Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07JAKARTA908
2007-03-29 12:15:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Jakarta
Cable title:  

COMMISSION ON TRUTH AND FRIENDSHIP HEARINGS

Tags:  PREL PHUM PINS KAWC TT ID 
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FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4091
INFO RUEHZS/ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 0593
RUEHLI/AMEMBASSY LISBON 2949
RUEHWL/AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON 1429
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0586
RHHJJPI/USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 JAKARTA 000908 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/29/2017
TAGS: PREL PHUM PINS KAWC TT ID
SUBJECT: COMMISSION ON TRUTH AND FRIENDSHIP HEARINGS


Classified By: CDA John Heffers, reason 1.4 (b) and (d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 JAKARTA 000908

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/29/2017
TAGS: PREL PHUM PINS KAWC TT ID
SUBJECT: COMMISSION ON TRUTH AND FRIENDSHIP HEARINGS


Classified By: CDA John Heffers, reason 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary: Following up on two days of hearings in
Bali in February, the Commission of Truth and Friendship
Indonesia-Timor Leste (CTF) began a weeklong series of
hearings March 26-30. Featuring both prominent (Nobel Peace
Prize winner Bishop Belo and former Indonesian President
Habibie) and notorious (convicted militia leader Eurico
Gutteres and indicted Major General Makarim) personalities,
the hearings have reflected a polite style in dealing with
unpleasant subjects, provided witnesses extensive freedom to
expound on their views in a manner of their own choosing, and
are marked by a visible difference in questioning patterns
between the Indonesian and East Timorese commissioners. The
Indonesians solicited suggestions that the United Nations
bore responsibility for the violence as well as the existence
of a "culture of violence" in East Timor. The East Timorese
commissioners searched for allegations of Indonesian
government complicity. In probably the most surprising
statement, Bishop Belo acknowledged East Timor to be a
violent society. Former Indonesian officials/sympathizers
laid blame on Portugal, the United Nations and Indonesia
itself. We have been told by one commissioner that the CTF's
mandate, which expires at the end of July, is likely to be
extended another 6 months or a year. This message covers the
first three days of the hearings. End Summary


2. (C) The Commission of Truth and Friendship
Indonesia-Timor Leste (CTF) began a weeklong series of
hearings March 26-30. This second session of public hearings
follows two days of similar hearings held in Bali in
February. At that time, the most prominent witness was
former foreign minister Ali Alatas. Embassy personnel are
attending all the current testimony. During the first three
days, witnesses included former Dili Bishop Belo, former
Indonesian President Habibie, convicted pro-integrationist
militia leader Eurico Guterres and retired Major General
Zacky Anwar Makarim, who has been indicted by the Special

Crimes Unit. Several victim witnesses are scheduled to
appear as are Major Generals Suhartono Suratman and Adam
Damiri.


3. (C) Since the CTF does not have the power of subpoena, in
many cases commission members held multiple meetings to
persuade witnesses to appear. Testimony can also be taken in
private at the request of witnesses, as it was done March 27
for former President Habibie. The style of the testimony has
been to have each witness read a statement. Although the
witnesses are asked to keep their remarks to thirty minutes,
in practice they speak for as along as they wish and are
allowed to address any point, relevant or not, that they
choose. Once the statements are read commissioners are
called upon to ask for "clarifications" of the witnesses'
views. Questioning is not accusatory in tone and tends to be
politely phrased. Witnesses are free to avoid providing hard
answers, engage in lengthy diatribes or suggest that the
questions be addressed to others. Indonesian co-chairman
Benjamin Mangkudilaga and acting East Timorese co-chairman
Jacinto Alves taken turns presiding over the sessions.

The Testimony of Bishop Carlos Belo
--------------


4. (SBU) On March 26, the Commission heard from Bishop
Belo, who dedicated most of his presentation describing
events he saw and participated in as violence unfolded at the
time of the referendum on East Timor's future. He described
in detail a series of incidents involving killings and the
destruction of church property. Since he spoke in Portuguese
with consecutive translation into Indonesian, he eventually
chose to cut short his statement due to its length (note: all
the hearings have had concurrent translation into English).
He described the Catholic Church's role as one that sought
reconciliation and peace and as being institutionally neutral
as to the referendum's result. He acknowledged under
questioning that there were elements within the church that
supported independence but said that he did not encourage
proponents of either integration or independence. When East
Timorese commissioner Cristovao asked for an opinion as to
whether the destruction following the announcement of the
voting results reflected Indonesian government policy, Belo
declined to give a view. At one point he stated that an
Indonesian colonel told him that the unfolding violence was
at the behest of higher orders, but declined to speculate as
to what those orders were or where they came from.


JAKARTA 00000908 002 OF 004



5. (SBU) Indonesian Commissioner Agus Widjojo suggested to
the Bishop that the three principle causes of the violence
seemed to be the actions of Indonesian government personnel,
pro-independence elements within the Church and the culture
of violence within East Timor before the events of 1999. He
asked Belo for the Bishop's assessment of which of the three
was the largest cause of the violence. The Bishop declined
to express an opinion but then said that there was a
government apparatus and resistance to that apparatus
existed. He then described East Timor as a place where there
is no culture of peace but one of war that has existed since
the 16th or 17th centuries. The East Timorese only feel good
if they are at war, he said, and that it is in "our blood."
He called that attitude a contributing factor to the 1999
events. In response to other questions he denied knowledge
of any ballot fixing and affirmed that his own residence was
burned down when it was attacked by militia men throwing
Molotov cocktails. He said that the Indonesian military
tried to make the Church a party to the events, but affirmed
that he did not want the Church to play a political or social
role but only a moral one. He pushed back a suggestion that
the Church had some special relationship with the UN presence
(UNAMET).

Pro-Indonesia Militia Leader Eurico Guterres
--------------


6. (C) In marked contrast to the orderly presentation by the
Bishop, two days later Eurico Guterres, the only person
convicted in the Indonesian courts for gross violation of
human rights in the conflict, and who is currently serving a
ten-year sentence, made a long rambling presentation that was
all over the map. Its most distinguishing characteristic was
it illustrated the broad leeway and massive patience that the
CTF was ready to accord witnesses. Guterres' themes included
a lengthy discussion of the CTF's lack of utility, the need
to look at violence in East Timor's history since at least
1959, systematic criticism of Portugal, a clear sense of
betrayal by Indonesia, and denial that he forced populations
to move to West Timor. He called Bishop Belo a liar and
expressed hurt at being prevented from kissing the Bishop's
ring during reconciliation meetings when pro-independence
representatives were so permitted. He made regular reference
to the continued violence in East Timor. He was regularly
cheered on by supporters. When asked to place responsibility
for the events for 1999, Guterres repeated his swipe at
Portugal but said that the Indonesia was responsible for not
maintaining order as it should have in accordance with the
May 5, 1999 agreement.


7. (C) The most important aspect of this session is that
while all of the commissioners looked bored throughout his
near 90 minute ramble, they spoke to and about him with a
remarkable level of respect. Two East Timorese commissioners
stated that his criticism of the CTF was welcome input. Some
Indonesian commissioners spoke along the same lines. Most
notably, he was applauded by the commissioners themselves
when he made statements of goodwill for the future of the two
countries and East Timor itself. In closing, the East Timor
co-chair noted that the whole proceeding would air on East
Timorese television in the coming week and invited Guterres
to address the people there, which he did for some ten
minutes. The three hours ended with warm handshakes with the
Indonesian co-chair and a hug from the East Timorese one.
The session actually produced few facts, was mostly an
opportunity for a prisoner to shine light on himself but it
was used by the commission members as a mechanism to
encourage the concept of
reconciliation and that the East Timorese commissioners
seemed as comfortable proceeding along those lines, at least
in a public forum, as the Indonesian ones.

Major General Zacky Anwar Makarim
--------------


8. (SBU) Retired Major General Zacky Anwar Makarim, then
Chief of the Task Force for referendum security, spent his
time alleging a UNAMET conspiracy to bring about East
Timorese independence through a fraudulent vote result. His
thesis was that independence came about by design of the
United Nations, that Indonesia was politically weak at the
time and could not resist the pressure. He criticized then
Foreign Minister Ali Alatas as not being willing to challenge
UN fraud. He claimed that the UN recruited only
pro-independence staff and blocked others. He alleged that
pre-punched ballots were at the polling stations and claimed

JAKARTA 00000908 003 OF 004


that UN information campaigns were designed to encourage
votes for independence. He said that before the referendum
that both Alatas and Dino Djalal (currently a senior foreign
affairs adviser to the President, then assigned by the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs to support GOI operations in East
Timor) were protesting unfair actions by the UN. He also
described UNAMET personnel as being recruited from NGO's and
having little discipline, stating that one of them went to
Papua and was arrested there for engaging in activities with
independence activists there. He accused the UN of being
unwilling to listen to sound advice, such as imposing a
cooling off period by prohibiting campaigning for a few days
before the vote itself. He described UNAMET as too
Western-oriented in its thinking and unwilling to accept
Indonesia's experience drawn from national elections earlier
that year.


9. (SBU) When asked about being under indictment by the
Special Crimes Unit, Makarim said that most of the charges
related to events that occurred after he departed from East
Timor. He rejected them as false. He acknowledged that
security forces had committed crimes, but said they did not
amount to gross violation of human rights because they were
not a result of government policy. He also affirmed that the
violations that did occur were neither systematic nor
widespread. When asked if burning structures was policy, he
denied it and replied that burnings in East Timor were a
local habit. He said that burnings were a common form of
retribution there for all types of grievances and usually
caused a cycle of reprisals. Makarim cited Portugal as most
responsible for the events, due to the large numbers of
weapons it left behind in the territory, affirmed that
Indonesia was morally responsible for not preparing the
referendum in a safe way, criticized the UN for its actions
and cited the East Timorese themselves for making the
conflict excessive.

Former President Habibie
--------------


10. (SBU) Other testimony included private statements by
former President Habibie and public ones by two former
regency heads in East Timor. According to statements made by
Indonesian Commissioner Achmad Ali to the press, Habibie
blamed then UN Secretary General Kofi Annan for announcing
the referendum results three days earlier than had been
previously agreed, leaving the GOI unprepared for the
subsequent violence. He claimed that reinforcements to
prevent violence were still on the way to East Timor. Ali
suggested publicly that the Commission might try to invite
Kofi Annan to testify. The two former regents, Domingos
Mario dos Dores Soares and Martinho Fernandez, blamed UNAMET
partiality for the resulting violence. Soares said that
international solutions would not work in East Timor, citing
current violence in the country. Viquesque complained of a
lack of mechanisms to challenge electoral fraud.

Commission Will Need an Extension
--------------


11. (C) Commissioner Widjojo told PolCouns that the CTF, with
a mandate that expires July 31, was likely to receive a six
month or one year extension, since the report would not be
completed on time. He expected Presidential approval on the
Indonesian side and thought the East Timorese would agree.
When asked whether he thought the commissioners would be able
to produce a unanimous document, he responded that was a
challenge they would have to face. He noted that it took
nine months for the commissioners to agree to a common
interpretation of the terms of reference. A senior
Commission staffer told us separately that the Commission is
planning at least four to six more multiple day sessions in
the future. The locations and timing are yet to be
determined.


12. (C) Comment: While the testimony does not seem to be
breaking new ground with respect to what happened in 1999,
there was a clear theme of trying to bring about some form of
reconciliation between the two countries. The style of the
sessions is one of respect for the witnesses and careful
phrasing of the requests for "clarification." Commissioners
are generally avoiding communicating any sense of hostility
to the statements of the witnesses. Thus far, the sessions
gave the sense that they were designed more for public airing
of views, rather than a blow by blow description of events.
The Commission is spending much time trying to review the

JAKARTA 00000908 004 OF 004


many other reports that have been produced on the events of

1999. The overarching theme of the public hearings seems to
be to set a tone that reconciliation of the past should
happen and can be achieved.
HEFFERN