AFGHAN NATIONAL CIVIL ORDER POLICE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 05 KABUL 000435

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

STATE FOR SCA/FO DAS GASTRIGHT, SCA/A, S/CRS, S/CT,
EUR/RPM, INL/CIVPOL
STATE PASS TO USAID FOR AID/ANE, AID/DCHA/DG,
NSC FOR AHARRIMAN
OSD FOR KIMMITT
CENTCOM FOR CFC-A, CG CJTF-76, POLAD

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: MARR SNAR PGOV AF
SUBJECT: AFGHAN NATIONAL CIVIL ORDER POLICE



1. (SBU) Summary: The Afghan National Civil Order
Police (ANCOP) (formerly the Civil Order Maintenance
and Constabulary Police) is currently being recruited
and trained by the MOI in close coordination with
CSTC-A and civilian police trainers at the Regional
Training Centers. This element of the police,
eventually totaling 5,000 personnel and scheduled to
be recruited, trained and deployed over the next two
years, should provide the GoA a highly trained,
specialized, well led and robustly equipped police
force. Composed of urban and rural patrol units, the
ANCOP will respond rapidly to urban unrest, civil
disorder and national emergencies, while also
providing a mobile police presence in high-threat
remote areas. The training for the first urban unit
commenced in Mazar-e Sharif on January 27th. Training
of the first patrol unit is scheduled to begin in
Herat on February 10th. (Comment: The nationally
recruited ANCOP will potentially provide the GoA a
robust police force capable of enforcing the rule of
law nationwide and enhancing security nationwide. End
Comment.) End Summary.


2. (SBU) At a meeting conducted at Camp Eggers on
January 29th, MG Durbin (Commanding General CSTC-A),
CSTC-A senior staff, and Deputy Minister of Interior
Khalid received a briefing on the ANCOP program.
During this meeting, Khalid, expressing very strong
support for the ANCOP, stated that the ANCOP was truly
a joint effort between the MOI and CSTC-A. He further
stated that the ANCOP would greatly enhance security
and is a long-desired capability.

ANCOP Composition


3. (SBU) The ANCOP will be comprised of two elements:
urban units and patrol units. The difference
between ANCOP and all other elements of the ANP is
that ANCOP units will be better trained, more robustly
equipped and better led. To ensure that the best
possible personnel are selected to lead ANCOP units,
the MoI claims to be using a deliberate process to
screen and evaluate candidates, which includes a
review of available personnel files by senior leaders
of the MOI and the Deputy Minister for Security,
before assigning these future leaders. Urban units
focus on the ability to quell urban unrest, civil
disorder and national emergencies, while patrol
units will provide a mobile police presence in high-
threat remote areas. As currently envisioned, the
ANCOP force will include eight urban units, the first
of which will be deployed to Kabul with future units
being deployed to Mazar-e Sharif, Konduz, Jalalabad,
Gardez, Kandahar, and Herat. The patrol units
will be deployed along the ring road and in areas
where there are currently no ANP, ANA, or ISAF forces
and will serve as the nation,s first police
responders. Currently there are significant areas of
the nation with no ANP or ANA forces and by deploying
professional patrol units that are ethnically
balanced, the GoA may be able to extend its reach and
improve the security situation. The patrol
units will differ from all other elements of the ANP
in that they will not simply be a static force manning
checkpoints like the Afghan National Auxiliary Police
(ANAP) or Afghan Border Police (ABP). ANCOP patrol
units will be better equipped and more robustly manned
in order to rapidly respond to emergencies that other
police units are neither trained nor equipped to
handle. Quoting Khalid, "unlike the standby police,
ANCOP will actually deploy and respond when called

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upon". (Note: The standby police are the element of
the ANP which are currently deployed to locations
nation-wide when, due to an increased threat, there is
a requirement for additional police presence.
However, the standby police are generally poorly led
and equipped and not effective. End Note). The ANCOP
operating in areas previously void of any ANSF and
providing a civilian police presence where none had
previously existed will establish internal security by
disrupting the linkage between the insurgents and
people serving as either passive or active supporters
of the insurgency. Another significant factor
according to Khalid is that the ANCOP will include
better screening of the recruits.

Recruiting


4. (SBU) ANCOP will be nationally recruited from a
variety of sources to include the ANP, the less
corrupt members of the disbanded highway police, the
standby police and the general population. The intent
is to vet the recruits to form ethnically balanced
units. The use of faster promotions and the increased
salaries associated with them should encourage the
recruits not only to complete the training but
additionally resist the temptation to go AWOL. The
current "tashkiel" (manning authorization document) of
the standby police will be used to provide the
manpower requirements of the ANCOP. Eventually, when
the ANCOP is fully fielded, the standby police will be
disbanded.

Comprehensive Training.


5. (SBU) Units will undergo a 16-week training
program, which is double the training provided to
other elements of the ANP. Both the urban and patrol
units initially complete eight weeks of basic police
training followed by a two-week common core
curriculum. Upon completion of the first 10 weeks of
training, the units will receive an additional six
weeks of specialty training. During these six weeks,
the urban units will be taught by personnel from the
German Police Project Office (GPPO) on crowd control
techniques. The six weeks of specialty training for
the patrol units, conducted by the MOI in close
coordination with CSTC-A and civilian police trainers,
will focus on techniques required to enforce the rule
of law in remote, high-threat areas. A significant
departure from training provided to other elements of
the police is the effort via the ANCOP curriculum to
stress Afghan values and culture. Khalid stressed the
importance of including classes on Afghan culture,
values, history and both Afghan and world geography.
(Comment: Although the importance of this Afghan
focused training was highlighted by both Khalid and
MG Durbin, the courses have not yet been developed
or included in the curriculum being used to train the
first urban police unit. If included, this Afghan-
centric training will address Khalid,s concern that
ANP recruits are being taught too many western
concepts and have forgotten their heritage, culture
and values. The inclusion of more Afghan focused
training may produce patrolmen who better represent
the Afghan culture and values. Ultimately, this could
help to generate greater acceptance of ANCOP by the
Afghan population, if the training results in ANCOP
personnel who are more broadly representative of the
Afghan culture and values. End Comment.)

Well Equipped


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6. (SBU) As designed, the ANCOP will be the most
robustly equipped element of the ANP. The equipment
currently being procured will include armored
vehicles, which will replace the unarmored Ford Ranger
trucks currently deployed throughout the ANP. The
equipment will offer significantly more protection
from IEDs and small arms fire and greater mobility.
The ANCOP will also be issued newer Eastern Bloc
weapons, rather than the aging, unreliable AK-47s that
are the common weapon of the ANP. CSTC-A, using FY06
supplemental funds, has already procured a significant
quantity of the required vehicles and weapons and will
use FY07 supplemental funds, if they are approved, to
purchase the remainder of the required equipment.
(Note: MG Durbin intends to coordinate with US DSCA
in February to determine the feasibility of expediting
delivery of several different categories of vehicles
that are not scheduled to arrive in theater until Aug
- Sep 07. End Note.)

Increased Pay


7. (SBU) In an effort to recruit quality personnel
and decrease the corruption prevalent throughout the
rest of the ANP, a more rapid promotion system will be
used for ANCOP personnel. During the first eight
weeks of training, the ANCOP patrolman will receive
the standard ANP salary of $70 per month. However,
after completion of the eighth week of training, each
patrolman will be promoted to 3rd Sergeant and will
receive a salary of $115 per month. Another promotion
will occur after completion of the 16th week of
training, at which time the individual will become a
2nd Sergeant and receive $140 per month. The rapid
increase in rank is designed to discourage corruption
in the ANCOP ranks. The relatively rapid promotions
may also help with ANCOP retention and reduce improper
behavior and performance that would result in
dismissal while also promoting future recruiting
efforts.

Current Status


8. (SBU) The first urban unit consisting of 321
patrolmen from six different provinces began training
in Mazar-e Sharif on January 27. While this unit is
only scheduled to be assigned 300 personnel, the
additional 21 recruits will provide a reserve to
backfill units as recruits are lost due to attrition.
This unit is scheduled to complete training on May 19
and will deploy to Kabul. The first patrol unit,
scheduled to begin training in Herat on February 10,
will consist of 200 patrolmen. Upon completion of
training on June 7th, it will deploy to Kandahar.
Obtaining the correct ethnic balance of this force is
deemed to be crucial by both Khalid and the CSTC-A
Commanding General. The standard is that the ethnic
balance of the first two units will be representative
of the national ethnic composition plus or minus 5
percent. If this standard is not achieved, the MoI
will rebalance the force using the excess pool of
manpower. Geographic representation, although
important, remains a future goal. (Comment: As with
the Afghan National Auxiliary Police (ANAP),the
verification of the ethnic balance is crucial to
prevent creating a force that is not representative of
the nation,s ethnic composition. Post working with
the international community will verify the ethnic
balance throughout the ANCOP program development. End
Comment.)

Germany Commits to ANCOP

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9. (SBU) Although initially opposed to the Civil
Order and Maintenance Constabulary concept (ANCOP,s
predecessor) because it was envisioned to be a para-
military organization and potentially another branch
of the ANA, German Special Ambassador Frick and the
German Police Project Office (GPPO) now completely
support the need for urban and patrol units. The
change occurred after it was explained that the ANCOP
is a civilian police force that will be provided
extensive specialty training focused on riot control
and patrolling. The GPPO realized the necessity, in
the midst of an active insurgency, of recruiting,
training and deploying a police force capable of
providing internal security to people in remote areas.
The fact that German Instructors developed the
training curriculum for the urban crowd control
specialty training and will conduct the training in
coordination with the MOI is a good sign of the German
acceptance and support of the ANCOP program

MOI Support of ANCOP


10. (SBU) Deputy Minister for Security Khalid
strongly supports the ANCOP program and stated that an
ANCOP type force has been long required, and that he
was very pleased that Afghanistan would soon possess a
national police force that would be "well led, well
paid, and well equipped." Khalid stressed the
importance of deploying the first unit of the ANCOP to
Kabul as this would be a strong signal that ANCOP
would belong to the people of Afghanistan. Other
indicators of the MOI,s acceptance of ANCOP include
the direction to implement a deliberate process, by
the senior MOI staff, to select qualified leadership
for ANCOP units.

Concerns


11. (SBU) There remain unresolved elements that may
impact the success or failure of this concept, to
include:

- (SBU) Leadership. The MOI has yet to identify the leaders
of the ANCOP 2nd and 3rd Battalions which, on a positive
note, may indicate that a deliberate process is being
employed to identify the high caliber of leadership
required for this force. However, this could also
indicate that there is too small of a pool from which
to select the quality of leaders required for this
type of force. If the MOI fails to identify
qualified, corruption free leaders, the ANCOP will
become yet another element of a police force that
performs poorly and does not have the acceptance of
the citizens. CSTC-A is working closely with the MOI to
monitor the selection of the ANCOP future leaders.

- (SBU) Ethnic Balance. If the ANCOP units are not
representative of the national ethnic balance, there
is the potential the ANCOP could serve as a coercive
asset, directly or indirectly furthering the ambitions
of Afghan warlords or other power brokers, or even of
an individual or unit intending to undermine the GoA.
Based upon initial recruiting information, it is not
clear that ANCOP is a nationally representative
ethnically balanced police force. Enforcement of
CSTC-A,s established standard and Post,s engagement
with the international community to verify ethnic
composition of the ANCOP will be essential factors in
successful implementation.

- (SBU) Funding. FY07 Supplemental funding is critical to

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the success of the program. If funding is not
approved, the equipment package needed for the ANCOP
will be unavailable and it will lose its mobility and
lethality advantages. The timing of the receipt of
FY07 Supplemental funds also could affect equipment
delivery dates and delay ANCOP fielding.

- (SBU) Impact on other programs. The ANCOP program may
divert personnel and assets from other ANP
initiatives. The emphasis on recruiting and equipping
for the ANCOP could delay the completion of other
initiatives to include the ANAP and ABP. Oversight
and management of the ANCOP program and any subsequent
impacts on other police programs will need to be
carefully coordinated to prevent negative influence on
the ANP as a whole.

- (SBU) Specialization of the ANP and sustainability. The
ANCOP will result in the creation of very specialized
patrolmen. Lacking a recruiting system that continues
to ensure only the best recruits enter the ANCOP, a
merit-based promotion system that promotes only the
best personnel and an ability to maintain the more
advanced equipment, the MOI,s ability to sustain the
quality of this force is uncertain. CSTC,s efforts to
ensure that these systems are not only in place but
fully operational will be essential if ANCOP is to
succeed.

- (SBU) Land procurement. The ANCOP proposal envisions a
total of 16 permanent facilities that will be used to
support day-to-day operations and training and
currently there is a lack of land for eight of these
sixteen future ANCOP operating locations. A failure
to procure the land would subsequently impact the
construction of future operating locations and would
undermine the ability of the ANCOP to successfully
perform its mission. Again, CSTC-A is working with
the MOI to obtain the necessary land to build ANCOP
operating locations.

Comment


12. (SBU) The ANCOP may be the first national, multi-
ethnic Afghan Police Force that can be relied upon to
serve the people of Afghanistan and reliably quell
future internal unrest, similar to what was
experienced in Kabul in May 2006, while also helping
to promote the rule of law throughout the entire country of
Afghanistan. However, the ethnic balance of the force
is critical during the initial development and
training and must involve the efforts of US and
international elements in country. The level of
commitment of the MOI, CSTC-A and GPPO are initial
positive indicators. As ANCOP is now a high priority
within both MOI and CSTC-A, Post will provide
oversight and diligently work with the international
community to monitor this effort. How soon the ANCOP
will make a difference is still unknown. The rural
patrol units could have a positive impact as soon as
they are fielded as they will be the first ANSF forces
to operate in remote areas of the country. However,
the commitment to providing rigorous training means
that the deployment of these units will take longer
than what was experienced for other ANP elements and
consequently ANCOP,s impact on security will be
delayed. Ultimately the training and resources
devoted to ANCOP could lead to a force that will help
to quell the insurgency but it will take time,
continued effort and resources.
NEUMANN