PRT NURISTAN: SEMI-ANNUAL REPORT ON SECURITY,

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 KABUL 000372

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

STATE FOR SCA/FO, SCA/A, S/CR, SCA/PB
NSC FOR AHARRIMAN
OSD FOR KIMMITT
CENTCOM FOR CG CFC-A, CG CJTF-76, POLAD
RELEASABLE TO NATO/ISAF/AUST/NZ

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV PTER ECON EAID MASS SOCI AF
SUBJECT: PRT NURISTAN: SEMI-ANNUAL REPORT ON SECURITY,
POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, AND SOCIAL SITUATION

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Summary
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1. (SBU) Nuristan Province has traditionally been neglected
and remains underdeveloped, but recent initiatives by
Governor Tamin are energizing district administrations and
encouraging communities to take responsibility for their own
security. Despite these efforts, security remains
problematic as anti-government elements continue to operate
in the province. An unprecedented number of big-ticket
public work construction projects are due to start in the
coming months. The economy and infrastructure of the
province and region are poised to undergo an unprecedented
transformation that will bring new opportunities and benefit
to even the most remote villages. Education and health care
have seen little improvement. Civil society organizations
are not present, and the condition of women is unchanged:
they have scant opportunities to do anything other than
engage in traditional subsistence activities. End Summary.

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Small, Neglected, Undeveloped
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2. (SBU) Nuristan province, which by population is
Afghanistan's smallest, remains largely neglected and
undeveloped. It has nothing that could be considered even a
small town and no commercial or trading center. Its
proximity to Pakistan, its rugged, forested terrain and
limited government presence contribute to it being a
sanctuary for anti-government groups that enjoy some local
support in some areas. The basis and extent of this support
are key issues for the government and the Coalition/ISAF.

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Security
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3. (SBU) Anti-government activity continues in the provinc,
but hostile contacts fell to a low levelduring January.
Winter's cold, short days and snow could account for the
lull, but others suggest that it may be the result of a
recent security initiative by the governor in eastern
Nuristan.


4. (SBU) Nuristani sources report that Coalition/IASF
operations which eliminated high value targets in a November
raid in Mondagal, Kamdesh district, and a January strike
against three insurgents in western Nuristan delivered a
message: enemies no longer can operate with impunity in the
province, and the Coalition/ISAF's ability to find them is
growing more effective. According to one well-informed
Nuristani source, the Mondagal operation brought a new
willingness among the residents in the east to oppose
insurgents who had previously operated without fear of
consequences.


5. (SBU) Insecurity in Nuristan has not deterred PRT
operations, but it had largely stopped activities of UN
organizations, international NGOs and implementing
organizations. Only a few international NGOs operate in the
province, and none has a permanent presence with expatriate
staff. Afghans working for international organizations have
been targeted in the past, but there were no significant
incidents in the second half of 2006. Nor were there
incidents that targeted Afghan officials, schools or clinics
or attacks against populations.


6. (SBU) Afghan government law enforcement and security
agencies have a limited presence in the province and
contribute little to security and the rule of law. The
Afghan National Police (ANP) command little respect and are
seen to be ineffective. Border police operate from a base in

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Bargimatal district, but they lack the means to control the
border with Pakistan. The Afghan National Army (ANA) which
is more respected than the police is only present in a few
locations where they work with Coalition/IASF units. The ANA
intends to extend its presence in Nuristan by building at
least one post in Qala Gush.


7. (SBU) The situation of the ANP is Nuristan is dire. With
their low pay and primitive facilities, most patrolmen insist
on serving only in their home districts. They reside at
home, allowing them to eke out a living on their paltry
wages. But because they are working in their own communities
and often musQdeal with their relatives, they often find it
difficult to be even-handed and impartial. Complaints are
common about police officers who exploit their positions for
personal gain and about patrolmen who ignore orders and the
law in order to protect the interests of their relatives. In
response to proposals that would keep rank and file police
from serving in their home districts, objections are raised
that they cannot serve at distant posts because they lack
adequate housing and they will be away from their families.
In early 2007, as a result of national reform effort, more
professional police officers are being assigned at both the
provincial and district levels in Nuristan. In addition,
plans are being refined to start recruitment and training in
order to deploy, in the near future, 550 auxiliary police who
have been authorized for the province. ANP training is a
positive step, but, by itself only marginally improves the
capacity and effectiveness of this troubled force.

8. (SBU) Last November, Governor Tamim launched an initiative
to mobilize councils to take responsibility for security in
their region. He spent several weeks in early winter
organizing a "security" council comprised of 45 elders and
religious leaders from Nuristan's two eastern districts. The
council agreed to visit communities in these districts in
order to deliver the message that Jihad is not now justified,
that communities must take responsibility for their own
security, and that villages will not receive development
projects unless they bar anti-government groups from
operating on their lands. Besides sending his deputy to
ensure that the council would follow through in its
commitments, the governor promised to return in the spring to
evaluate the council's performance. He has expressed his
intention to set up similar councils elsewhere in the
province.

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Politics
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9. (SBU) The eastern Nuristan security council was one
example of the sharply increased activity by the governor and
his immediate staff in late 2006. These efforts strengthened
support for his administration, the Afghan government and the
Coalition/IASF. Tamim earned praise for naming new
administrators for every district and for getting involved in
settling some long-festering disputes between communities.
He dispatched his deputy and several other provincial
officials to work on settling a bloody, disruptive 14-year
conflict between Kamdesh and Kushtoz villages in eastern
Nuristan. Tamim also sought to shake up and energize
district-level administration through personnel changes.
Other than the governor and his staff, however, the
provincial administration appears to be ineffective: the
Provincial Council is not active, and many line ministry
positions for the province are vacant or the incumbents are
seldom at their jobs.


10. (SBU) Popular sentiment about the provincial
administration hinges on the services it provides. Support
for the national government depends on this and also on
intangibles, particularly perceptions of the legitimacy of
the national leader, his character, integrity, and conduct.
On all these counts Nuristanis continue to hold President

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Karzai in high esteem. While to some extent Karzai benefits
from low expectations of national leadership, the perception
is widespread in Nuristan that he has brought relative
stability and development.


11. (SBU) Despite enemy activities in Nuristan, support for
the opposition does not appear strong. When asked, most
Nuristanis profess their indifference or outright hostility
to the opposition and their agenda. Yet, even in this
context, in many parts of Nuristan, the opposition is
tolerated and even supported. This appears driven more by
fear based on intimidation or material considerations than by
conviction. The minority in Nuristan who oppose the
government employ a variety of strategies. Some feign
support for the government to benefit from projects and
economic opportunities. Others take a low-key,
non-confrontational approach, expecting the tide to turn,
with the government foundering and the Coalition/IASF
withdrawing. Others actively support or participate in armed
confrontation.


12. (SBU) Information from many different sources suggests
that support for the government is growing while the appeal
of the opposition is weakening. Factors for this include the
Coalition's successes over the opponents, increased
provincial administration activity, and recognition of the
prospects of receiving humanitarian assistance and
development projects.

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Economics
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13. (SBU) Despite the dramatic changes that have transformed
Afghanistan since the 2001 ouster of the Taliban, most
Nuristanis have seen few changes to their difficult lives.
They continue to practice the same subsistence activities as
generations of ancestors: transhumant small-animal
pastoralism and intensive cereal cultivation on postage-stamp
sized irrigated fields built on steeply terraced hillsides.
The province has no paved roads, only a handful of secondary
schools, and no public telephone system. Nuristan, however,
is endowed with extensive valuable natural resources,
particularly dense coniferous forests in the eastern and
central regions and abundant deposits of semi-precious gems
and minerals -- which are illegally mined and smuggled out of
the country bringing little benefit to Nuristanis or the
Afghan government.


14. (U) In Nuristan, like most regions of Afghanistan, the
public sector has contributed little to the economy. That is
about to change dramatically. Plans for major projects,
funded or mediated through the public sector are poised to
inject massive amounts of money into the province's largely
non-monetized economy. A USAID-sponsored Alternate
Livelihoods Cobblestone Road, Cash-for-Work project in
Nurgram district is already underway and needs more workers
than are available locally. That project, which started in
October 2006, will provide over 75,000 worker days of pay.
Work on the five multi-million dollar road projects managed
by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers in Nuristan are planned
to start in the coming months. Each project will hire
thousands of local unskilled laborers allowing their
households to accumulate cash, in many cases for the first
time. Unfortunately, with Nuristan largely lacking anything
except subsistence economic activities, there are few
opportunities for this cash to circulate and generate added
economic benefit in the province.


15. (U) Beyond the work and earnings that these projects
provide, these resulting roads will bring material changes to
the people's lives by facilitating commerce, and creating
opportunities for new transport and commercial services and
even new productive ventures. Because the roads will lower

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transport costs, they should reduce the price of goods even
in the remote communities which lie far beyond the reach of
the roads. On the negative side, the roads will also make it
easier to engage in illegal activities, particularly the
smuggling of timber and gems and semi-precious stones
extracted from unregulated mines.


16. (U) Many small-scale development projects have been
undertaken by the National Solidarity Program, NGOs and the
U.S. military. While they have improved the lives and
livelihoods for residents of those communities where they are
located, their effect on the overall well-being of the people
in the province has been marginal. Most Nuristani
communities are not accessible from the existing roads and
paths that can be negotiated by pack animals so have not
benefited from such projects.

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Cultural/Social Situation
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17. (U) Conditions for the people in Nuristan have changed
little. There are only a handful of secondary schools, none
for girls. Most schools lack purpose-built structures.
Eight hundred of the 1300 teachers are described as having no
formal teacher training. Health care facilities are
rudimentary. The province has no hospital and most
communities are hours or days distant from even a basic
health clinic. Civil society organizations do not exist
other than informal gatherings to address specific issues or
problems. Nuristan's mountains militate against the
population developing a common identity, defining common
interests or engaging in joint effort.


18. (U) Few opportunities exist for women other than engaging
in the subsistence activities practices by their mothers and
grandmothers. The relatively greater influence of strict
Islam practices, promulgated by religious leaders trained at
madrassas in Pakistan has resulted in more restrictions on
women including veiling. However, because most communities
in Nuristan are constructed in a manner where the houses are
not surrounded by walls, and because Nuristani women
typically are responsible for agriculture and other essential
tasks such as collecting wood from the hillsides, it is not
possible to restrict women to the confines of their
residences as is typical in many other parts of Afghanistan.
NEUMANN