SCENESETTER FOR UNDERSECRETARY EDELMAN'S NOVEMBER

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 KABUL 003765

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

EMBASSY PRAGUE PLEASE PASS TO U/S EDELMAN
STATE FOR SCA/FO (DAS GASTRIGHT),SCA/A
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E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/25/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER AF
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR UNDERSECRETARY EDELMAN'S NOVEMBER
7-8 VISIT TO AFGHANISTAN

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Classified By: AMB. Wood, for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D)


1. (S) SUMMARY/INTRODUCTION: Your visit, coming near the end
of this year,s fighting season, is an opportunity to assess
2007,s military, political and development progress and to
prepare the ground for major challenges in 2008. With 2008
being the last full year before the next Afghan presidential
election, President Karzai,s government is focused on
bringing increased security and prosperity to the people. We
are getting a lot right, but significant challenges remain.
On the positive side:

-- Although Taliban asymmetric attacks have increased, ISAF
battlefield successes have bought time and space for
political and economic progress;
-- Recent polling shows strong public support for Karzai
(albeit at somewhat lower levels than in the past) and for a
continued international presence;
-- Many more Afghan National Army (ANA) units are scheduled
to come on line in coming months and we are about to embark
on a major Afghan National Police (ANP) reform and retraining
program linked closely to development assistance;
-- Although there is a long way to go, economic growth is up
and the backbone of national infrastructure is building;
-- Coordination and cooperation among USG agencies in
Afghanistan is working well and improving; we are moving
toward a common campaign plan in-country; Provincial
Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) remain a work in progress, but
with the help of State,s S/CRS experts, we are methodically
applying lessons learned for planning and training purposes;
-- The U.S. military in RC-E, working closely with civilian
PRT counterparts and Afghan civilian and security
authorities, is making effective counterinsurgency doctrine a
reality in its AOR.

The list of challenges remains long, many of which are not
entirely in U.S. or Afghan control; key issues include:

-- Despite ISAF and OEF battlefield successes, we will have
to work closely with Karzai to ensure that his outreach
efforts to woo significant Taliban elements away from
violence and into the Afghan body politic do not cross USG
redlines; we also need to remain heavily engaged in shoring
up Allied commitments to ISAF;
-- Taliban and al-Qaida sanctuary in Pakistan will remain an
abiding problem, with the impact of Pakistan,s internal
political turmoil on Afghan security interests still to be
assessed; and we need to keep an eye on growing Iranian
meddling both in Afghanistan,s domestic political arena and
in support of the Taliban;
-- The continued growth in illegal narcotics production,
which finances Taliban operations and undermines progress in
governance, has to be tackled;
-- We need to keep Karzai focused on governance and
corruption issues, e.g., by reinforcing the positive step of
moving sub-national governance control from the Interior
Ministry (MOI) to the Palace )- including supporting
initiatives that help the government address the politically
explosive gap between expectations and delivery of services
-- and his initial steps to reform the MOI.


2. (S) International community (including U.S.) kibitzing on
governance issues and the hard work of managing the complex
political geometry of ISAF coalition members create
inevitable frictions with Karzai and the IRoA. Your visit
provides a critical opportunity to reassure senior Afghan
officials of the depth of the U.S. commitment to Afghanistan.
END SUMMARY/INTRODUCTION.

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SECURITY
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3. (C) Under GEN McNeill, NATO-ISAF has worked closely with
Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) and Operation Enduring
Freedom (OEF) to maintain pressure on insurgents, beating
them regularly on the battlefield and increasing the
stability necessary for good governance and economic

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development. Polls show that the Afghan people solidly
support the presence of international forces in Afghanistan.
ISAF-OEF coordination, meanwhile, is excellent, while efforts
to further protect civilians and counter Taliban
disinformation have made real headway since the summer.


4. (S) The Taliban remain resilient, however, evidenced by
their massing of forces and seizure of territory in Farah,
Helmand and Kandahar. While overall attacks in 2007 are up
from 2006, especially via asymmetric means (improvised
explosive devises (IEDs),suicide bombings, and kidnappings),
government tactics are also evolving, particularly in Kabul
and major urban areas. The Taliban,s use of dramatic
violence is bitterly resented by the people, but also shakes
their confidence in the ability of Karzai,s government and
ISAF forces to protect them. The increase in Taliban attacks
in the west, north and in Kabul also raises the specter of
former warlords and powerbrokers taking up arms to fend off
insurgents, which should be strongly discouraged. We need to
reassure President Karzai that ISAF will continue to work
closely with expanded ANA units to aggressively pursue
stability operations in 2008, so that the government has more
time and space to improve local governance and development.


5. (S) The Allies remain a particular cause for concern.
While the Canadians and Dutch are shouldering heavy burdens,
the south is certain to become more unstable if they impose
artificial timelines, reduce their involvement or depart.
Secretary Gates, strong statement to this effect at the NATO

SIPDIS
Noordwijk Defense Ministerial was most welcome and we
continue to press Allies stationed in the north and west to
do more. European political wrangling has not, so far,
harmed operations on the ground, but could if or Allies
announce plans to depart or internal Alliance debate turns
into public recriminations.

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AFGHAN NATIONAL SECURITY FORCES
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6. (S) ANSF are playing an increasing role in establishing
and maintaining security. ANA units are acquitting
themselves well in combat, particularly when matched with
U.S. or Allied mentoring teams, and the Army is evolving into
a respected national institution. While some Army units can
operate independently, most play supportive roles in larger
ISAF operations due to their limited capacity for planning,
logistics, and integrated operations. The ANA pay system is
becoming more transparent, having a positive effect on morale
and retention. According to the Combined Security Transition
Command ) Afghanistan (CSTC-A),we have trained and equipped
about 47,000 ANA, of which 31,000 are combat troops, with a
cyclical present-for-duty rate at around 68 percent. Getting
to the 70,000 goal, which is likely to increase to 80,000 in
2008, will take time. Minister Wardak needs to stay focused
on implementing agreed ANA train and equip programs and avoid
&shopping8 for advanced weapons systems that Afghanistan
cannot afford or sustain.


7. (C) The ANP is at least two years behind the ANA in
qualitative development, however, and widely viewed as
corrupt and inept by the Afghan people. A CSTC-A survey
covering 301 of 395 districts accounted for 80 percent of
police in those districts, a positive sign. New equipment is
arriving and being distributed but it will take time and
serious efforts to get the police fully ready to handle
frontline insurgent threats. Starting this December,
CSTC-A,s new Focused District Development (FDD) strategy
will seek to retrain and reform entire ANP units, district by
district. We should encourage Afghan leaders to
wholeheartedly embrace this program so that FDD security
advances can be closely linked to development assistance in
each district.


8. (C) The USG and the international community are also
promoting serious MOI reform measures to reduce corruption
and ensure that the police force will meet community
policing, counterinsurgency, and counter-narcotics goals.

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President Karzai,s recent reshuffling of 28 Afghan National
Police (ANP) officers partly reflects the need, publicly and
systemically, to end corruption at all levels of government.
Regrettably, this move was also a response to internal IRoA
political pressures, with some senior figures known for their
venality simply reshuffled to other, less prominent
positions. Public perception that the government is
seriously willing to tackle corruption is critical to
enhancing Karzai,s stature as he prepares for the 2009
elections. We need to encourage the IRoA at all levels, not
just MOI, to take serious steps to investigate, charge and
prosecute corrupt leaders in order to enhance the
government's stability and credibility.

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POLITICS AND GOVERNANCE
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9. (C) Although President Karzai benefited politically from
his successful Camp David visit and cross-border Jirga with
Pakistan, both in August, he faces serious political
challenges at home. Presidential elections are less than two
years away, and opposition groups, including the Northern
Alliance (recycled as the United Front Party),are
encouraging the population to focus on what the government is
not delivering. With the licit economy improving (albeit
from a low starting point),polls show that the people,s
number one concern has shifted from employment to security,
and Karzai has only a short window to demonstrate that the
government is meeting people,s needs. We strongly supported
his moving responsibility for local governance out of the MOI
into a new Independent Directorate for Local Governance in
the Palace and are working with the new Director to support
initiatives focused at strengthening provincial and
particularly district governance.

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COUNTERNARCOTICS
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10. (C) Poppy cultivation and opium trafficking grew at an
alarming rate in 2007, feeding the insurgency and
undercutting development and good governance efforts. The
narcotics economy now accounts for about one third of Afghan
GDP. On August 27, UNODC announced that 193,000 hectares
were cultivated with poppy in 2007, up from 165,000 in 2006,
and 74,000 hectares in 2002. Karzai,s response to the
announcement was in keeping with his characteristic hesitancy
to take on the opium problem: he cast barely-veiled blame on
the international community and called for &Afghan
solutions.8 The Ministry of Counter Narcotics and many
provincial governors waged an anti-poppy campaign during this
fall,s pre-planting season. Result: northern and central
provinces seem to be continuing their drift away from poppy
cultivation; Nangarhar, the second biggest poppy producer
last year after Helmand, is showing strong success in curbing
planting; however, the big poppy producing areas of the
south, including Helmand province, seem bent on another year
of heavy cultivation. In August we released the new U.S.
counter narcotics strategy for Afghanistan, outlining
intensified efforts through all five pillars (eradication,
alternative livelihoods, public information, law enforcement,
demand reduction). The U.S strategy and the UNODC report
emphasize the need for extensive forced eradication; and in
October the Policy Action Group (PAG) set the goal of
eradicating 50,000 hectares in 2008. Karzai remains opposed
to aerial spraying but has given signs he may permit limited
ground-based spraying. We should encourage Karzai to meet
the PAG,s eradication goal and take the steps necessary to
make spray available as a counter narcotics tool. We should
also encourage Karzai to hold governors accountable for
curbing the opium economy in their provinces.

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TALKING TO THE TALIBAN
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11. (S) On September 29, President Karzai stated that he was

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willing to talk with the Taliban and insurgent leaders,
including Mullah Omar and Gulbuddin Hekmatyar. The Taliban
failed to take the bait, however, saying that they would not
talk unless all Western soldiers were removed from Afghan
soil. Our message to Karzai has been clear and consistent
since 2004. We do not oppose talks so long as certain
redlines are respected: the U.S. will continue
counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operations; no talks
with senior Taliban leaders on our blacklist without prior
consultations; no power sharing; no protected geographic
areas; and individuals or groups must lay down their arms,
recognize the constitution and democratically-elected
government, and have no association with Al Qaeda.

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DEALING WITH THE NEIGHBORS
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12. (C) Presidents Karzai and Musharraf have ceased their
public bickering since the surprisingly successful August
9-12 cross-border Peace Jirga. In private, Karzai still
blames Pakistan for radicalizing Pashtuns on both sides of
the border and fueling the insurgency. The 50-person
bilateral &jirgagai,8 which is to guide implementation
initiatives that came out of the August Peace Jirga, is
scheduled to meet by mid-November. Given Pakistan,s
political turmoil, this may be delayed. We are encouraging
both governments to maintain the momentum.


13. (S) From the west, Iranian assistance to the Taliban
contrasts sharply with Tehran,s professed support for
President Karzai. ISAF and OEF have intercepted several
weapons shipments, including Explosively Formed Penetrators
(EFPs),of unambiguously Iranian origin. We have engaged
Karzai on several occasions about Iranian meddling. In
private, he shares our worries, but resists public
condemnation of Iran,s duplicity. The Afghans plead that
they cannot risk a two-front war, and Karzai's attention
remains fixed on Pakistan as the more serious external threat
to Afghanistan,s peace and stability. His Deputy National
Security Advisor has told us the Palace is more concerned by
the Iranian government's acknowledged support for the
Northern Alliance than "radical elements" who are supplying
arms. We continue to stress that ignoring Iran,s malicious
actions ) which has led to the deaths of international
forces and Afghan alike ) will not improve Tehran,s
behavior.

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RECONSTRUCTION AND THE ECONOMY
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14. (SBU) The IMF projects that licit GDP growth for 2007
will be 13 percent and that this level of growth will need to
be sustained to absorb Afghanistan's unemployed (estimated at
40 percent) and the 2.4-plus million refugees still living in
neighboring countries, while generating greater revenue to
cover government expenditures. We remain focused on
improving the national infrastructure, particularly roads and
electric power. We need to stress that IRoA fiscal
responsibility is not only essential for maintaining
macroeconomic stability but also for managing long-term
security programs, especially the anticipated increases in
ANA and ANP personnel ranks.


15. (SBU) With eighty percent of Afghanistan's workforce in
the agricultural sector, our USAID and other USG programs
seek to transform Afghanistan's rural economy from its
current anemic traditional base, susceptible to purchasers of
illegal drugs, to a modern, integrated, commercial
agricultural economy growing licit high value crops and
exporting to high-priced demand centers. The Afghan First
program has shown the way forward with its contracting for
bottled water, uniforms, and construction services. In the
future, we hope the Afghan government will be able to work
more proactively with USG -- including DOD -- health experts
to help Afghan food suppliers elevate their quality so that
more meat, poultry, fruits, and vegetables can be produced

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locally and sold to Coalition forces.
WOOD