Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07KABUL4005
2007-12-06 14:43:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Kabul
Cable title:  

CANADA'S MANLEY PANEL IN AFGHANISTAN

Tags:  PREL MARR SNAR PGOV AF 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO5365
PP RUEHPW
DE RUEHBUL #4005/01 3401443
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 061443Z DEC 07
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1651
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/OSD WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RUMICEA/JICCENT MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RHMFISS/COMSOCCENT MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KABUL 004005 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR SCA/FO (DAS GASTRIGHT),SCA/A
STATE PASS TO USAID FOR AID/ANE, AID/CDHA/DG
NSC FOR JWOOD
OSD FOR MSHIVERS
CENTCOM FOR CG CJTF-82 AND POLAD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/04/2017
TAGS: PREL MARR SNAR PGOV AF
SUBJECT: CANADA'S MANLEY PANEL IN AFGHANISTAN

REF: A. (A) OTTAWA 2134


B. (B) OTTAWA 2133

C. (C) 11/26/07 HARTLEY-COVINGTON AND 11/28/07
HARTLEY-MATTEI E-MAILS

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Christopher Dell for reasons 1.4 (B) a
nd (D)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KABUL 004005

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR SCA/FO (DAS GASTRIGHT),SCA/A
STATE PASS TO USAID FOR AID/ANE, AID/CDHA/DG
NSC FOR JWOOD
OSD FOR MSHIVERS
CENTCOM FOR CG CJTF-82 AND POLAD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/04/2017
TAGS: PREL MARR SNAR PGOV AF
SUBJECT: CANADA'S MANLEY PANEL IN AFGHANISTAN

REF: A. (A) OTTAWA 2134


B. (B) OTTAWA 2133

C. (C) 11/26/07 HARTLEY-COVINGTON AND 11/28/07
HARTLEY-MATTEI E-MAILS

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Christopher Dell for reasons 1.4 (B) a
nd (D)


1. (C) SUMMARY: Canadian DCM Hoffman on December 4 provided
the Charge with an assessment of the 10-day visit to
Afghanistan by the Panel on the Future Role of Canada in
Afghanistan (Manley Panel). Hoffman emphasized repeatedly
that the Panel,s report will be critical to the future of
the Canadian participation in ISAF and that their upcoming
visit to Washington will be critical to the outcome of the
report. Although Panel members seemed to struggle in trying
to sort out the mass of contradictory information they
gathered during their visit, Hoffmann was persuaded that most
of them favored continued Canadian engagement in Afghanistan.
During a November 24 meeting with the Panel, Ambassador Wood
emphasized Afghanistan,s important role in the war on terror
and the U.S.,s long-term commitment to Afghanistan.
Ambassador Wood also stressed that sustained military action
is imperative to provide security and space for Afghan
civilian authorities to extend the government to the people
and push forward on reconstruction and economic development.
The Panel was particularly impressed with U.S. efforts to
train and equip Afghan National Security Forces, led by the
Combined Security Transition Command ) Afghanistan. END
SUMMARY.




2. (C) Canadian DCM Hoffmann in a December 4 meeting with the
Charge provided a read-out on the November 18-28 visit by the
Manley Panel to Afghanistan and the Canadian domestic
political context which led to the creation of the Panel.
Hoffmann emphasized repeatedly that the Panel,s report will
be critical to the future of the Canadian participation in
ISAF and that their visit to Washington will be critical to

the outcome of the report.


3. (C) Describing the current Canadian political climate as
&odd,8 Hoffmann highlighted the difficulties of a minority
government which is on the defensive on an issue where the
public is almost evenly split, but still trying to do the
right thing. The Panel,s report will condition Canadian
public opinion and could neutralize the issue politically.
This in turn could set the stage for extending the Canadian
mandate beyond 2009.


4. (C) According to Hoffmann (who worked directly for Manley
when he was Foreign Minister),Manley does not think highly
of Karzai, perceives the Afghan government and the
international community to be weak, and is not all that
positive toward NATO. That said, Manley recognizes the
security link to humanitarian intervention, has a personal
interest in assisting Afghanistan as a result of his work
with the international relief organization CARE, and has
publicly made the case for sustaining a robust international
commitment to Afghanistan. He described PM Harper,s success
in recruiting Manley for the job as a real coup and a major
disappointment for the Liberal Party, which is on record
opposing a mandate extension.


5. (C) Hoffmann observed that the Panel membership is stacked
in favor of maintaining Canadian engagement in Afghanistan,
with most being known for supporting the military and
international engagement. He noted that the Panel was
struggling in trying to sort out the mass of contradictory
information they were gathering. They agreed there are not
enough troops in the South, a point of fact that Hoffmann
anticipates will be highlighted in the report,s conclusions.
They seemed surprised during their visit to Kandahar by the
development progress that has been achieved and by the extent
of other IC representatives present and working in the
province, but had difficulty trying to gauge the significance

KABUL 00004005 002 OF 003


of what they saw, both in Kandahar and at stops to view
Canadian development projects in Bamyan and Mazar-e-Sherif in
the north.


6. (C) While in Kabul, the Panel met with President Karzai,
then-Deputy COMISAF General Robison, Director of the
Independent Directorate for Local Governance Popal, and
CSTC-A CG MG Cone. Hoffmann noted that the Panel was
particularly impressed with MG Cone, who convinced them that
the Combined Security Transition Command ) Afghanistan has a
good handle on training and equipping the Afghan National
Army and the Afghan National Police.


7. (C) As reported REF C, in a November 24 meeting of IC
representatives with the Panel, Ambassador Wood outlined the
strategic parameters that he advised should guide the future
of Canada,s contribution to ISAF. Ambassador Wood noted
that:

- The international community (IC) intervened in Afghanistan
after the September 11 attacks revealed a global threat that
required a global response. The global dimension of the
threat remains: the November 24 attack by a suicide bomber
that resulted in the deaths of an Italian soldier and several
Afghan civilians (including children) is suspected to be
non-Afghan.

- Afghanistan is a lynch-pin for regional stability in a
complicated neighborhood that begins with Israel and Lebanon,
extends through Iraq and Iran, and is bounded in the east by
Pakistan. The interests of regional and global nuclear
powers -- Russia, China, Pakistan and India -- intersect in
this region. Afghanistan can be a source of regional
stability or instability. Canada, as a responsible member of
the IC, can contribute to regional stability.

- Even six years after IC intervention, Afghanistan remains a
humanitarian disaster area and will require significant
outside assistance for years to come. For this support to be
effective and more than a band aid, Canada and the rest of
the IC need to continue efforts to establish security in the
country.

- Afghanistan,s role as a major opium and heroin producer is
a global threat.


8. (C) Underscoring the U.S. long-term commitment to
Afghanistan, Ambassador Wood emphasized that the purpose of
military operations in Afghanistan is to give the civilian
side space to advance development and governance. Last year,
there was a widespread belief that ISAF and IRoA would lose
against the Taliban during the fighting season. That did not
happen, and the military side of the equation is doing well.
The civilian side is not moving fast enough, which means that
continued military action to provide security and space for
civilian development remains imperative.


9. (C) Responding to Panel questions, Wood said Pakistani
authorities are doing more than they used to in the FATA but
they are distracted by the political turmoil. Contrary to
the observations of some Panel members, the U.S. had pressed
hard on Pakistan to put an end to al-Qaida and Taliban
sanctuaries, but since Musharraf,s imposition of martial law
our focus had shifted to the Pakistani political crisis.


10. (C) The Panel members were largely in receive mode.
Panel member Derek Burney made the principal substantive
point, noting that since a partner (sic) was found for the
Netherlands, it would be impossible for Canada to stay in its
current mandate without a partner as well. He observed that
Europeans appear to be able to help one another but no one
else. (Comment: Given that Burney is known to be close to
PM Harper, it is possible that his comment signals Harper,s
intent to seek a partner for Canada in Kandahar as a
condition for extending the current mandate. End comment.)


11. (C) Hoffmann said the Panel expects to have its report

KABUL 00004005 003 OF 003


drafted by the end of the year, and Hoffmann anticipates the
report will recommend a mandate extension, saying that Canada
has to do its part for international security and
humanitarian relief, but it must do it better.
DELL