Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07JAKARTA706
2007-03-12 08:50:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Jakarta
Cable title:  

U.S. TEAM VISITS INDONESIA'S SULAWESI SEA AREA

Tags:  PTER ASEC EFIN KCRM KHLS KPAO ID 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO2389
OO RUEHCHI RUEHDT RUEHHM
DE RUEHJA #0706/01 0710850
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 120850Z MAR 07
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3798
INFO RUEHZS/ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS PRIORITY
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA PRIORITY 0512
RUEHWL/AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON PRIORITY 1385
RHHJJPI/USPACOM HONOLULU HI PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RHMCSUU/FBI WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 JAKARTA 000706 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EAP/MTS, S/CT, DS/IP/EAP, DS/DSS/ITA, DS/T/ATA,
DS/CC
DOJ FOR CTS THORNTON, AAG SWARTZ
FBI FOR ETTIU/SSA ROTH

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/12/2017
TAGS: PTER ASEC EFIN KCRM KHLS KPAO ID
SUBJECT: U.S. TEAM VISITS INDONESIA'S SULAWESI SEA AREA

REF: A. JAKARTA 00092

B. 2006 JAKARTA 10926

C. 2006 SECSTATE 143178

D. 2006 JAKARTA 07378

E. 2006 SECSTATE 115283

F. 2006 BANGKOK 02270

G. 2006 JAKARTA 03898

H. 2006 JAKARTA 1454

Classified By: Political Officer David Willis for reasons 1.4 (b) and (
d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 JAKARTA 000706

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EAP/MTS, S/CT, DS/IP/EAP, DS/DSS/ITA, DS/T/ATA,
DS/CC
DOJ FOR CTS THORNTON, AAG SWARTZ
FBI FOR ETTIU/SSA ROTH

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/12/2017
TAGS: PTER ASEC EFIN KCRM KHLS KPAO ID
SUBJECT: U.S. TEAM VISITS INDONESIA'S SULAWESI SEA AREA

REF: A. JAKARTA 00092

B. 2006 JAKARTA 10926

C. 2006 SECSTATE 143178

D. 2006 JAKARTA 07378

E. 2006 SECSTATE 115283

F. 2006 BANGKOK 02270

G. 2006 JAKARTA 03898

H. 2006 JAKARTA 1454

Classified By: Political Officer David Willis for reasons 1.4 (b) and (
d).


1. (C) Summary. In late January, a DS/ATA-led team of U.S.
and GOI security officials sponsored by S/CT assessed the
security needs along Indonesia's Sulawesi Sea border areas.
The visit was part of the Border Control Assessment
Initiative (BCAI) targeting the strategic
Indonesia-Malaysia-Philippines triborder area, in response to
a 2006 request by regional Chiefs of Mission. GOI officials
were supportive of the study and regarded it as directly
relevant to countering ongoing terrorist operations. Many
local officials appeared eager to make needed improvements,
while the team observed a general lack of security equipment,
training, standard procedures and coordination among law
enforcement agencies. The local GOI Immigration and Customs
capabilities were the most underdeveloped and neither agency
exercised control over the area's ports of entry. The GOI's
difficulties in overcoming even the most basic operational
challenges indicates that foreign assistance remains crucial
in order for GOI agencies to secure this important border
area. The release of the team's study, expected later this
month, will create an opportunity for USG and partner nations
to work with the GOI to develop the capabilities required to
improve border security, including the monitoring and
interdicting of terrorists and other transnational criminals
and the routes they exploit. We need to find the necessary
resources to make the most of this opportunity. End Summary.


2. (SBU) A nine-member DS/ATA-led team of U.S. and GOI
security officials conducted a January 23-29 visit of

Indonesia's Sulawesi Sea border areas to meet with local GOI
officials and assess the security needs there. The
S/CT-sponsored visit was part of the Department's Border
Control Assessment Initiative (BCAI) directed at the
strategic Indonesia-Malaysia-Philippines triborder area, in
response to a 2006 request by regional Chiefs of Mission
(Refs E, H). The team consisted of six U.S. officials from
DS/ATA, the U.S. Coast Guard, DHS/CBP, DHS/ICE,
DOD/JIATF-West and DOJ/ICITAP, as well as three GOI officials
from the Indonesian National Police (INP),Immigration and
Customs. An Embassy officer accompanied the team throughout
the assessment.


3. (SBU) During a January 23 pre-trip meeting with GOI
officials, (ret) INP Inspector General Ansyaad Mbai, head of
the National CT Coordinating Desk, told the assessment team
of the direct relevance of the triborder area to ongoing
terrorist operations. Using a large wall-size relief map of
the archipelago, Mbai pointed out the traditional
cross-border channels in East Kalimantan and the
Sangihe-Talaud islands of North Sulawesi used by terrorists
and other transnational criminals. He told the team that he
hoped the study would build momentum and support for the
assistance needed to secure these areas, and that he hoped we
would not find ourselves returning to this point every few
years to conduct yet another initial assessment. As a
parting instruction, Mbai urged the team's three GOI members
to ensure local officials facilitated the team's work, and
said the border study comprised part of our ongoing bilateral
cooperation.


4. (C) Starting with Manado and Bitung in North Sulawesi,
followed by Balikpapan, Tarakan and Nunukan in East
Kalimantan, the team met with local INP, Immigration and
Customs officials and conducted site visits to observe the
security tools and procedures in place at important transit
locations. The closer to the border and the further from
Jakarta the team traveled, the more meager the GOI investment
in security measures became. Previous Post observations
(Refs A, G) were confirmed in the general lack of security
equipment, training, standard procedures and coordination

JAKARTA 00000706 002 OF 002


among law enforcement agencies, despite an apparent eagerness
among many local officials to improve overall security.


5. (C) The team's DHS members noted that the GOI Immigration
and Customs offices functioned at the most basic levels, and
were as much as 30 years behind the times. Neither
Immigration nor Customs were seen as exercising control over
the area's ports of entry. While visiting the formal
cross-border maritime entry point in Nunukan, team members
witnessed few security procedures in place: nearly all the
baggage and passengers arriving on the ferry from Tawao,
Malaysia went unchecked. Neither agency appeared to have a
strategy for continuous improvement or professional
development, nor did they perceive themselves as having a
role as a law enforcement authority. Except for the INP, the
agencies did not maintain the ability to conduct serious
investigations, detentions or arrests. In the rare instance
where Immigration or Customs detained someone, they told the
team, no restraints were used either in transporting or in
detaining the person.


6. (C) The lack of a baseline from which to assess either the
threat or the GOI response complicates the effort to develop
recommendations for improving security. None of the GOI
agencies maintained a reliable set of statistics, performance
indicators or standardized reporting system, and local
officials were hardpressed to point to recent arrests related
to crossing the border. Nonetheless, INP and other GOI
security officials continue to assert that transnational
criminals, including terrorists, currently use official
maritime ports of entry as their primary crossing points when
transiting among Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Southern
Philippines. Former Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) member Nasir Abas
confirmed to us recently that the JI continues to actively
use the border crossing between Nunukan and Tawau.


7. (C) The GOI's difficulty in overcoming even the most
primitive operational challenges, such as fuel to operate
existing assets, suggests that foreign assistance will remain
essential for GOI agencies to achieve the more advanced level
of readiness needed to secure this important border area. As
a case in point, the GOI Immigration Department's
International Cooperation Section contacted the Embassy
shortly after completing the border trip to request
assistance to publish internal resource manuals on
identifying fraudulent documents and conducting border
operations that the office had recently compiled but lacked
the resources to publish and distribute. Also, the Mission
will use funds from an existing Department of Defense program
to publish and distribute the manuals to GOI Immigration
field offices, including in the triborder area. The release
of the team's study, expected later this month, will create
an opportunity for USG and partner nations to work with the
GOI to develop the capabilities required to improve border
security, including the interdiction of terrorists and other
transnational criminals and the monitoring and control of the
routes they exploit. We need to find the necessary resources
to make the most of this opportunity.

HEFFERN