Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07KABUL3973
2007-12-02 08:34:00
SECRET
Embassy Kabul
Cable title:  

SCENESETTER FOR SECDEF GATES' DECEMBER 3-5 VISIT

Tags:  PGOV PREL PINS MARR AF 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO1281
OO RUEHDBU RUEHPW
DE RUEHBUL #3973/01 3360834
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 020834Z DEC 07 ZFR
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHDJ/AMEMBASSY DJIBOUTI IMMEDIATE 0004
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1611
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE
RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/OSD WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUMICEA/JICCENT MACDILL AFB FL
RHMFISS/COMSOCCENT MACDILL AFB FL
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 4293
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 3710
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 KABUL 003973 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR SCA/FO DAS GASTRIGHT, SCA/A, S/CRS, S/CT,
EUR/RPM, INL/CIVPOL
STATE PASS TO USAID FOR AID/ANE, AID/DCHA/DG,
NSC FOR JWOOD
OSD FOR SHIVERS
CENTCOM FOR CSTC-A, CG CJTF-82, POLAD
EMBASSY DJIBOUTI PLEASE PASS TO SECDEF DEL VIA CAPT SCOTT
SMITH

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/29/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINS MARR AF
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR SECDEF GATES' DECEMBER 3-5 VISIT
TO AFGHANISTAN

KABUL 00003973 001.2 OF 004



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REF: A. (A) KABUL 3800

B. (B) KABUL 3765

Classified By: Charge Christopher Dell for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 KABUL 003973

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR SCA/FO DAS GASTRIGHT, SCA/A, S/CRS, S/CT,
EUR/RPM, INL/CIVPOL
STATE PASS TO USAID FOR AID/ANE, AID/DCHA/DG,
NSC FOR JWOOD
OSD FOR SHIVERS
CENTCOM FOR CSTC-A, CG CJTF-82, POLAD
EMBASSY DJIBOUTI PLEASE PASS TO SECDEF DEL VIA CAPT SCOTT
SMITH

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/29/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINS MARR AF
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR SECDEF GATES' DECEMBER 3-5 VISIT
TO AFGHANISTAN

KABUL 00003973 001.2 OF 004



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REF: A. (A) KABUL 3800

B. (B) KABUL 3765

Classified By: Charge Christopher Dell for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (S/NOFORN) SUMMARY: Your visit, coming at the end of this
year,s fighting season, is an opportunity to assess 2007,s
military, political and development progress. ISAF was the
clear winner this year on the battlefield, which has pushed
the enemy to resort increasingly to asymmetric attacks. At
least in the U.S.-controlled RC-E, good progress on key
development and governance indicators has been achieved.
Elections during the 2009-10 window have President Karzai
focused on the need to deliver services and security to the
population. Northern-based opposition groups are
increasingly critical of Karzai's leadership, including his
idea of a national unity government led by a strong
president. Earlier this month the costliest suicide bombing
in recent Afghan history took place n
Baghlan Province, fueling partisan sniping between opposition
members of Parliament and Karzai. In your meetings with
President Karzai and Defense Minister Wardak, you may wish to
focus on the importance of improving domestic governance and
strategic communications as part of an effective COIN
strategy, the need to deal effectively with Iran as well as
Pakistan, and our continuing concern
over counternarcotics. Both Karzai and Wardak may press you
for a significant increase in USG support for a larger but
unsustainable Army Air Corps. END SUMMARY.

--------------

SECURITY
--------------


2. (C/NOFORN) Under GEN McNeill, NATO-ISAF has worked
closely with Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) and
Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) to maintain pressure on
insurgents, inflicting regular defeats on the battlefield.
Recent intelligence indicates that senior Taliban leaders are
exhibiting clear signs of stress as a result of ISAF
operations, particularly the heavy casualties inflicted on
mid-level commanders. Nonetheless, the Taliban remain a
determined and resilient foe, as evidenced by their ability
to mass forces and seize at least temporarily territory in
Farah, Helmand and Kandahar. Overall attacks in 2007 are up
from 2006, especially via asymmetric means (improvised
explosive devices (IEDs),suicide bombings, and kidnappings).
That up-tick also reflects greater engagement by ISAF troops
with the insurgents as they sought from the first snow-melt
this spring to take the fight to
the enemy. The Taliban,s indiscriminate use of violence is
bitterly resented by the people, but at the same time it
shakes public confidence in the ability of Karzai,s
government and ISAF forces to protect non-combatants. We
need to reassure President Karzai that ISAF will continue to
work closely with expanded ANA units to pursue stability
operations in 2008, so that the government has more time and
space to improve local governance and development. ISAF
analysts believe that while Pakistani military operations in
Swat may be distracting Taliban attention away from
Afghanistan for now, ISAF may find itself facing an
emboldened enemy in spring 2008 if the extremists are
successful in resisting the Pakistani campaign.


3. (S/NOFORN) ISAF is holding together, despite Allied
governments having to manage shaky domestic public support
for NATO,s role in Afghanistan. While the Canadins and
Dutch are shouldering heavy burdens, the south is certain to

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become more unstable if they impose artificial timelines,
reduce their involvement or depart. Your strong statement to
this effect at the NATO Noordwijk Defense Ministerial was
most welcome, and we continue to press Allies stationed in
the north and west to do more. In this
regard, German Chancellor Merkel,s October visit to
Afghanistan has been followed closely by a tripling (from 12
million to 35.7 million euros) of German assistance to the
Afghan police in 2008. European political wrangling has not,
so far, harmed operations on the ground, but could if
recriminations fly or Allies announce plans to depart. The
Dutch cabinet has moved to extend their mandate. Also,
Canada,s Manley Panel departed Afghanistan on November 28
after a week-long visit in which they met with senior IRoA,
ISAF and international community representatives (including
Karzai and Wardak) and visited Canadian troops and
development projects in Kandahar, Bamyan province and
RC-North. Although they did not tip their hand on possible
recommendations, one Panel member close to PM Harper did
focus on the desirability of another Ally sharing the
Canadian burden in Kandahar.

--------------
GOVERNANCE AND SECURITY
--------------


4. (C/NOFORN) President Karzai faces elections sometime
during 2009-10, and the campaign season has already begun.
Opposition groups, including the United Front (whose core
leadership comes from the old Tajik-based Northern Alliance)
are encouraging the population to focus on what the
government is not delivering in terms of security and
services, while the central government is focusing on
demonstrating it can deliver. Initiatives include a new
Independent Directorate for Local Governance (IDLG) within
the Palace to encourage greater coordination and
effectiveness in the areas of security, service
delivery and governance at the local level. The challenges,
including resource shortages, are significant. As the
opposition increases the pressure, Karzai must fight the
temptation to give up on his vision of national unity and
fall back on his ethnic-Pashtun base, which is troubled by a
counter-insurgency strategy that targets a largely Pashtun
insurgency. He needs to be reminded that his credibility and
power comes from strong leadership of Afghanistan as a whole.


5. (C/NOFORN) With the licit economy improving (albeit from
a low starting point) and terrorist attacks increasing, polls
show that the people,s number-one concern has shifted from
employment to security. Karzai has only a short window to
demonstrate that the government is meeting people,s needs.
U.S. forces under ISAF command in RC-East, working in close
collaboration with State, USAID and USDA officers through the
PRTs and local officials, have achieved significant progress
on development and governance goals, including reductions in
infant mortality, enrollment of 96 percent of school-age boys
and 68 percent of girls in school, construction of 85
district center facilities (starting from zero) with 53 more
under construction, major progress in road construction and
canal repair, and significant
improvements in access to health care. We are starting to
see signs of growing economic activity, a key to long-term
prosperity and satisfaction with the government. This work
has been done in partnership with provincial and district
authorities, with credit going to Afghan government entities.
In order for ordinary Afghans to see the government as a
credible alternative to parallel structures, including shadow
Taliban governments operating in some provinces, the IRoA

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needs to do more to empower
provincial and district officials to take the lead on (and be
held accountable for) providing services.
--------------
ISSUES TO RAISE
--------------


6. (C) You may want to be prepared to address the following
topics:

- Governance: The IRoA increasingly recognizes that good
governance is central to an effective COIN strategy, but it
is struggling to in place the reforms and initiatives that
would convince the population that the government is here to
stay and prepared to deliver. You should underline U.S.
support for the new Independent Directorate for Local
Governance, and encourage Karzai to give ministers, governors
and district officials more authority and resources to
deliver the services that will connect the people to the
government. Governors, in particular, are too often
shuffled. Picking good people, investing in them and giving
them resources and authority, and holding them accountable is
the key to good governance. The Afghan government needs to
do a better job against corruption and in the effective
formulation and execution of policy.

- Strategic Communications: We must react faster to tactical
events, good and bad, and use our technological edge to
advance our offensive messaging agenda both domestically and
abroad. Both the Afghans and the international community
need to do a better job in publicizing successes. All
recognize the need for a strong and visible Afghan lead in
the messaging effort. A new Government Media Center will
provide opportunity for Afghans and the IC better to
coordinate communications
strategy. Essential Taliban weaknesses include the damage
they do to the reconstruction effort and their role in
civilian casualties, both of which reinforce poll results
showing that Afghans do not want a return to Taliban rule.
We must keep reminding Afghans of the progress which has been
achieved, notably in transportation, health and education,
but also in new areas like the availability of cell phones
and a free and independent media.

- The Neighbors: Karzai will be interested in your
assessment of the political situation in Pakistan. On Iran,
Karzai has shown increasing concern since the Edelman visit
(REF A) regarding Iranian meddling, especially regarding
evidence of Iranian support for Karzai,s political opponents
in the United Front party. His advisors highlight the risks
of "a second front" and the utility of Iran as a bulwark
against radical (Wahabist) influence in the region. They
hope to manage the Iranian threat, including by encouraging
expanded U.S. presence in Western Afghanistan as
counterpoint. We are prepared to deepen our presence; this
will provide an opportunity for you to reinforce with Karzai
the need for him to speak out against Iranian
mischief-making.

- Counternarcotics: At the moment, Karzai remains opposed to
both aerial and ground-based spraying. Poppy cultivation and
opium trafficking grew at an alarming rate in 2007, feeding
the insurgency and undercutting development and good
governance efforts. You should emphasize that Karzai needs
to take personal responsibility for improving the narcotics
situation, including pushing governors for progress. Defense
Minister Wardak is resisting providing force protection to
Afghan eradication

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teams. You should strongly urge Karzai to persuade the
minister to reverse that position.

--------------
TOPICS TO ANTICIPATE
--------------


7. (S) It can be difficult to predict what issues the
mentally peripatetic Karzai will raise. Among the issues
that could come up include:

-- Senior UN Special Representative: Karzai may ask you for
an update on the status of this appointment. Karzai has
resigned himself to the appointment of a senior UN Special
Representative to coordinate the international community,s
civilian efforts, but he has made clear his sensitivity to
any IC infringement on Afghan government sovereignty. To the
contrary, voices within IRoA increasingly call for the
"Afghanization" of policy formulation and execution.

-- Afghan Army Air Corps: During the November 29 visit of
Senator Bennett and his delegation, President Karzai
protested our refusal to agree to the insistent requests by
MOD Wardak to support an Army Air Corps far beyond the means
of the IRoA to sustain in the long run. This has been a pet
gripe of Defense Minister Wardak, who has managed to get the
subject on the President's mind. ADM Fallon has endorsed the
Combined Air Power Transition Force,s plan for an
appropriately-sized and effects-capable
Afghan National Army Air Corps focused on air mobility,
Presidential/DV lift, casualty evacuation, and close air
support.

-- Reconciliation: There is growing recognition that the
reconciliation program (PTS) established in 2005, under
Karzai's personal mentor, former Afghan President Mojaddidi,
to receive individual reconcilees, is not up to the task of
dealing with current challenge of larger groups or organized
elements of the Taliban looking for guarantees before
committing to reconciliation. Karzai has expressed a
willingness to talk to Taliban who are willing to commit to
the authority of the government; it will be useful to hear
his views on the scope and methods for the process he
envisions. We are prepared to support an expanded
PTS/reconciliation program, beginning with a statement of
principles to guide efforts by international partners as the
process moves forward.


8. (SBU) - Condolences over Baghlan Bombing Victims: Your
visit comes three weeks after Afghanistan's deadliest suicide
attack to date. Both President Karzai and Parliament Speaker
Qanooni declared three days of national mourning. Six
parliamentarians died in the November 6 attack, of whom all
but one were buried in a memorial ceremony at the site of the
new Parliament building still under construction. Some 59
children, along with teachers and factory workers, also
perished in the blast. The Taliban and HIG denied
responsibility for the bombing. It remains unclear who is
actually responsible; public
speculation has centered on Hekmatyar-allied forces having
carried out the attack.
DELL