and is working with
ANSF leadership to increase the capabilities of both
ANA and ANP in RC(S). In addition, the ANA leadership
has recognized the combat capability shortfall and is
planning to bolster combat power in the South.
Although challenges remain, we continue to see
improvement in overall ANSF leadership and operational
abilities. It is to be hoped that as these changes
take effect at the local level, the governors will
begin to see a positive impact on the security
situation.

NEUMANN