OSCE INTEREST IN AFGHANISTAN

C O N F I D E N T I A L KABUL 002250

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR SCA/FO DAS GASTRIGHT, SCA/A, S/CRS, SA/PB
STATE PASS TO USAID FOR AID/ANE, AID/DCHA/DG
NSC PASS FOR AHARRIMAN
OSD FOR SHIVERS
CENTCOM FOR CG CJTF-82, POLAD, JICCENT

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/12/2017
TAGS: PREL PTER ASEC MARR AF OSCE ECON EAID
SUBJECT: OSCE INTEREST IN AFGHANISTAN


Classified By: A/DCM Carol Rodley for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D).


1. (C) SUMMARY: OSCE Secretary General Marc Perrin de
Brichambant briefed Ambassador July 2 on OSCE's interest in
forging a partnership with Afghanistan. OSCE plans to take a
step-by-step approach to Afghanistan, beginning in limited,
specific areas. It is looking at a possible border
management project in the northeast. The Ambassador welcomed
OSCE interest, noting its value to Afghanistan could extend
beyond police training and border management to regional
economic integration. He cautioned against half-hearted,
poorly planned adventures. OSCE could play a useful role in
many areas, but getting it right in terms of planning,
support, and logistics would be crucial. The Ambassador
suggested OSCE observership in the September 12 JCMB meeting
in Kabul as a starting point. END SUMMARY


2. (C) During OSCE Secretary General Marc Perrin de
Brichambant's July 2 call on Ambassador Wood, he explained
that, at GOA request, OSCE will be looking at a border
project in the northeast to be supported by the OSCE office
in Tajikistan. OSCE will not have a permanent presence in
Afghanistan. The Secretary General indicated he needs the
Spanish Chair to sell it to the membership. He said he used
his meeting with President Karzai to encourage him address
the OSCE during a future trip to Europe. He cautioned that,
beyond this initial step, OSCE involvement in Afghanistan was
uncertain as the EU was already doing work in Afghanistan,
through the EU police training program which de Brichambant
characterized as "confused." The OSCE would work closely
with the Norwegians in Afghanistan but also wanted to work
with the U.S. and plug into supplemental funding from the
U.S. Only the U.S. can put the OSCE in the league for
middle-sized projects, he stressed.


3. (C) The Ambassador encouraged OSCE to look beyond police
training and border management projects. He highlighted
economic issues -- specifically assisting Afghanistan serve
as a Central Asian land bridge -- as also deserving
attention. The Ambassador cautioned against half-hearted and
poorly planned adventures. He described the EU's police
training program which had made no preparations to house
itself or set up communications. The EU was working out of
its headquarters rather than in the field. It was unclear
how the program was going to be a net gain. Coherence was
not just an Afghan problem, but an international community
one as well. There were many useful roles the OSCE could
play since Afghanistan needed everything, but getting it
right in terms of planning, support, and logistics would be
crucial. The Ambassador stressed the U.S. will continue to
be in Afghanistan in a big way. If the OSCE wanted to be a
player, it would need to prepare and think about the whole
package.


4. (C) The Ambassador noted that the JCMB had a natural
connection to OSCE issues. He suggested that the OSCE send
observers to a JCMB meeting, beginning with the September 12
meeting in Kabul, which will have a regional economic focus.
The Secretary General agreed. He recognized that there would
be a learning curve and that the OSCE did not need to be too
ambitious. The Secretary General noted it would be important
to link up with other key players. For example, UNAMA had
items on the table that they did not know how to address.
This includes election preparations. OSCE has experience in
this area, he stressed, but the issue appeared to be highly
politicized. The Secretary General reiterated that OSCE's
approach would be pragmatic, concrete, and step-by-step.
U.S. encouragement would be needed as well as U.S. funding,
he said.


WOOD