INDONESIA'S DETACHMENT 88 HITTING ITS STRIDE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 JAKARTA 000545

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EAP/MTS, S/CT, DS/IP/EAP, DS/DSS/ITA, DS/T/ATA,
DS/CC
DOJ FOR CTS THORNTON, AAG SWARTZ
FBI FOR ETTIU/SSA ROTH

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/28/2017
TAGS: PTER ASEC EFIN KCRM KHLS KPAO ID
SUBJECT: INDONESIA'S DETACHMENT 88 HITTING ITS STRIDE

REF: A. JAKARTA 00292

B. JAKARTA 00248

C. 06 JAKARTA 05485

D. 05 JAKARTA 14789

E. 03 STATE 310662

Classified By: Political Officer David Willis for reasons 1.4 (b) and (
d)


1. (C) SUMMARY: Since first emerging in the wake of the 2002
Bali terror attacks, Detachment 88 has begun to establish
itself as the counterterrorism flagship of the Indonesian
National Police (INP). A growing list of successful CT
operations marks the Detachment's maturing capabilities.
Recently, its CT operations again drew criticism from Jemaah
Islamiyah (JI) leader Abu Bakar Ba'asyir, who repeated his
calls for the dissolution of the Detachment. Since 2002,
foreign donors have focused CT assistance on the elite cadre
of officers in Detachment 88, many of whom are drawn from the
INP's existing special units. This steady stream of foreign
assistance has given important support to Indonesia's effort
to combat violent extremism; in particular, the U.S.
Antiterrorism Assistance (ATA) program and Australian and
United Kingdom assistance continues to develop the
Detachment's tactical capabilities. The Detachment still
faces several internal INP challenges before it becomes fully
functional, such as stabilizing its relationship with the
INP's CT Taskforce ("Team Bomb") and developing a rank
advancement plan that will retain INP officers in CT units.
Lifting the 2003 ban on using International Narcotics and Law
Enforcement (INCLE) funding to train INP Mobile Brigade units
would help us broaden our training to include the units most
in need of assistance. END SUMMARY

Police CT Success Attracts Ire of Extremists
--------------


2. (C) JI leader Abu Bakar Ba'asyir and other associated with
the JI-linked Majelis Mujahedin Indonesia (MMI) have again
targeted the INP with public calls to dissolve its CT
flagship, Detachment 88, after widely publicized INP
operations in January against Central Sulawesi militants. In
late January, both Ba'asyir and MMI Chairman Fauzan Al
Anshori in separate statements accused Detachment 88 of
conducting a war against Muslims in Poso and intentionally
ignoring the crimes committed by Christians there. These and
other recent criticisms launched against the INP have largely
failed to gain traction among the general public and, unlike
previous occasions, failed to weaken the INP's resolve to
continue to pursue the Central Sulawesi extremists behind
much of that area's violence. (Ref B) The GOI has no plans
to change course on Detachment 88, or the pursuit of violent
extremists.


3. (C) Detachment 88 continues to make significant progress
in Indonesia's fight against terrorism and is playing an
increasingly important role. The unit's growing list of
accomplishments includes the recent nabbing of over 25
Central Sulawesi extremists and numerous successful raids of
JI safehouses throughout the archipelago. Formed in the wake
of the 2002 Bali terror attacks, the Detachment represents a
massive combined Indonesian and international assistance
effort to create within the INP an effective anti-terror and
crisis response element.

Structure of National and Local CT Detachments
-------------- --


4. (SBU) INP directives in June 2003 and March 2005 detail
the organizational structure of Detachment 88. The roughly
350-person Detachment at the national INP headquarters
remains the first and the largest of the CT units. Also
identified as Directorate VI under the INP's national
Criminal Investigative Division (CID),the Detachment has a
chief, a deputy and four sub-chiefs, each of whom directs one
of the four sub-units: Intelligence, Investigations,
Operations, and Logistics. The organization of the
detachments at the regional INP level is a smaller-scale
mirror image of the headquarters structure.


5. (SBU) The 2005 directive identifies six regionally
deployed, 100-person detachments designed to facilitate the

JAKARTA 00000545 002 OF 004


INP's response to local crises. The six units, located in
North Sumatra, Jakarta Metro Jaya, East Java, Bali, South
Sulawesi and Papua, are directly under the authority of the
respective regional police chief. Although the INP plans
eventually to deploy 75-person units in at least 20 of the
country's 33 provinces, our police contacts have told us the
initial six regional units (listed above) will retain an AOR
beyond their respective province.

Special Police Units Form Detachment 88 Backbone
-------------- ---


6. (SBU) The Detachment's crisis response teams (CRTs),
organizationally housed under the Operations sub-unit, are by
far the most talked-about of its four components. These
forces are drawn almost exclusively from the INP's 30,000 man
Mobile Brigade special-operations unit, which has maintained
the INP's highest physical and tactical standards since its
formation over 60 years ago. The Mobile Brigade gained
notoriety during its checkered service in conflict areas like
East Timor, Aceh and Papua under the regime of former
Indonesian President Soeharto. Mobile Brigade headquarters
is located a short distance outside Jakarta at the INP's
Kelapa Dua facility, though many of the INP provincial
commands include a local Mobile Brigade detachment.


7. (SBU) Among the Mobile Brigade's most distinct elements is
Gegana, initially formed in the 1970s as an independent INP
unit to handle terror incidents, search-and-rescue operations
and explosive ordnance disposal. It was subsumed by Mobile
Brigade under a 1995 INP reorganization, and placed alongside
the Brigade's two Ranger units. Currently, Gegana has
between 8,000 and 10,000 personnel and maintains its unique
name and mission. The majority of Gegana personnel are based
at Kelapa Dua, though a few Gegana personnel are deployed to
provincial police commands among the regular local Mobile
Brigade detachments. The crisis response force attached to
the INP Headquarters Detachment consists exclusively of
Gegana personnel, whereas the crisis response elements at the
provincial INP commands consist primarily of local Mobile
Brigade personnel. ATA CRT training does not use
International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INCLE) funding
and thus is able to train Mobile Brigade personnel. (Ref A)
However, INP personnel selected for ATA training are
carefully vetted for human rights violations before training
begins.


8. (SBU) In addition to providing a ready source of recruits
for Detachment 88, the Mobile Brigade provides support to
major CT field operations. The January INP operations in
Central Sulawesi provide a recent example. The INP officer
who led the January 11 and January 22 safehouse raids told us
recently that Gegana and Mobile Brigade units from Jakarta
had deployed to assist the local Mobile Brigade detachments
in supporting the Detachment's operations. While Detachment
88 CRTs from Jakarta and Central Sulawesi conducted the
raids, the Gegana and Mobile Brigade units from Jakarta
surrounded the target area, forming the first and second
perimeter, respectively. (Note: Mobile Brigade personnel
already in Poso have included other units called in to assist
from regional police commands in East Kalimantan and North
and South Sulawesi. INP contacts explained that Jakarta
units, not local units, were so heavily involved in
supporting the actual raids as a measure to avoid increasing
tensions between residents and local police units already on
the ground.)

International Aid Vital to Jakarta's CT Fight
--------------


9. (SBU) Significant assistance from international donors has
been critical to Indonesia's recent progress in combating
Islamic militants. Diplomatic Security Service's ATA program
remains the primary trainer of Detachment 88's CRTs, having
trained approximately 240 strike-force officers since
training began in 2003. CRT 11 began training 24 officers
from Papua on February 26, and training of CRT 12 is slated
for later this year.


10. (SBU) ATA conducts most of the CRT training at the INP's
CID training facility in Megamendung, located in the hills
south of Jakarta, where ATA maintains an office and training

JAKARTA 00000545 003 OF 004


grounds. The ATA's basic six-week course gives each
24-person training class both classroom and practical
training in human rights, arrest techniques, weapons, close
quarter combat, sniper skills, assault planning, and
breaching. The ATA's CRT Instructor Development Course has
provided additional "train-the-trainer" instruction to over
36 individually selected CRT graduates to build a corps of
competent CRT instructors within the INP. Of these 36
trainers, 23 have attended additional ATA courses in training
management. Several of these INP trainers participate as
instructors in each running of the basic CRT course.


11. (SBU) After successful completion of the CRT training,
ATA equips the newly minted teams with the weapons, personal
gear, breaching kits, communication equipment, and some of
the tactical vehicles needed to be operational upon their
return to the Detachment-88 unit at their home regional
command. ATA records indicate the following CRT deployments
(Note: The "CRT" designation listed below is a reference to
that specific CRT training class):

--Jakarta, INP Headquarters (CRT 1; 24 Officers)
--Jakarta, Metro Jaya (CRT 2; 24 Officers)
--Medan, North Sumatra (CRT 3; 24 Officers)
--Denpasar, Bali (CRT 4; 24 Officers)
--Yogyakarta, Central Java (Co-located with INP Headquarter
CRT) (CRT 5, 10; 24 Officers)
--Manado, North Sulawesi (CRT 6; 12 Officers)
--Makassar, South Sulawesi (CRT 6; 12 Officers)
--Palu, Central Sulawesi (CRT 7; 12 Officers)
--Ambon, Maluku (CRT 7; 12 Officers)
--Bandung, West Java (CRT 8; 12 Officers)
--Surabaya, East Java (CRT 8, 10; 24 Officers)
--Riau (CRT 9; 12 Officers)
--Balikpapan, East Kalimantan (CRT 9; 12 Officers)
--Jayapura, Papua (CRT 11; 24 Officers) (Pending)


12. (SBU) Graduates of the CRT program have played key roles
in Indonesia's counterterror effort. In addition to CRT 1
and CRT 7 participation in the January Central Sulawesi
operations, CRT 1 and CRT 5 conducted the April 2006 raid in
Wonosobo, Central Java, and the November 2005 raid in Malang,
East Java which took out the JI's main bombmakers. (Ref C,D)
The explosives uncovered in these operations were defused and
analyzed by INP graduates of the ATA's explosiveQcident
countermeasures training.


13. (C) While a large part of the funding for ATA's programs
with the INP -- $8 million (2003),$4.3 million (2004),$5.1
million (2005),and $4 million (2006) -- is currently
directed towards training and equipping CRTs, ATA also
provides the INP with other course offerings. Since 2003,
the ATA has trained approximately 65 INP officers on
explosive-incident countermeasures, approximately 48 INP
officers on both post blast investigations and
cyber-terrorism, and 22 INP officers on major case-management
techniques. ATA is also training and equipping two INP
canine explosive detection units, a total of 25 handlers and
25 dogs. ATA sponsored seven Detachment 88 officers to
attend the 2006 Tactical Officers Association Conference in
Los Angeles, where INP headquarters Detachment 88 Chief Bekto
Suprapto and his Intelligence Chief, Tito Karnavian, gave a
presentation on terrorism in Indonesia. The FBI (Jakarta's
Legal Attache office),ICITAP, and JIATF-West are in
discussions with the INP to conduct a post blast
investigation course later in 2007 that will include
Detachment 88 officers. Other offices in the Mission,
including the Department of Defense, also are planning
complimentary training opportunities with the INP, under the
DS/ATA umbrella, including events in May and July that will
offer advanced special operations training to Detachment 88
CRTs.


14. (C) Australia and the United Kingdom have focused their
respective programs on equally vital needs in the
Detachment's investigative and intelligence arms, including
providing surveillance, counter-surveillance, and technical
analytic training and equipment. Recent UK training
objectives for Detachment 88 included resource management and
operational planning courses, training on developing standard
operating procedures, surveillance training and equipment
(coordinated with the Japanese) and intelligence network

JAKARTA 00000545 004 OF 004


training.

Internal Rough Spots Still Need Smoothing
--------------


15. (C) Several important challenges facing Detachment 88
still await resolution:

-- Although the INP has developed Detachment 88 as its
primary CT operational arm, the INP's informal CT Taskforce
("Team Bomb") predates the Detachment by several years and
remains a serious CT player. The Taskforce is a highly
effective informal collection of experienced CID
investigators under the direction of the INP's CID Deputy,
Inspector General Gories Mere, and CID Directorate I Chief,
Brigadier General Surya Dharma. Although significant
operational coordination and cooperation occurs between the
two CT units, internal distrust and tension remain periodic
problems.

-- Mobile Brigade forces receive a special financial
entitlement which they lose upon joining a Detachment-88 CRT.
This presents a unique challenge to identifying, recruiting,
training, deploying and retaining the best officers for the
Detachment. Also, CT work is not typically rewarded by rank
advancement, so Detachment 88 officers will eventually have
to leave in search of career progression.

-- Not all CRTs are assigned fulltime to Detachment 88 units
or remain an identifiable team after their training, but
remain in their previous positions until activated in a time
of crisis. As a result, Detachment-88 leaders will
frequently deploy the INP Headquarters CRT to areas under
regional police commands to avoid a cumbersome and deeply
bureaucratic process required by some local Mobile Brigade
commanders to request permission to deploy a local CRT
consisting of Mobile Brigade members under their command.Qurther indicative of
the lack of support from some field
commanders, the West Java Mobile Brigade commander has a
reputation for redistributing the equipment of CRT graduates
under his command to his senior-level officers, despite a
strongly worded internal communiqu from INP Chief Sutanto
forbidding the practice.

-- Lack of a central location in some INP commands to house
the Detachment-88 personnel, including CRTs and equipment,
contributes to the problems outlined above. The ATA program
has begun to discuss with the INP the possibility of building
a separate facility for the Detachment at INP headquarters to
house CRT 1 members and their equipment, currently located at
the Mobile Brigade's Kelapa Dua headquarters. Similar INP
initiatives to develop separate facilities for other CRTs are
underway in some regions outside Jakarta.

COMMENT:
--------------

16. (C) The ATA program is crucial to the INP's CT effort and
Post strongly supports this program's continued engagement
with the INP. This and other Mission programs help push the
INP to make necessary institutional changes, and complement
other Department of State programs, such as those funded by
International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INCLE). Post
continues to urge Washington to lift the 2003 restriction
prohibiting the use of INCLE funding to train Mobile Brigade
units, so we can broaden our support for the INP, including
in areas of human rights. (Ref A, E)

HEFFERN