PRT KHOST - GOVERNOR JAMAL: FUNDING DELAY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KABUL 000359

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/31/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV AF
SUBJECT: PRT KHOST - GOVERNOR JAMAL: FUNDING DELAY
THREATENS SECURITY AND GOVERNANCE GAINS

REF: A. 06 KABUL 5632

B. 06 KABUL 5853

C. KABUL 255

Classified By: PolCounselor SRosenberry for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D)


1. (C) SUMMARY: During mid-December meeting with PRT, Khost
Governor Arsala Jamal expressed concern that, due to funds
from the Ministery of Interior into his Governor's
Discretionary Fund drying up at the end of the fiscal year,
he would not be able to pay the governor's militia that he
was relying on to augment the ANP. The Governor argued that,
until the PAG-approved Afghan National Auxiliary Police
(ANAP) in Khost is up and running and able to absorb the
existing militia force, or the flow of discretionary funds is
resumed, districts that rely heavily on the milita paid by
the governor are vulnerable to Anti-Coalition Militia (ACM).
While the governor may be exaggerating the likely
consequences of the gap in security funds, the situation does
point to the need to address problems with relying on the
Governor's Discretionary Fund to cover security requirements
(Septel). The GOA recognizes there is a problem, and it is
not clear, at this point, whether there will be provision for
the Governor's Discretionary Fund in the next year's budget.
END SUMMARY.

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Governor Says Funding Gap Threatens Security
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2. (C) During mid-December meeting with PRT, Khost Governor
Jamal said his priority for the province remained the
build-up and support of militia paid directly by the governor
himself. Until the Afghan National Auxiliary Police had been
approved for use in Khost, allowing these militia to be
absorbed into the ANAP, the Governor would need to continue
to pay these militia out of his Discretionay Fund, which has
been provided by the Ministry of Interior to governors in
several provinces since 2005 to help with extraordinary
security requirements. Since payments from Kabul into the
governor's Discretionary Fund ceased in November until the
new fiscal year, he was concerned that he would not be able
to pay salaries to the militia and might lose some to
anti-coalition militia. (Embassy Note: There are different
explanations regarding why the discretionary funds dried up
before the end of the fiscal year, but we are told the funds
available from the current year's budget were exhausted in
December. There are reports the Minister of Interior is
developing a proposal to secure 50 million afghanis (USD 1
million) to continue resourcing the Discretionary Funds, but
this of course would be at the expense of other obligations.
The willingness/ability of the GOA to support the MOI request
is not clear. In fact there are indications that the GOA may
not include monies for the Governor's Discretionary Fund in
next year's budget, which is currently being negotiated -
Septel. End Note)


3. (C) The Governor said he feared that existing militia
would abandon their positions before a new infusion of
discretionary funds became available or the ANAP was able to
absorb and pay those currently serving in the militia. He
warned that districts like Spera, with only eight regular
Afghan National Police (ANP) and 30 militia, would be
vulnerable and could fall to anti-coalition militia.
(Embassy Note: ANAP training for Khost was approved by the
January 11 PAG (ref C). It is expected to being March 1, but
it will take time to train the full complement of 460
authorized ANAP, given constraints on facilities and
personnel. End Note)

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Also Threatens Tribal Security Agreement
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4. (U) Jamal warned that the recently-brokered Tribal
Security Resolution (ref A) could also be at risk. The
agreement obliges tribes to secure their areas in cooperation
with District Administrators and requires to come to the aid
of district centers, schools, and other GOA structures.
Since tribal elders signed the agreement November 23, there
have been several examples of villagers coming to the aid of
District Centers and checkpoints attacked by ACM. The most
recent example occurred December 9, when villagers came
beating drums and shooting guns within 25 minutes to help a
besieged Sabari District ANP checkpoint. This effectively
scared off the ACM and two ACM bodies were recovered.


5. (C) Despite early successes, Jamal is concerned that
enthusiasm for the agreement will fade with time, so he is
trying to stand up an "agreement enforcement group" to ensure
that elders and mullahs follow through on their commitments.
The group would consist of one or two tribal leaders from
each district plus all district administrators, and a
representative of the PC, ANP, NDS and ABP. The group would
travel to districts where attacks are continuing and shame
tribal leaders into stepping up their resistance to ACM
infiltration and operations ("Our districts are safe, why
isn't yours?") and possibly offer suggestions and best
practices from more secure districts. Jamal described the
group's purpose as enforcing the agreement "by traditional
means." He said villages would also suffer if the militia
continued to go unpaid, as this would further undermining the
agreement and the relationship between the GOA and tribal
leaders.

-------------- --
Security, Anti-Corruption, Outreach Initiatives
-------------- --


6. (SBU) Jamal said that the gap in the Governor's
Discretionary Fund would undermine progress he had made over
the last three months on security, anti-corruption, and
public outreach. Without funds to transport, house, feed,
and organize events and shuras for elders, mullahs, GOA
officials, and visiting Kabul delegations, Jamal feared
important symbolic progress could be lost. He said he would
have to make some difficult decisions on spending what was
left of prior months funds. He claimed his initiatives were
being examined by other governors as potential best practices
and argued that many of the following initiatives would be
threatened:

--an anti-Taliban stance and issuing of fatwas from the
Provincial Mullah Shura;
--public events to rally support for GOA (most notable
example: 3,600-man October 12 Peace Rally);
--proposed establishment of cross-border, tribally based
"micro-jirgas";
--three-man provincial anti-corruption team;
--accountability shuras (GoA Officials meet the press/public)
--Kabul delegation support, including anti-corruption
investigations.


7. (C) PRT Comment: While Jamal has grounds to be concerned
about the loss of funding for his militia, his comment about
losing districts may be alarmist and was likely designed to
scare us into lobbying for expedited funding. Ex-Governor
Pathan went three months without paying the militia a year
ago when the MOI funds ran dry at the end of the last fiscal
year. The militia, are in many cases drawn from the local
Arbekei or "village defenders" who serve out of loyalty to
the tribal leaders that select them. Pay is not the sole or
even the most important determinant of their loyalty. In
fact, whether the militia that become integrated into the
ANAP will bring the same loyalty to that organization remains
to be seen. With regard to the other programs Jamal

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described, while only time will tell if his strategies bear
fruit, his initiative and creativity should be applauded,
supported and shared with other provincial officials as a
model.


8. (SBU) Embassy Comment: An interagency group at post is
addressing the overall issue of funding going to the
provinces/governors, including the role of the Governor's
Discretionary Fund. The objective is to ensure we are
encouraging options that provide regular, sufficient,
transparent and sustainable funding to key sectors, including
security -- Septel. End Comment.
NEUMANN