Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07KABUL3767
2007-11-06 11:52:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Kabul
Cable title:  

DEPUTY NSA IBRAHIM ON IRAN, PAKISTAN, RUSSIA, AND

Tags:  PREL PGOV PTER AF 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO9113
PP RUEHDBU RUEHPW
DE RUEHBUL #3767/01 3101152
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 061152Z NOV 07
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1353
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 2957
RUEHRH/AMEMBASSY RIYADH PRIORITY 4274
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/OSD WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KABUL 003767 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR SCA/FO (DAS GASTRIGHT),SCA/A
STATE PASS TO USAID FOR AID/ANE, AID/CDHA/DG
NSC FOR JWOOD
OSD FOR MSHIVERS
CENTCOM FOR CG CJTF-82 AND POLAD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/25/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER AF
SUBJECT: DEPUTY NSA IBRAHIM ON IRAN, PAKISTAN, RUSSIA, AND
AFGHANISTAN'S DOMESTIC SITUATION

Classified By: DCM Christopher Dell for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D)

-------
Summary
-------

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KABUL 003767

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR SCA/FO (DAS GASTRIGHT),SCA/A
STATE PASS TO USAID FOR AID/ANE, AID/CDHA/DG
NSC FOR JWOOD
OSD FOR MSHIVERS
CENTCOM FOR CG CJTF-82 AND POLAD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/25/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER AF
SUBJECT: DEPUTY NSA IBRAHIM ON IRAN, PAKISTAN, RUSSIA, AND
AFGHANISTAN'S DOMESTIC SITUATION

Classified By: DCM Christopher Dell for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D)

--------------
Summary
--------------


1. (C) DCM used his introductory meeting with Deputy NSA
Engineer Ibrahim to underline U.S. support for the new
Independent Directorate for Local Governance, headed by
Jelani Popal, highlighting the role it can play in ensuring
the Afghan National Development Strategy (ANDS) both
addresses local needs and meets the IMF's poverty reduction
benchmarks. He underlined the importance of ensuring
Provincial Development Plans (PDPs) do not create a new gap
between expectations and delivery capability. Ibrahim
acknowledged the significant governance challenges faced by
the government. He highlighted the pressures put on
Afghanistan by its neighbors who he claimed see democratic
initiatives as a threat. Ibrahim defended ForMin Spanta's
comments discounting the Iranian Government's involvement in
arms shipment to Afghanistan, saying Spanta had made clear
the Taliban is the enemy. Ibrahim linked the flow of arms to
"radical elements," not the Government of Iran. He
underlined that Afghanistan considers Pakistan's support for
the Taliban the greater threat. He highlighted Saudi flows
of money to Pakistan and characterized a strong Iran as
useful in keeping Saudi Arabia in check. Ibrahim raised the
issue of the "uprising" led by Mullah Salam in Musa Qala
against the Taliban, noting that Salam had been in contact
with the Palace and asking if ISAF could provide support.
End Summary.

-------------- --------------
Governance: Managing Expectations and Need for Decisiveness
-------------- --------------


2. (C) The DCM began his October 23 meeting with Deputy NSA
Engineer Ibrahim by underlining U.S. support for the new
Independent Directorate for Local Governance, housed in the
Palace. He highlighted the need to link the provincial and
district-level governance initiatives coming out of that

office with the activities of the Afghan National Development
Strategy (ANDS) which is based on the sectoral strategies
developed by the ministries. The ANDS, which is the poverty
reduction strategy that must be in place and be approved by
the World Bank in March 2008 in order for Afghanistan to stay
on track for HIPC debt relief in March 2009, has been a
driving force in the development of Provincial Development
Plans (PDPs) which have raised expectations in terms of
government performance, particularly in the area of service
delivery. The DCM underlined the need for Popal's office to
focus on this process to ensure it does not result in a gap
between expectations resulting from the PDP process and the
government's capacity to deliver. Ibrahim said the
government is very focused on the political consequences of
unmet expectations. He acknowledged there is a growing sense
that the government and international community are failing
to respond to what the people are identifying as priority
needs. Ibrahim said the PDP process tends to reinforce this
perception as projects communities ask for are not being
funded. The government is already hearing "where is all the
international assistance going; we aren't seeing any of it."


3. (C) The DCM and Ibrahim agreed that Popal's challenge
will be finding ways to address critical needs (security,
development) without being becoming accountable for
everything the government does or does not do at the local
level. Ibrahim underlined that the government's credibility
depends on Popal being able to deliver over the next 24
months (before the presidential elections). Ibrahim noted
that elements of the government itself -- "ministers,
parliament, even the palace" -- will want to try to shape
what Popal is doing or block initiatives if they are seen as
intruding on established turf. Ibrahim also expressed
concern that a lack of support from the Ministry of Finance
might limit what Popal can do. Some people -- Ibrahim
mentioned (Burhanuddin) Rabbani and (Abdul Rasul) Sayyaf by
name -- are greedy and will never be happy. Ibrahim's advice

KABUL 00003767 002 OF 003


to Popal had been to "be aware of the complications ahead and
be decisive." He highlighted the importance of making good
appointments. The DCM reiterated support for Popal's office
and initiatives, underlining that the U.S. will be guided by
President Karzai's instincts and decisions.

-------------- -
Pakistani Terror, Saudi Money, Iran's Meddling
-------------- -


4. (C) Ibrahim turned the conversation to difficulties
Afghanistan faces working within constraints imposed by its
neighbors. He told the DCM that "our neighbors see
democratic development in Afghanistan as a direct threat,"
adding "Islam and politics are an explosive mix." Ibrahim
reiterated a Palace concern -- that the international
community does not take into account the pressures and
fissures created by pushing too far and too fast in
Afghanistan. He noted that rapid change fuels the assertion
made by critics that Afghanistan is willing to betray Islamic
values. "To the extent that we succeed in one direction, we
are fueling the radicalism that bounces back on us." Ibrahim
underlined that, from Afghanistan's perspective, the greatest
threat in this regard comes from Pakistan -- with the support
of Saudi Arabia.


5. (C) Ibrahim described the madrases in Pakistan as
"factories of Taliban churning out large numbers of
radicals." Some become fighters and some do not. While the
ANA will be dealing with the fighters for some time in the
future, it is critical to have a political strategy to deal
with those who are not fighting but nevertheless working to
undermine the government. Ibrahim underlined the need to
target "the children who inherit illiteracy," adding that "no
one is born a radical." He accused Pakistan of having a
policy of radicalizing the Pashtun belt, adding that Saudi
Arabia is a major source of funding for the effort. He
shared that Hekmatyar's son is currently "an honored guest"
in Saudi Arabia. "The Saudis should have to answer for this."


6. (C) Ibrahim's description of regional dynamics provided
the context for his explanation of Afghanistan's view of
Iran. He reiterated an argument he has made in the past --
that Afghanistan cannot afford "a second front." He went
further in this meeting, adding that "we like a strong Iran,
as it helps keep Saudi Arabia in check." Ibrahim said that
Afghanistan is concerned over Iran's meddling, but stated
that there is greater concern over official support to the
United Front than about arms provided by "radical (Iranian)
elements." He repeated the charge made in earlier meetings
-- that the Iranians had acknowledged earlier this year that
they were supporting the United Front, justifying it as a
necessary defense against the Taliban given the Afghan
government's ineffectiveness. Ibrahim noted the irony of
arms now moving from Iran to the Taliban, adding that the
target in this effort seems to be the U.S. The DCM pressed
on the issue of arms, highlighting U.S. concern over ForMin
Spanta's statement in Herat (on the margins of the ECO
conference) that there was no proof that Iran was providing
arms. Ibrahim said that Afghanistan is not ignoring evidence
of arms coming from Iran. The Iranian Ambassador had been
called in but denied official government involvement. When
the DCM said that such denials are not credible, Ibrahim
underlined that the Afghans were looking to see if there is
proof of official Iranian involvement. He underlined that
Spanta had made clear that Afghanistan considered the Taliban
to be the enemy.


7. (C) In response to the DCM's query, Ibrahim said the
Russians are also supporting the United Front. He observed
that Russia's interest in Afghanistan had been renewed during
the period of the Taliban, when Moscow wanted to ensure it
had a buffer protecting its interests in Central Asia. Its
support the Northern Alliance during that period has
continued and is channeled through individuals with old KGB
ties.

--------------

KABUL 00003767 003 OF 003


Palace Interest in Musa Qala's Mullah Salam
--------------


8. (C) Ibrahim said he wanted to alert the U.S. to Palace
interest in "the uprising against the Taliban" in Musa Qala
that he said was being led by Mullah Salam, who heads a
faction of the Alizai tribe. According to Ibrahim, after the
Taliban had taken one person from the village and other
villagers somehow negotiated his release, Mullah Salam had
decided "enough is enough," and challenged the Taliban. The
Palace wanted to avoid a repeat of the outcome during an
earlier uprising in Sangin, where the Taliban had dragged
resisters behind trucks to make examples of them. He said
the Palace had talked to Governor Wafa and asked him to share
what he could find out with international military on the
ground. He said the Palace was also reaching out to COMISAF
General McNeill.


9. (C) Note: The details of the Palace-Mullah Salam dynamics
and Mullah Salam's relationship with the Taliban are fuzzy.
Ibrahim said that Mullah Salam had earlier approached
President Karzai (in the context of Karzai's statement of
interest in negotiating with Taliban members). These reports
suggest that the Taliban got wind of Mullah Salam's effort to
sound out the Palace on what kind of deal might be possible
and decided to make an example of him. This triggered the
appeals for help from ISAF and the U.S. There are also
reports that Mullah Salam may have tribal connections to Sher
Mohammed, infamous warlord, former Helmand governor, and
current Senator, and relative (by marriage once removed) of
Karzai. There are also suggestions that Mullah Salam's break
with the Taliban also involves a split between the Alizai
faction he leads and another Alizai faction. End Note.
WOOD