Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07KABUL2968
2007-09-05 14:43:00
SECRET
Embassy Kabul
Cable title:  

SCENE-SETTER FOR DEPUTY SECRETARY NEGROPONTE'S

Tags:  PGOV MARR PREL SNAR PTER ECON EAIDCIN AF 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO8722
OO RUEHDBU RUEHPW
DE RUEHBUL #2968/01 2481443
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 051443Z SEP 07
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0018
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/OSD WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 KABUL 002968 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR SCA/FO DAS GASTRIGHT, SCA/A, S/CRS, S/CT
STATE PASS TO USAID FOR AID/ANE, AID/DCHA/DG,
NSC FOR HARRIMAN
OSD FOR SHIVERS
CENTCOM FOR CSTC-A, CG CJTF-82, POLAD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/25/2017
TAGS: PGOV MARR PREL SNAR PTER ECON EAIDCIN AF
SUBJECT: SCENE-SETTER FOR DEPUTY SECRETARY NEGROPONTE'S
VISIT TO KABUL


Classified By: Charge Christopher Dell, for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D)

-------
SUMMARY
-------

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 KABUL 002968

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR SCA/FO DAS GASTRIGHT, SCA/A, S/CRS, S/CT
STATE PASS TO USAID FOR AID/ANE, AID/DCHA/DG,
NSC FOR HARRIMAN
OSD FOR SHIVERS
CENTCOM FOR CSTC-A, CG CJTF-82, POLAD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/25/2017
TAGS: PGOV MARR PREL SNAR PTER ECON EAIDCIN AF
SUBJECT: SCENE-SETTER FOR DEPUTY SECRETARY NEGROPONTE'S
VISIT TO KABUL


Classified By: Charge Christopher Dell, for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D)

--------------
SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) We welcome your first visit as
Deputy Secretary to Afghanistan, which comes
at an opportune time to advance our effort
to establish a self-sustaining multi-channel
dialogue between Afghanistan and Pakistan.
The inauguration in Jalalabad of a discreet
communications channel between the national
security advisors offers the two neighbors
their best opportunity to put aside public
bickering and explore possible joint
ventures to counter their common terrorist
enemy. Your meeting with President Karzai
will help us engage him on a focused
dialogue about security, development, and
governance. The last is emerging as the
most critical area, one where no amount of
international support can substitute for a
lack of presidential leadership. Over
recent months, the absence of an effective
government presence in many districts has
allowed the insurgency to move into new
areas. Strong leadership on policing,
accountable governance, corruption, and
counter-narcotics would both enhance
Karzai's credibility and serve as a bulwark
against further insurgent gains. Your visit
is an opportunity to prod him towards
sustained, high-profile initiatives that can
address these challenges. You will also
want to reinforce our gathering concerns
about Iran's activities in Afghanistan. End
Summary.

--------------
Karzai's Leadership Challenge
--------------


2. (C) President Karzai benefited
politically from his successful August 5-6
Camp David visit and the August 9-12 cross
border jirga with Pakistan, but he continues

to face intense pressure from an
increasingly assertive opposition and a
resurgent insurgency. The chorus of
complaint from Afghans across the country is
rising and he must show he can deliver on
security, particularly policing, and provide
effective and accountable governance. He
must balance his inclination to make
concessions designed to keep his enemies
inside the tent with more dynamic leadership
to avoid the growing impression that he is
too accommodating of warlords, drug lords,
and corrupt officials. His strategy of
balancing interests should not, and need
not, produce a least-common-denominator
government. He can fulfill his mandate to
lead if he picks his battles and his allies
carefully and outmaneuvers perceived power-
brokers by going directly to the people.

--------------
Restructuring the Police Means Reforming the
MoI
--------------


3. (C) The Afghan National Police is the
"face of the Afghan government," and often
the leading edge of the central government's
strategic effort to draw insular villagers,
long-abused minority groups and suspicious
Pashtun tribals into a national community.

KABUL 00002968 002 OF 005


Its root-and-branch restructuring is a major
focus of the Combined Security Transition
Command - Afghanistan (CSTC-A) and our
Coalition partners; however, a corrupt and
thoroughly dysfunctional Ministry of
Interior is obscuring the progress we have
achieved. Urge Karzai to announce publicly
before he travels to New York his decision
to move responsibility for sub-national
governance out of the dysfunctional Ministry
of Interior into an office in the Palace, so
that he will receive plaudits rather than
questions from donor nations during his
overseas travel. He must abandon his
practice of awarding senior police
management positions as sinecures to power-
brokers he wants to cultivate. Integrity
and effectiveness must be the guiding
principles of an entirely transparent senior
ministerial appointment process. Karzai has
heard these messages several times and now,
at last, appears to be abandoning his
reluctance to accept them. We are
developing for his consideration a detailed
MoI reform plan. You should assure him that
the United States, the international
community and, most importantly, the Afghan
people will stand by him in making the tough
decisions that lie ahead.

--------------
Governance: Supporting a Revitalized Afghan
Social Contract
--------------


4. (C) Karzai knows his government is being
judged on its ability to provide security,
development and governance, including basic
justice. Unmet expectations on all fronts
are fueling opposition movements and
providing fertile ground for insurgent
support in an increasing number of
districts. Commend Karzai for taking a hard
look at his ministries and for considering
consolidation in order to gain efficiency
and improve performance. Note that his
decision regarding the Ministry of Interior
is only a first step. He has appointed an
energetic leader to the sub-governance
office, but now must grant him and the
governors the latitude and resources to
bring effective governance to the provinces.


5. (C) We have told Karzai we want our
governance programs to support his goal of
strengthening the partnership between state
and traditional structures at the local
level. Karzai recognizes that government
must be more responsive to local needs, but
remains loathe to devolve authority to local
officials. Encourage Karzai toward the
realization that improved government
performance at the local level depends on
his willingness to move from a top-down
command model to a partnering arrangement
with his provincial governors that allows
them to dispense resources to local
community leaders.

--------------
Be Courageous to Stop Corruption
--------------


6. (C) Corruption threatens to undermine
everything we and Karzai are trying to
accomplish, and beating Afghanistan's deeply
ingrained corruption is a long-term
challenge. The justice system does not yet

KABUL 00002968 003 OF 005


function at a level that would allow the
arrest, conviction and incarceration of
white collar criminals. Karzai has tried,
albeit slowly, to remove some corrupt
officials; however, the effective impunity
of the powerful is demoralizing to the
general public. Remind him that he needs to
make a public example of the worst
offenders, as he did in late 2006 and early
2007 when he consented to the removal of
several police chief appointees with
egregious reputations for human rights
abuses and corruption. That will likely
enrage powerful patrons, but courage in
combating corruption will win Karzai popular
support.

--------------
Counter-Narcotics: Time for Tough Decisions
--------------


7. (C) Poppy cultivation and opium
trafficking are growing at alarming rates,
feeding the insurgency, and undercutting
development and governance efforts. The
2006/2007 poppy season saw the most
comprehensive counter-narcotics activity to-
date in Afghanistan, but results have been
disappointing. On August 27, UNODC
announced the latest poppy national
cultivation figures, which will reach
193,000 hectares, up from 165,000 in 2006.
The 2002 figure was 74,000 hectares.


8. (C) Karzai initially responded to the
announcement by criticizing the
international community's efforts to
suppress opium production. Convoluting the
facts, he publicly stated that poppy
cultivation was rising in provinces where
the Coalition had focused its eradication
efforts. Without elaborating, he said
Afghan solutions would be far more effective
and that his governors should stop heeding
international community eradication
advisors. Caution Karzai that his
intemperate remarks may discourage
international support and funding for opium
eradication. Stress the link between poppy
production and insurgency funding. Be
prepared to deflect his contention that the
impoverished seek opium income out of
desperation: Helmand Province is wealthy by
Afghan standards and has received over $400
million in U.S. development assistance since
2002, yet was the source for almost half the
world's heroin last year. Urge his full
engagement in developing a public consensus
between the Afghan government and the
international community on a sustained,
coherent approach to eradication.

--------------
Working with the Neighbors
--------------


9. (C) The August 9-12 Afghanistan-Pakistan
Peace Jirga exceeded expectations; it began
a confidence-building dialogue and
identified areas where sides are willing to
commit to cooperation. Afghans' perception
of the diplomatic success boosted their
collective self-confidence. Karzai deserves
credit for following through on the
commitment he made to the jirga proposal in
the White House last November. Thank him
for his team's success in nimbly deflecting
the Pakistani delegation's efforts to

KABUL 00002968 004 OF 005


include in the conclusions calls for the
withdrawal of foreign troops and for direct
talks with the Taliban. Tell him we will be
working with his team as it follows up on
the more practical bilateral projects
proposed by the jirga. Our goals are to
institutionalize this dialogue and, through
your inauguration in Jalalabad of a discreet
communications channel between the two
national security advisors, allow the two
governments a more private forum in which
they can drop their posturing public
antagonism and begin to coordinate their
efforts to combat their common terrorist
enemy.


10. (S) Senior Afghan officials have taken
pains to impress upon us Karzai's desire to
avoid a "second front" in the West, with
Iran. Ahmedinejad's August 14 visit to
Kabul was scripted as an opportunity for the
two presidents to get to know one another
and to discuss binational cooperation.
Compliment the Afghan Foreign Ministry's
success in resisting Iranian pressure on
Karzai to sign a joint security agreement.
Afghan officials privately acknowledge that,
despite the visit's positive public
atmospherics, they do not believe that Iran
will cease its meddling, stop pressing for a
security agreement, or refrain from using
assistance and deportations of Afghans as
leverage on Kabul. The head of
Afghanistan's National Directorate of
Security privately registered with the
visitors his government's worries over the
appearance of Iranian weapons in Taliban
inventories. Karzai understands the Iranian
challenge and is privately concerned, but
will resist publicly confronting Tehran.
You will want to convey to him our
conviction that Iran's machinations can only
be countered with unambiguous firmness.


11. (SBU) The Afghan government and the
international community launched a process
in 2005 to encourage economic integration of
Afghanistan with its neighbors through
annual conferences. These meetings bring
together regional states and donors to
discuss enhanced cooperation in areas such
as energy, agriculture, investment climate
and trade facilitation, with the next
meeting scheduled for February in Islamabad.
The potential for regional economic
cooperation to increase trade and reduce
Afghanistan's unemployment makes it
imperative that Afghanistan use this process
to make headway in removing impediments to
its goods transiting through Pakistan and
the region. Encourage Karzai to capitalize
on the good feeling engendered by the recent
jirga to work with Pakistan in achieving
this goal. Note the promise for enhanced
trade links between Central and South Asia
through the new U.S.-funded bridge linking
Afghanistan and Tajikistan.

--------------
The Way Ahead
--------------


12. (SBU) With Camp David, the successful
jirga, the carefully managed Ahmadinejad
visit, and the Afghan-Tajik bridge opening,
Karzai has had a good month, but a good
month guarantees neither a good season nor
long-term success. Karzai should use the

KABUL 00002968 005 OF 005


momentum established this month to gain
traction on the tough issues, including
counter-narcotics, Ministry of Interior
reform, and sub-national governance. We
will continue to provide him resources and
advice, but Afghanistan needs his
leadership. That will require tremendous
courage on his part, but your visit is one
more indication of the American people's
unflagging commitment to him and to
Afghanistan.
DELL